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This study offers a new approach to language attitudes and ideologies which applies 
argumentation theory in a discourse-based analysis of the processes of sociolinguistic 
indexicality. This method is presented in the context of the previously-used discourse-
based approaches to language attitudes which are reviewed here in terms of their 
contributions to the understanding of the creation of socio-indexical meanings in 
discourse. The review proposes a five-level typology which includes topic-oriented, 
linguistic, cognitive, interactional, and rhetorical levels of analysis.  
 
This study explores the potential of the New Rhetoric theory developed by Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) to serve as an overarching framework which can help cohere 
multidisciplinary perspectives on language use and social relations in the analysis of folk-
linguistic discourse. This approach allows for an analysis of the rhetorical connectedness 
of discursive acts that contribute to semiotic construals of folk-linguistic beliefs at 
different levels of discourse organization.  
 
This dissertation proposes that a sociolinguistic study may use as a starting point of 
analysis a specific locally-salient folk-concept and shows that this type of analytic focus 
may be productive in exploring the metapragmatic functioning of folk-concepts in the 
context-specific activations of the fluid fields of sociolinguistic indexical relations. As a 
result of applying the proposed rhetorically-oriented method, this study provides new 
perspectives on how language users argumentatively construct conceptual associations 
between language-related and social representations in everyday discourse. It discusses 
the ways in which propositional processes of sociolinguistic indexicality engage 
experiential, affective, performative, perceptual, and identity-related processes: 
participants demonstrate these interrelated engagements in everyday metalinguistic 
discourse when they rationalize, justify, valorize, and illustrate their individual 
experiences with linguistic variability. The metapragmatic aspects of such constructions 
include discursive processes of objectivation, essentialization, and reification of 
sociolinguistic distinctiveness, as well as constructions of the clustering of linguistic and 
social typifications that create indexical profiles of speaking styles and index symbolic 
boundaries between social groups. These processes reveal how speakers appropriate the 
meaning potential of linguistic variables and conceptualize it in discursive constructions 
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1.1 Opening Remarks 
This study offers a new discourse-based approach to language attitudes and ideologies 
which explores the potential of the New Rhetoric theory developed by Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1969) to serve as an overarching framework that can help cohere multidisciplinary 
perspectives on language use and social relations in the analysis of folk-linguistic discourse 
(Rodgers, 2016, in press). The proposed rhetorical approach to language attitudes and ideologies 
is situated in the context of the previously-used discourse-based methods which are reviewed here 
in terms of a five-level typology that includes topic-oriented, linguistic, cognitive, interactional, 
and rhetorical levels of analysis (Rodgers, in press). 
This dissertation proposes that the expression of language attitudes, ideologies, and 
language-related beliefs can be examined in terms of what I call “propositional processes of 
sociolinguistic indexicality” – discursive, metalinguistic processes of meaning creation that 
language users engage in when they reflect and comment on linguistic differences. This 
dissertation also develops the idea that a sociolinguistic study may use as a starting point of 
analysis a specific locally-salient folk-concept. I illustrate this type of analytic focus and show 
that it may be productive in exploring the metapragmatic functioning of folk-concepts in the 




 This dissertation begins with a brief introduction (chapter 1), followed by a thorough review 
of the previously-used discourse-based approaches to language attitudes and ideologies organized as a 
five-level typology (chapter 2). Next comes a presentation of selected aspects of the New Rhetoric 
theory with examples of data analysis illustrating the application of each aspect to the analysis of 
folk-linguistic discourse (chapter 3). Chapter 4 presents an application of the proposed rhetorical 
approach to the analysis which is focused on a specific folk-linguistic concept “twang.” The final 
chapter gives a summary of the theoretical and methodological proposals, as well as a summary of 
findings from the analysis, a brief discussion, and conclusions (chapter 5).  
 I begin this chapter with a presentation of the recent theoretical views of sociolinguistic 
variation in terms of the social-semiotic theory and a theory of indexicality. Against the context of 
these developments, I continue with my proposal that a sociolinguistic investigation may use a salient 
folk-linguistic concept as the starting point of analysis.  In the final section, I use a theory of 
metapragmatics to present my analysis of how folk-linguistic discourse may be viewed in terms of 
metasemiotic activity.      
1.3 Sociolinguistic Variation as a Social-Semiotic System 
Recent sociolinguistic and linguistic-anthropological work has developed the idea that the 
nature of the social meaning of linguistic variation may be understood in terms of indexical relations 
between linguistic and social forms. The concept of “indexicality” was mainly introduced into the 
fields of semiotics, philosophy of language, linguistics, and anthropology through Charles S. Peirce’s 
semiotic theory of sign processes and his influential tripartite distinction between the modes of 
relationship between a semiotic sign and what a sign signifies. These modes include (1) a symbolic 
mode, in which signs are used as arbitrary, agreed upon, or conventional signs, (2) an iconic mode in 
which a sign resembles or imitates what is signified, and (3) an indexical mode, in which a sign 
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indicates its relation to what is signified: this relation can be observed or inferred, and it is based on 
“association by contiguity” (Chandler, 2007, pp. 36-37).  
Understanding the relations between linguistic signs and social forms in terms of the social-
semiotic notion of indexicality has led to the developments in what is known as the “third-wave” of 
sociolinguistic variation studies. Such studies (e.g., Babel, 2014; Johnstone et al., 2006; Johnstone, 
2010; Moore & Podesva, 2009) underscore the importance of exploring the processes of indexicality 
as they relate to language variation. While earlier studies of the “first wave” explored the relations 
between linguistic variables and macrosocial categories, the “second-wave” work used ethnographic 
methods to study local social categories and their configurations in relation to linguistic variability 
(Eckert, 2012, p. 87). The “third wave” of work on sociolinguistic variation introduced the “stylistic 
perspective”: instead of viewing individuals as belonging to static sociological categories, these 
studies focused on how speakers use the social meaningfulness of linguistic variability to create their 
social identities through styles of speech (2012, p. 94). In “third-wave” studies, according to Eckert 
(2012), the social meaning of linguistic variation is viewed in terms of its social-semiotic indexical 
meaning potential which is realized in what Eckert (2008) calls “indexical fields”: 
… the meanings of variables are not precise or fixed but rather constitute a field of potential 
meanings – an indexical field, or constellation of ideologically related meanings, any one of 
which can be activated in the situated use of the variable.  The field is fluid, and each new 
activation has the potential to change the field by building on ideological connections. Thus 
variation constitutes an indexical system that embeds ideology in language and that is in turn 
part and parcel of the construction of ideology (p. 453, emphasis in the original).    
Silverstein’s (1993; 2003) and Eckert’s (2008; 2012) theoretical proposals to view 
sociolinguistic variation in terms of the theory of indexicality have been influential in promoting the 
research on production and perception of linguistic variables that focuses on how linguistic features 
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and other signs are used to index particular social identities and practices. However, such studies 
often supply researchers’ interpretations of the relations between a sign and an object of signification, 
while language users’ own interpretations of these relations may remain obscured, especially if 
ethnographic approaches are not used.  
1.4  Folk-linguistic Concept as a Starting Point of Analysis in Sociolinguistic Inquiry  
Traditionally, in the sociolinguistic approaches based on the Labovian (Labov, 1972) 
variationist paradigm, the starting point and the focus of the analysis have been on a particular 
isolated sociolinguistic variable. It appears, however, that there has been an insufficient focus in 
sociolinguistic work on investigations of language users’ interpretations of the indexical relations 
between linguistic and social forms and of the ways such relations become developed in specific 
contexts of meaning-making. It also appears that the study of sociolinguistic indexical meanings has 
often been approached without due consideration of lay people’s conceptualizations of what 
constitutes a linguistic sign and its social object and which features determine the relation of 
signification between them.  
The problem is that dialectologists’ terminology and understandings of linguistic features in 
variation, categorization of such features, and their placing in the linguistic, geographic, and social 
systems may differ considerably from the understandings of the same phenomena by lay people 
(Niedzielski & Preston, 2003). While linguists approach these questions from the point of view of 
research-based factual knowledge and carefully-developed scientific theories, lay people use their 
own terminology, “facts,” and theories characterized by meanings derived from systems of socially 
shared typifications or from individual interpretations of and experiences with linguistic and social 
distinctiveness. The terms such as “South Midland” or “glide deletion,” for example, do not mean 
much to non-dialectologists in the US, while the terms such as “speaking country,” “twang,” and 
“drawl” are meaningful to many language users in signaling linguistic distinctions in American 
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English as well as divisions along social and geographical boundaries. Linguists’ and non-linguists’ 
vocabularies and theories about language use in society result from different reflexive processes, but 
“dialects” and “varieties” are mainly defined in sociolinguistics based on the “artefacts of the ways 
sociolinguists talk about talk” (Johnstone, 2006b, p. 463). In the traditional variationist approach, 
“sociolects and dialects are conceived as attributes of social aggregates that can in principle be 
distinguished by the analyst without attention to the reflexive activities of their members” (Agha, 
2007, p. 135). One of the difficulties with this approach is that it doesn’t take into account language 
users’ perspective in the social interpretation of empirical results derived from correlational analyses 
(p. 135). A related problem is the fact that when linguistic features are extracted from their contexts 
of use, it “obscures the processes of reanalysis through which social indexical values are assigned to 
these pieces” (p. 136). In those cases when linguists and lay people use the same term referring to a 
linguistic distinction, the social meanings that are relevant to lay people may differ considerably from 
the specialists’ understandings, as is the case with rich folk conceptualizations of the notion 
“nasality,” for example (Niedzielski & Preston, 2003, pp. 5-6). In spite of the widely-acknowledged 
importance of language ideologies, especially as it emerges in the recent applications of social 
semiotics and indexicality theory in sociolinguistics, folk-linguistic terms have often been disregarded 
as “vague” and “ambiguous” by sociolinguists, and the meanings of such concepts have often been 
interpreted in terms of specialists’ definitions, or dictionary definitions, or in terms of researchers’ 
intuitions. A specific example will be given later in this dissertation using the case of the folk-term 
“twang” to illustrate this point further, in more detail. 
Another issue to consider is that linguistic variants of the same variable may function as 
independent social indices of multiple social meanings. As Campbell-Kibler (2010) has shown for 
ING variants in English, “each variant occupies its own position in the same or related indexical 
fields” (p. 437).  This independent semiotic functioning of the variants of the same variable suggests 
that using an isolated linguistic variable as the point of departure in the sociolinguistic analysis may 
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limit our understanding of how linguistic features fit into the social landscape of their use and how 
they cluster with other features to form ideologically meaningful social distinctions in various 
hierarchically organized semiotic configurations.   
The starting point of analysis in sociolinguistic inquiry may be a folk-linguistic or social 
concept and its meaningfulness to language users as part of language ideologies in a particular speech 
community. In Silverstein’s (2003) and Agha’s (2007) terms, folk-linguistic concepts constitute 
“ethnometapragmatic terminology” – distinctive vocabularies that are used to create typifications of 
social phenomena. They are used to accomplish various types of metasemiotic work: 
… to typify the form and meaning of behaviors, and to classify persons, identities, group 
membership, and other facts of social being in relation to behavior … such terminologies 
share characteristics of very general consequence. The very fact that they are terms or 
vocabularies … entails that they are very easily decontextualized from use in one event and 
recontextualized in other events to form typifications of phenomena occurring elsewhere. 
They are devices which, by their linguistic design, are pre-eminently capable of circulation 
through social space and of creating unities among disparate events. They are also devices 
whose meaning may be codified, linked to criteria of authenticity and essence. Once codified, 
attributes held essential to the class can be used to evaluate the range of attributes actually 
displayed by persons in behavior, thus providing normative criteria that convert facts of 
social difference into measures of rank or hierarchy (Agha, 2007, pp. 74-75).   
Considering the rich indexical potential of folk-linguistic (“ethnometapragamtic”) concepts 
functioning in interaction as typifying metasemiotic signs, they can be usefully taken up as objects of 
discourse-based investigations of text-level indexicality aimed at analyzing how these metasemiotic 
signs point to a range of other semiotic micro- and macro-level phenomena and their relationships 
relevant to discourse-based ideological constructions of sociolinguistic distinctiveness.      
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More specifically, using folk-linguistic concepts as a point of departure in sociolinguistic 
analysis may reveal the clustering of variables that is meaningful to language users in terms of social 
significance of interrelated sets of variables indexing social and linguistic distinctions and 
typifications. It can also reveal how these meanings relate to both the macro-social level of broader 
language ideologies functioning as socially shared stereotypes and to the micro-social level of 
situated interaction. This type of analytic focus offers a different way of conceptualizing the study of 
the social meaning of language variation: this type of inquiry puts the meanings relevant to language 
users’ understandings at the center of analytical attention. Such an analytical framework can cohere 
the results from the mainstream sociolinguistic studies since the data on perception and production of 
isolated variables should be theorized not only in terms of sociolinguists’ theories and dialectologists’ 
maps: it is important to see how these data and theories correspond to the language-ideological 
systems of folk-linguistic distinctions that place linguistic variables in a certain social, cultural, 
geographical, or temporal context of language use. A better understanding of folk-linguistic theories 
can shed light on the cognitive processes of linguistic perception: it has recently been shown that 
ideological models may create expectations that have the potential to structure low-level, automatic 
perceptions of the use of specific linguistic variants (D’Onofrio, 2015). Some examples of the recent 
sociolinguistic work centered on language users’ meanings of specific folk linguistic concepts include 
Johnstone’s studies of Pittsburghese (Johnstone et al., 2006), Oxley’s (2015) study of “Southernness,” 
and Hall-Lew and Stephens’ (2012) study of “country talk.” To draw a parallel with ethnographic 
approaches, Eckert’s (2000) groundbreaking study of “Jocks” and “Burnouts” had as its starting point 
of analysis a social distinction which was locally significant to the participants rather than an isolated 
linguistic variable pre-selected by the researcher.    
Theoretical and methodological foundations that can be used in studying language users’ 
conceptions of linguistic variability and its social meanings have been developed in the fields of folk 
linguistics (Niedzielski & Preston, 2003) and perceptual dialectology (Long & Preston, 2002). Folk-
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linguistic conceptualizations can also be analyzed in terms of the social-semiotic theory of 
metapragmatics and indexicality (Silverstein, 2003). This theoretical connection is taken up and 
developed in the next section. 
1.5 Folk-linguistic Discourse as a Metasemiotic Activity  
In Pierce’s theory of signs, the relation between a sign and its object of signification is a 
matter of interpretation: the “effect” it has on a person is what Pierce calls “an interpretant” (Pierce, 
1998, p. 478, as cited in Atkin, 2013). For Pierce, only selected features of the sign enable it to signify 
the object, and selected characteristics of the object enable it to be signified by the sign; what is 
important is the connection that exists between the sign and the object – the understanding of this 
signifying relation, its “translation” and “development” form “the interpretant” (Atkin, 2013). The 
functioning of the “interpretants” of a sign’s relation to its object of signification determines the 
property of the mutability of semiotic relations. This functioning is context-bound since the mode in 
which a sign is used depends on the user’s purposes and the context of use: “A sign may consequently 
be treated as symbolic by one person, as iconic by another and as indexical by a third” (Chandler, 
2007, p. 45). In Pierce’s theory, the mode of relationship between a sign and its object of signification 
may also change over time (p. 45).  
The potential for reinterpretation of sign relations in certain contexts of use and over time is 
what constitutes a sign’s meaning potential. Language users explore this meaning potential as they 
employ linguistic signs to evoke, modify, or create social meanings. This meaning-making process is 
crucial to an understanding of how language variation works as an indexical system that embeds 
ideology. Language users may be to some extent aware of this process; they may comment on it or 
refer to sociolinguistic indexical relations implicitly. In such explicit and implicit references, not only 
do they evoke the existing indexical relations in certain regions of an indexical field, they may also 
9 
 
modify such relations, create new relations, or select new features of the sign or its object that enable 
new signifying relations to emerge.  
Folk-linguistic discourse may be seen as a metacognitive, metapragmatic activity which 
represents participants’ interpretations of the signification of linguistic and socially-meaningful signs 
that function as interrelated indices of the object of signification (Silverstein, 1993). Silverstein 
introduced the notions of “metapragmatic phenomena” (1976, pp. 48-51), including “metapragmatic 
functions” and “metapragmatic discourse” (1993), and developed these notions within the framework 
of indexicality theory:  
Signs functioning metapragmatically have pragmatic phenomena – indexical sign phenomena 
– as their semiotic objects. They thus have an inherently “framing,” or “regimenting,” or 
“stipulative” character with respect to indexical phenomena (p. 33).  
When language users comment on linguistic distinctions and express their beliefs about 
language, they may be said to engage in what I call propositional processes of sociolinguistic 
indexicality. The semiotic relations characterizing these processes are constructed at a different level 
of metapragmatic functioning compared to the situations of the actual use of linguistic signs to 
perform or index social identities. Everyday talk about language involves the use of metasigns to refer 
to other metasigns functioning pragmatically. This is different from the actual use of linguistic signs 
to index social identities or other social phenomena. When speakers use creaky voice to signal a 
persona of a “hardcore Chicano gangster” (Mendoza-Denton, 2011), for example, they use linguistic 
signs to index a pragmatic relation to a set of social objects. When American speakers use Spanish 
phrases in English that signal implicit devaluations of the Spanish language (Hill, 2001), they create 
pragmatic metasign-sign relations as they characterize semantic sign-object relations (Urban, 2006, p. 
90). But if people discuss the meanings of the folk-linguistic label “Spanglish” in everyday talk, they 
engage in a different kind of metapragmatic activity. This activity involves propositional processes of 
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indexicality wherein pragmatic metasign-sign relations characterize other pragmatic, i.e., indexical, 
symbolic, or iconic, metasign-sign relations. In this type of metapragmatic discourse, participants 
explicitly (or implicitly) refer to the indexical meanings of pragmatic meta-signs, thereby constructing 
new “interpretants,” in Pierce’s terms, and new indexical signs and their relations to other signs at a 
higher level of metapragmatic awareness.  
These differences in the levels of metapragmatic functioning of semiotic relations may be 
seen in terms of hierarchical layering of meanings that constitutes “indexical orders,” according to 
Silverstein (2003). This concept of indexical hierarchies elucidates how social meanings may accrue 
to linguistic variables during contextualized social-semiotic activity. Contextualization of the 
occurrence of indexical signs is realized, according to Silverstein (1993; 2003), in the pragmatic 
relationships of presupposition and entailment. While presuppositional meanings of an indexical sign 
are an expression of speakers’ sensitivity to what is appropriate to the context of communication 
based on its conceptualization at the macro-social level, entailments contribute to the creation of 
micro-contextual effects (1993, p. 36; 2003, p. 193). These “co-present dimensions of indexicality” 
(1993, p. 36) reveal the perspective in which social meanings of language variation are seen as both 
conventional and emergent (Jaffe, 2016, p. 86).  
“Indexical order” is an expression of the inherent dialectic nature of indexical processes in 
which any “n-th order indexical form can … be conceptualized … in terms of its n + 1st order 
indexical relationship to context” (p. 194). This relationship is, according to Sliverstein (2003, p. 
194), 
a function of the way ideologically- (or culturally-) laden metapragmatics engages with n-th 
order indexicality in the characteristic mode of giving it motivation (for example, iconic 
motivation). N + 1st order indexicality is thus always already immanent as a competing 
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structure of values potentially indexed in-and-by a communicative form of the n-th order, 
depending on the degree of intensity of ideologization.       
Everyday talk about language involves metasemiotic activity in which ideological values 
indexed by the n + 1st-order indexicality become the object of the signification process bringing 
about the n + 2d-order (and, potentially, higher-order) indexicality. Motivations and rationalizations 
of such ideological values that people construct in discourse as “a cultural construal of the n-th order 
usage” (Silverstein, 2003, p. 194) may be analyzed as part of the pragmatic relations of 
presupposition and entailment in discourse. In other words, folk-linguistic concepts functioning as 
indexical meta-signs may be seen as, using Silverstein’s terms (1993), “the point-from-which, or 
semiotic origin of, a presuppositional/entailing projection of whatever is to be understood as context” 
(p. 36).  
At the macro-social level, such meaning projections index/create “partitions and gradations of 
social space” (Silverstein, 2003, p. 202) constructing thereby the meanings of social (categorial) 
differentiation as it relates to linguistic distinctions.  In this process, the meanings that have been 
conventionalized through ideological processes into metapragmatic labels for “persona styles” 
(Eckert, 2008) and “registers” of language (Silverstein, 2003; Agha, 2007) may acquire new indexical 
associations in folk-linguistic discourse as the result of propositional processes of contextualized 
reinterpretation. Not only do such processes propose new “interpetants;” they may also construct 
instructions stipulating or “regimenting” the conditions in which further interpretations can be or 
“should be” made, as in folk discussions of “standard” varieties of language, for example. The 
contextual situatedness of propositional indexicality and the variable indexical meaning potential it 
can explore in reinterpretations of sociolinguistic meanings at various levels of indexical orders 
highlight the importance of finding those discourse-analytic techniques for the analysis of folk-
linguistic discourse that closely attend to the contextual surround of the discursive event in which 
indexical associations are formed.  
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In everyday talk about language, the “framing,” “regimenting,” or “stipulative” functioning 
of folk-concepts and their “interpretants” as metasigns is embedded into the coherence structure of a 
dynamic discursive event “that maps presupposed cause onto entailed effect” (Silverstein, 1993, p. 
36). As Jaffe (2016) has noted in her discussion of the concept “indexical field,” various indexical 
projections of the same concept can be better seen as cohering in a particular context of 
indexicalization rather than as coherent constructions within a specific field of meaning: “the 
ideological coherence or relatedness of the field is not a formal property of the field itself but, rather, 
a property of socially situated uses and interpretations of that field” (p. 92). Thus, contextualized 
presuppositional/entailing projections of folk-linguistic concepts which constitute sociolinguistic 
indexical relations constructed in discursive interaction have to be analyzed in the context of 
structures of discourse coherence. Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides an overview of how 
previously-proposed discourse-analytic techniques elucidate the propositional processes of 
sociolinguistic indexicality at different levels of discourse coherence.    
Attending to coherence relations in discourse allows for an analysis of folk-linguistic 
concepts and their presupposing/entailing projections in the context of their co-occurrence with other 
concepts acting as social indexicals in different semiotic configurations that cumulatively construct 
locally-coherent representations of sociolinguistic indexical relations.  These representations delineate 
“a semiotic sketch” (Agha, 2007, p. 86) of the interrelations between conceptualized phenomena; the 
analysis of such representations needs to go beyond an approach that “attends only to the local 
semanticity of isolable expressions” and move to “a more encompassing, text-centric analysis, i.e., a 
view that treats individual pieces of semiotic text as contributing sketches or images of referents 
which are filled in or further specified by accompanying signs” (p. 86, emphasis in the original).  If 
the meanings of such folk-terms as “accent,” “twang,” “hick,” or “slang,” for example, are taken in 
isolation from their contexts of occurrence in discourses about language varieties that circulate in 
certain speech communities, these terms may be considered as rather vague and imprecise. In fact, the 
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dictionary definitions which supply the denotational meanings of such terms can often be insufficient 
for an understanding of these words’ meanings in varied contexts of their use in everyday 
metalinguistic discourse. A better understanding of the meanings of folk-linguistic concepts, and, 
consequently, of the nature of language-ideological constructs, may be achieved if the analysis 
attends to presuppositional and entailing projections of folk-terms, as well as to other co-occurring 
indexicals and their relationships constructed in discourse. One of the purposes of this dissertation is 
to propose and illustrate such an analytical approach which views folk-linguistic concepts as part of 
their semiotic co-text created in a particular communicative context. In this approach, the co-
occurrence of indexical meta-signs is analyzed in terms of rhetorical relations revealed in the 
structures of argumentation that associate or dissociate sets of concepts. This approach allows for an 
analysis of the rhetorical connectedness of discursive acts that contribute to semiotic construals of 
folk-linguistic beliefs at different levels of discourse organization.  
Discursive construals of socially typifying linguistic distinctions reflect and contribute to the 
process of gradual stabilization of meanings at the macro-social level of ideological differentiation. 
Agha (2007) developed the notion of “enregisterment” to describe such sociohistorical and linguistic 
“processes through which a linguistic repertoire becomes differentiable within a language as a 
socially recognized register of forms” (p. 190). “Registers” are “cultural models of action that link 
diverse behavioral signs to enactable effects, including images of persona, interpersonal relationship, 
and type of conduct” (p. 145). However, these linkages are not permanent: registers are not static 
collections of linguistic repertoires with fixed meanings. According to Silverstein (2003),  
The existence of registers … is an aspect of the dialectical process of indexical order, in 
which the n + 1st-order indexicality depends on the existence of a cultural schema of 
enregisterment of forms perceived to be involved in n-th-order indexical meaningfulness … 
(p. 212).  
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In their dependence on schemes of underlying cultural values, socially recognizable registers of 
linguistic forms develop over time as systems of social values develop during “the processes of 
valorization, circulation, and reanalysis” (Agha, 2007, p. 190) of the social meanings of linguistic 
forms.  
The notion of “enregisterment” has been applied and developed in Johnstone’s extensive 
research on the language-ideological construction of the Pittsburghese dialect in American English 
(Johnstone, 2013).  Johnstone analyzes how the social meanings of “Pittsburghese” become linked 
with certain linguistic features and social practices. Through discursive practices, these linkages 
become “enregistered” as socially and culturally recognized meaningful ways of speaking. Johnstone 
used a number of approaches, including historical research, ethnography, and discourse analysis and 
has shown how “Pittsburghese” has become enregistered through various discursive practices 
revealed in sociolinguistic interviews (Johnstone et al., 2006), personal narratives (Johnstone, 2006a), 
online discussions (Johnstone & Baumgardt, 2004), the language of the public media (Johnstone, 
2011), and in the production of material artefacts (Johnstone, 2009).  
Importantly, Johnstone (2016, pp. 633-634) has pointed out that “enregister” is “a multi-place 
predicate” which designates relations between a linguistic form, a register, an agent of the meta-
semiotic process, a related ideological schema, an interactional exigency in which enregisterment has 
a rhetorical function, and a sociohistorical exigency which conditions metapragmatic functioning of 
linguistic variants. This view of enregisterment underscores the complexity and the dynamism of this 
sociohistorical and cultural process as well as the importance of attending to both macro- and micro-
social frames of meaning construction, including its interactional and rhetorical contexts. In this view, 
the functioning of folk-linguistic labels as widely-recognized metasigns of a metapragmatic 
relationship does not simply reveal the enregisterment of the linguistic repertoire associated with the 
label. The analysis of enregisterment processes needs to attend to the ways in which specific salient 
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features of the register are associated with certain ideological schemata in particular rhetorical and 
interactional contexts of communication.  
The abovementioned goal may be achieved in discourse-based investigations of the 
propositional processes of sociolinguistic indexicality. Studying such processes is important since it 
can help us understand how language users construct sociolinguistic indexical relations and their 
interpretations as part of the development of ideological models of sociolinguistic variation. This 
knowledge can shed light on how folk-linguistic discourses contribute to language-ideological 










2.1 Organizational Overview 
 This literature review discusses the types of discourse-based approaches to language 
attitudes and proposes a five-level typology which includes topic-oriented, linguistic, cognitive, 
interactional, and rhetorical analyses (Rodgers, in press).  The main purpose of this discussion is 
to methodologically locate different discourse-based approaches to language attitudes within a 
common framework and situate a rhetorically-oriented analysis in the context of previous 
approaches to metalinguistic discourse. This methodological analysis focuses on the contributions 
of different approaches to understanding the creation of socio-indexical meaning in metalinguistic 
commentary on the subject of language variation. Overall, the studies in this review are discussed 
in terms of the following analytical strategies: 
· micro-level interpretations of locally-situated communicative events and their linkage to 
macro-level analyses of ideological and socio-historical processes, 
· analytical attention to different planes of discourse, 




· analytical attention to different types of semiotic resources used by participants in 
constructing sociolinguistic indexical relations. 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 provides a brief comparison of the studies of 
language attitudes and language ideologies in quantitative and qualitative paradigms; section 2.3 
provides a comparison of the terms “language attitudes,” “language ideologies,” and “language 
regard”; section 2.4 explains a rationale behind a proposed typology of discourse-based 
approaches to language attitudes;  sections 2.5 through 2.9 provide a review and discussion of 
five levels of discourse-based analyses of language attitudes and ideologies, and section 2.10 
presents concluding remarks. 
2.2 The study of Language Attitudes and Ideologies in Quantitative and Qualitative 
Paradigms  
Discourse-based approaches to language attitudes, beliefs and ideologies have recently 
gained wider recognition as methods of research which can usefully complement the 
experimental paradigms traditionally used in sociolinguistics and social psychology of language 
(Giles & Coupland, 1991; Garrett, 2010; Johnstone, 2010; Preston, 2010). This methodological 
development is related to a number of theoretical considerations, including the following 
concerns about the limitations of experimental techniques in studying language attitudes:  
· the narrow conception of social meaning underlying experimental language attitude 
research which does not reflect the complexity of social interpretation (Coupland, 2007; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987); 
· the conception of attitudes as static and decontextualized constructs (Liebscher & 
Dailey-O’Cain, 2009; Soukup, 2012); 
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· the essentialist nature of links between social categories, speakers, and language use 
underlying some of the quantitative approaches (Coupland, 2007; Garrett et al., 2003). 
Experimental studies are based on the “principle of quantitative modeling” (Bayley, 
2002, p.118) which presupposes a close examination of a selected linguistic variable in its co-
occurrence with particular contextual features. Linguistic stimuli in quantitative studies of 
implicit attitudes are usually presented to participants in some isolated form: as separate sounds, 
groups of sounds, isolated words, or audio speech samples presented to respondents in a lab 
setting. As a result, 
“the descriptive methods of variationist sociolinguistics have themselves contributed to 
the illusion that socially significant dialect variation can be captured wholly in terms of 
frequency arrays of discrete sets of phonological, lexical or morpho-syntactic forms” 
(Garrett, Coupland, & Williams, 2003, pp. 61-62).  
While an isolated form of stimuli presentation may highlight the impact of a particular 
linguistic, social or other contextual feature/cluster of features on participants’ responses to 
linguistic stimuli, this method offers a limited ability to provide a more holistic account of the 
complex socio-cognitive and interactional processes which may influence responses to language 
as they occur in the natural context of communication.  
Experimental studies of implicit language attitudes, especially those involving semantic-
differential scales and Likert—type items, often describe social meanings of variation in 
participants’ responses to isolated, decontextualized, and/or artificially modified linguistic stimuli 
in terms of the social categories preselected for the experiment by the researcher. In such an 
approach, it is difficult to account for the complexity of conceptualization systems of language 
users relevant to particular contexts of occurrence of the focal linguistic and/or social variables. 
19 
 
In contrast, from a discursive perspective, language attitudes have been viewed as 
processes rather than entities (e.g. Cargile et al., 1994): “social meanings are assumed to be 
inferred by means of constructive, interpretive processes” (p. 218, emphasis in the original). 
Contributions of discourse-based research in language attitudes stem from its potential to address 
a number of important characteristics of language variation such as those, for example, which 
were pointed out by Garrett, Coupland and  Williams (2003):  (1) the holistic nature of people’s 
sensitivity to a full range of social meanings of dialectal differences, (2) “the cultural constitution 
of dialect,” (3) the fact that dialects are “ideological as well as linguistic entities,” and (4) the 
“semantic and pragmatic phenomena on the fringe of dialect … to do with rhetorical style, stance 
and implicature” (p. 62). 
2.3  The Question of Definition: “Language Attitudes,” “Language Ideologies,” and 
“Language Regard” 
Approaches to the study of language attitudes have been based on various theoretical 
understandings of the term “attitude.” In discourse-oriented, social-constructionist approaches, 
such as, for example, discursive psychology, the theory of social representations, and the 
rhetorical approach, attitudes have been viewed as variable constructions in the evaluative 
practices serving different purposes in on-going discourse (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), as 
structural components of abstract social representations (Fraser, 1994), and as “stances on matters 
of public debate” (Billig, 1987). According to Garrett’s (2010) review of both quantitative and 
qualitative language attitude studies, the “core” in the traditional definition of an attitude is “an 
evaluative orientation to a social object of some sort” (p. 20), a favorable or unfavorable response 
to a stimulus.  However, people’s reactions to language are not always strictly evaluative and 
include more than just an expression of attitudes: they are based on and reflect people’s complex 
systems of beliefs and ideologies about language (Kristiansen, 2010; Preston, 2010, 2011). As 
Niedzielski and Preston (2000) have noted, “A language attitude is, after all, not really an attitude 
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to a language feature; it is an awakening of a set of beliefs about individuals or sorts of 
individuals through the filter of a linguistic performance” (p. 9). The role of beliefs in attitude 
formation should not be underestimated since beliefs are part of the cognitive core of attitudes – 
they are “elements which describe the object of the attitude, its characteristics, and its relations to 
other objects” (Katz, 1960, p. 168).  
As a result of recent theoretical developments, the construct “language attitudes” has 
been reconceptualized in several ways, and the scope of language attitude research has expanded 
to include much more than the traditional focus on enduring evaluative reactions. This 
dissertation draws on the folk-linguistic tradition of research which views language attitudes as 
part of larger concepts of “folk theories of language” (Niedzielski & Preston, 2003) and 
“language regard” (Preston, 2010, 2011). The theory of “language regard” brings together such 
areas of inquiry as language attitudes, folk beliefs about language, and language ideologies. 
According to this theory, both conscious and subconscious types of attitudinal responses to 
language-related phenomena are outcomes of a complex system of cognitive processes which are 
closely related to aspects of language production and comprehension. These processes involve 
noticing and classifying linguistic signals, as well as imbuing such signals with social meanings 
retrieved from an associated “cognitorium” or “reservoir” of the stored mental representations 
(Preston, 2011). There are close interconnections between these cognitive representations and 
responses to linguistic variants. Depending on the combination of contextual features such as 
prior experience and eliciting conditions (Bassili & Brown, 2005), some of the stored mental 
associations become selected from the cognitorium and become activated in response to linguistic 
stimuli. According to the theory of language regard, this activation may underlie an affective and 
automatic attitudinal reaction or, at a more conscious level, participate in the formation of beliefs 
about language. The theory of language regard reveals that language attitudes and ideologies are 
inseparable parts of the complex system used to process the social meanings of language. In the 
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discursive approach used in this study, I generally rely on this theoretical conceptualization, but I 
use the terms “language regard” and “language ideologies” as interchangeable notions, assuming 
at the same time that the attitudinal, evaluative component is part of the systems of beliefs about 
language as well as one of the possible dimensions of the ideological construals constructed in 
discourse.    
In addition to the language regard framework which models socio-cognitive processes 
underlying reactions to language, this dissertation draws on recent developments in the linguistic-
anthropological and sociolinguistic theories that emphasize sociocultural and sociosemiotic 
orientations in identity and language variation studies (see Bucholtz & Hall, 2008; van 
Compernolle, 2011; Eckert, 2012; Woolard, 2008 for discussion). This study relies on these 
recent theoretical advances in viewing folk-linguistic concepts as rich sources of information 
about the meta-semiotic processes of sociolinguistic differentiation. Folk-linguistic concepts are 
seen here as gateways to understanding the complexity of socioindexical meanings that language 
variation has for its agents – language users. A discourse-based approach allows for a 
contextualized analysis of the semiotic complexity of folk concepts which emerges in local, 
reflexive negotiations of their meanings. Through the processes of contextualization, a folk-
linguistic concept may reveal its meaning potential that resides in the “dialogicality” (Bakhtin, 
1981) of everyday discourse reflected in the fluid and dynamic positioning of individual 
ideological consciousness with respect to other ideological values and points of view available in 
the micro- or macro-social frames of reference (Silverstein, 1993). 
In linguistic anthropology, language ideologies are popularly defined in Silverstein’s 
(1979, p. 193) terms as beliefs “articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of 
perceived language structure and use,” in Kroskrity’s (2010, p. 192) terms as “attempts to 
rationalize language usage,” and in Irvine and Gal’s (2009, p. 403) terms as part of behavior of 
noticing, rationalizing, and justifying linguistic indices. These definitions highlight 
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“rationalization” and “justification” of beliefs as important aspects of language ideology creation. 
In other words, these definitions point out the significance of examining ideational functions of 
metalinguistic beliefs as well as rhetorical strategies of ideology construction. This perspective 
evokes a view of ideology which Friedrich (1989) described as “ideational, intellectual, and 
conceptual constituent of culture.” In this sense, ideology has “a considerable degree of 
coherence and direction, an agenda, and a validating, mythic aspect” (1989, p. 301). This 
understanding of language ideologies highlights the relevance of the rhetorical approach to 
metalinguistic discourse proposed in this dissertation.  
2.4 Towards a Typology of Discourse-Based Approaches to Language Attitudes: A 
Rationale  
One of the methodological problems in discoursal studies of language attitudes lies in 
finding theoretically-informed discourse-analytic approaches that would allow the researcher to 
provide an account of how the relations created at different levels of discourse function as part of 
a coherent construction of sociolinguistic indexicality. This methodological review seeks to 
contribute to an understanding of the abovementioned methodological problem by comparing 
different discoursal approaches to the study of language attitudes in terms of their potential to 
reveal various aspects of sociolinguistic meaning-making in discourse. It revises a previous 
classification of such approaches in Liebscher and Dailey-O’Cain (2009) which includes three 
levels of analysis: content-based, turn-internal pragmatic and semantic, and interactional. The 
classification I propose here presents finer distinctions between levels of analysis and expands the 
typology to include the following five levels: topic-oriented, linguistic, cognitive, interactional 
and rhetorically-oriented appraoches. The rationale for these distinctions is that different levels of 
analysis may highlight various facets of discursively-constructed language attitudes and beliefs 
which may lead researchers to provide different accounts of language users’ perceptions and 
belief systems. Distinguishing different levels of analysis and comparing their relevant 
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advantages and limitations may help develop ways of integrating analytical techniques into 
methodologies which would serve to provide multifaceted accounts of complex language-
attitudinal constructions in discourse. 
Theoretically, differential use and combination of such analytical strategies in language-
attitude research may be seen as related to the differences in defining the locus of attitudinal and 
belief constructs, i.e., whether such constructs are primarily viewed (1) as structures emerging 
and developing within local interactional contexts (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1987), (2) as part of 
linguistic ideologies shared in a community of speakers (e.g., Irvine & Gal, 2009), or (3) as a 
complex intersection of locally-situated and socially-widespread meanings of language variation 
(e.g., Johnstone et al., 2006). Variable use of discourse-analytical strategies is also pertinent to a 
theoretical and methodological problem of making inferential links between the micro-level 
analysis of metapragmatic awareness observed in locally-situated interactions and macro-level 
representations of language ideology construction at communal, regional or national levels. The 
problem lies in having a theoretical and methodological justification for making such inferential 
links, and analyses at different levels of discourse provide various possibilities for linking larger 
ideological constructs to the contexts of situated interaction and local discourses.   
The amount of analytical attention given to different planes of discourse is the basis for a 
classification of discoursal approaches to language attitudes proposed in this paper. Planes of 
discourse are distinguished here using Schiffrin’s (1987) model of discourse coherence which 
includes five interrelated pragmatic, semantic and cognitive planes. The pragmatic structures 
include a “participation framework,” an “action structure,” and an “exchange structure.” The 
semantic plane is represented by an “ideational structure,” and the cognitive component includes 
an “information state.” Differences in attending to discourse structures may result in different 
accounts of the resources that participants use in explicit or implicit constructions of 
sociolinguistic indexical relations. In particular, depending on the level of analysis, the same 
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discoursal data may be interpreted as revealing different ways of construing language-ideological 
relations through participants’ use of ideational, linguistic, cognitive, interactional, or rhetorical 
resources. The overall significance of interpretations and conclusions resulting from different 
analytical approaches to language attitudes lies in their contributions to understanding the social 
meanings of linguistic variables. They are also important for further development of theorization 
about the nature and role of metasemiosis (Silverstein, 1993, 2003) which is potentially a useful 
step in explaining the processes of language variation and change (Weinreich et al., 1968).  
The studies discussed in this review deal with written and spoken metalinguistic 
discourse. The analytical foci of the studies surveyed are grouped on such evidence as samples of 
data analysis and presentation of results, rather than researchers’ own claims as to the type of the 
methodology used.  One of the reasons for this classificatory approach is that claims about the 
method of data analysis used in the studies are often not supported by the details in the 
Methodology section explaining the specifics of how discourse-analytical procedures were 
applied to the data. Another problem is that the same labels, for example, “content-oriented 
discourse analysis” in Preston (1994) and Hall-Lew and Stephens (2012) have been used to refer 
to quite different analytical techniques that reveal different aspects of attitude construction.  
Although different structures of discourse are treated in this review as belonging to 
separate levels of analysis, this separation does not reflect the disparity of the phenomena 
analyzed at different levels; rather, distinguishing these structures serves the analytical purposes 
of examining how the multifunctional and multifaceted nature of metalinguistic discourse has 
been and can be approached from different methodological perspectives that attend to various 
aspects of sociolinguistic meaning-making. This helps achieve an understanding of the diverse 




This discussion is not meant to be a criticism of the approaches that do not attend to all 
planes of discourse, since such approaches may serve their purpose in specific research contexts. 
Rather, it is aimed at highlighting the potential that different levels of analysis have for unpacking 
the complexity of the sociolinguistic indexical processes revealed in everyday discursive 
interaction. A larger goal here is to view the contributions from different approaches as part of a 
joint effort in the field to understand how indexical relations are constructed in metalinguistic 
discourse. This review methodologically locates different analytical techniques in relation to one 
another within a common framework while clarifying important distinctions and similarities 
between them. It also establishes the background for an understanding of the potential of the 
rhetorical approach to serve as a unifying framework for integrating analyses of various types of 
meaning-making processes. 
2.5 Topic-oriented Analysis 
One of the important features defining the content of discourse on the subject of language 
variation is its topical development, and a number of discourse-based studies of language 
attitudes have focused on identification of the main topics in nonlinguists’ conversations about 
language. Using Schiffrin’s (1987) terms, this level of analysis is mainly focused on “the 
ideational structure” of discourse consisting of semantic units, propositions, or ideas, and the 
topical relations among idea units, while other types of relations, such as cohesive and functional 
(Schiffrin, 1987, p. 26), are not considered. Presuppositions which may underlie semantic 
relationships between idea units or the functional roles such units play vis-à-vis one another and 
in the overall structure of text are usually not part of the topic-oriented level of analysis. 
Ideational meanings are mainly identified in such studies by focusing on explicit mentions of 
thematically-related lexical units and category labels across the whole data set (e.g., Bucholtz et 
al., 2007; Campbell-Kibler, 2012; Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012; Hyrkstedt & Kalaja, 1998).  
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Thematic data in this type of analysis are categorized according to the topically-
convergent patterns in the propositional content of a set of analyzed utterances, and such topic-
based categories are discussed as the outcomes of aggregate analysis. In Hall-Lew and Stephens’s 
(2012) study of the social meanings of “Country Talk,” for example, a small corpus of 
metalinguistic discourse was analyzed using the evidence of explicit mentions of the topics 
relevant to the research question. The article claims to have used the approach that Preston (1993, 
1994) named “content-oriented discourse analysis,” but the foci of the analytical techniques 
suggested by Preston are different – he mainly approaches the content of discourse through the 
analysis of linguistic details, interactional development, and rhetorical structure. Hall-Lew and 
Stephens’s (2012) study, however, was centered on the main topics of the exchanges between the 
fieldworker and interviewees, although some linguistic details in the responses (e.g., hedging of 
statements) were included into the analysis. The following examples from Hall-Lew and 
Stephens’s study (2012, pp. 268–269) illustrate its use of metalinguistic discourse for 
identification of thematic categories in the data: 
(1) 
Interviewer: Do you think that talking country sounds Southern? 
Pete: I think it’s more Southern than anything else. I think it is. Yes, I would definitely I think it 
has to go back to a lot of the South when people migrated up into this area. 
(2) 
Interviewer: Do you think talking country is a Southern thing or more general? 
Hannah: You know, I kinda I think [pause] I sort of associate Southern and country. 
The interviewees’ answers in (1) and (2) were analyzed as containing explicit mentions of the 
ideological associations between Country Talk and Southern U.S. English variety. Based on 
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similar observations of the topics mentioned in the interviews, major thematic categories in the 
data were identified and further interpreted as broadly representing  three main “semiotic fields of 
rurality, regionality, and stigma” (Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012, p. 266) in the participants’ 
imaginings of Country Talk. These findings were interpreted as evidence of “enregisterment” 
(Agha, 2005) of Country Talk in the community of Texoma, on the Texas/Oklahoma border. 
Enregisterment of the social values of linguistic variants renders such meanings as belonging to a 
macro- rather than a micro-social contextual frame, since “enregisterment” refers to “processes 
whereby distinct forms of speech come to be socially recognized (or enregistered) as indexical of 
speaker attributes by a population of language users” (Agha, 2005, p. 38). In other words, the 
meanings of “Country Talk” that were recorded during the topic-oriented data analysis as 
frequent explicit mentions of ideas in local contexts of research interviews receive an 
interpretation of larger socio-semiotic constructs shared as part of cultural knowledge in the 
community of Texoma. This transition from locally-situated analyses to interpretations of broader 
social significance at the level of language ideologies is an important step in the analytical 
procedure characterizing a particular method of analysis. This analytical step seemed to be mainly 
justified by the frequency of idea mentions in the data and was also partly supported by the 
comparison of the study findings with the descriptions of regional linguistic features in 
dialectology literature. It is important, however, for the researchers to provide an account of how 
exactly such transitions in analytical interpretations were made in their studies – this information 
can help understand the nature of enregisterment of social meanings of linguistic variants, how 
enregisterment occurs and how it can be investigated using discoursal data. Johnstone et al.’s 
(2006) proposal to situate a case-based discourse-analytic study in a larger context of 
participants’ life experiences and combine it with historical research and socioeconomic analysis  
is instructive in this regard as it offers a way of examining the linkage, “usually assumed but not 
often described” (p. 100), between micro-level and macro-level contextual frames of language 
ideology construction.   
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While the focus on the topical structure of metadiscourse may provide valuable insights 
into socio-semiotic processes pointing to commonalities in the patterns of sociolinguistic 
stereotyping at the communal or regional level, this approach is restricted in several ways, 
including its limited potential to reveal the following aspects of language attitude construction: 
1. the complexity of intersections of social meanings at which socio-indexical fields 
(Eckert, 2012) are formed in dynamic and context-dependent ways,  
2. the embeddedness of idea units in the interactional context of individual speakers’ 
footings and their alignments with ideas and stances constructed as part of that context – 
a noteworthy limitation considering the important role of contextual factors in discourse 
and evaluation practices (e.g., Giles & Ryan, 1982), 
3. indirect expressions of attitudes and the presupposed content of metapragmatic 
constructions which may be loaded with attitudinal positions. 
Another concern with the topic-oriented analysis is related to the process of data 
collection in which some of the central idea units are first introduced into the discourse in the 
interviewer’s questions or in researcher-generated experimental tools (e.g., Hyrkstedt & Kalaja, 
1998) rather than through participant-initiated contributions. In this practice of data collection, the 
researchers’ questions or materials include queries about those associations that are hypothesized 
by the researcher as being relevant to participants’ imaginings of certain speaking styles. Such 
data collection techniques, however, may predispose participants to provide the responses 
expected by the researcher or otherwise influence the ways in which topics are discussed. A 
valuable insight into the topical development of such discourse may be obtained if the analysis 
includes identification of the balance between interviewer-initiated and participant-initiated 
topical transitions (see Labov, 1984 for further discussion). If interviewer-initiated topics prevail 
in the data, more caution may be needed in making generalizations about the centrality of certain 
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themes defining participants’ perceptions of speaking styles (Bucholtz et al. 2007, p. 83). The 
importance of this problem may be seen in terms of the differences between the kind of 
intersubjectivity (Linell & Korolija, 1997, p. 196) created between an interviewer and an 
interviewee in a structured interview context versus the kind of intersubjectivity achieved among 
participants when they have more control over topic development in the process of interaction 
more closely resembling naturally-occurring communication in everyday contexts. While the 
former type of context may lead researchers to examine topics as mentions in single utterances, 
the latter is more conducive to examining topicality as sustained at different discourse levels in 
the process of interactional and rhetorical development. The second approach is more 
advantageous if we view sociolinguistic indexicality as a multilayered configuration of co-
occurring indexicals related “through some schema of hierarchical concatenation” (Silverstein, 
1993, p. 48).  
Topic-oriented analysis may be considered the first step in making sense of 
metadiscourse – a stage in the analytical process which offers an overview of the central topics 
discussed in conversations about language variation with some degree of denotational 
explicitness. This information is important in revealing how sociolinguistic identities and styles 
are reified and typified as social and linguistic categories (Moore & Podesva, 2009, p. 449) made 
explicitly relevant in discourse to a set of beliefs about language variation. Another advantage of 
the topic-oriented analysis is that it offers flexibility of use with different kinds of researchers’ 
ontological and epistemological orientations: with both emic and etic perspectives, constructivist 
and objectivist positions, with “attitudes” viewed as emerging in interaction, as reflecting larger 





2.6 Linguistically-oriented Analysis 
 While idea units and topical development in discourse are central to understanding 
message content, they are not sufficient in the analysis of metadiscourse since “the means of 
expression condition and sometimes control content” (Hymes, 1974, p. 55). Linguistic structures 
do not constitute a separate plane of discourse, but they serve to contribute to meaning creation at 
more global levels, according to Schiffrin’s (1987) model of discourse coherence. A 
linguistically-oriented analysis of metadiscourse begins with an examination of linguistic patterns 
at turn-internal levels of linguistic structure and proceeds with an analysis of how such patterns 
are used to create meanings at higher levels of discourse.  
A need for principled linguistically-oriented studies of discoursal data on language 
attitudes was pointed out by Kleiner and Preston (1997), who suggested that, in the study of the 
relationship between content and form of discourse, analysts should “look for patterns of 
established textual elements (that is, linguistic forms) which are not behaving normally” (p. 109).  
Such linguistic patterns may be seen as peculiar ways of expressing beliefs and attitudes, as ways 
of encoding pragmatic meanings and rhetorical strategies in discourse, and as resources used in 
speakers’ “acts of identity”(Le Page & Tabouret-Keller, p. 1985), when identities are “projected”  
through discursive action.  
A linguistically-oriented analysis may attend to different types of linguistic behavior 
distinguished by the extent to which speakers strategically manage and control their use of 
linguistic resources to express self- and other-identities (Coupland 2007, p. 111; Goffman 1959; 
Johnstone et al., 2006) and reflect on aspects of language use.  Metadiscoursal data may contain 
linguistic features which indirectly point to latent aspects of participants’ identity work or other 
hidden internal motivations of participants related to their constructions of sociolinguistic 
indexical links. Preston (1993, pp. 240–250), for example, used Givon’s (1983) theory of topic 
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continuity to examine unusual patterns in the respondents’ use of pronominal reference in 
metalinguistic discourse. The study showed that such patterns were indicative of the cultural 
sensitivity and complexity of the negotiated topic of conversation - “African American 
Vernacular English” (AAVE). The pattern of anaphora avoidance signaled that the participants 
did not agree on their interpretations of the topic and its relation to their linguistic and social 
identities. The pattern of anaphoric packing, on the other hand, suggested that the participants 
were treating the discourse topic as conceptually complicated and related to broader beliefs about 
language, culture and society. Such dynamics in the implicit treatments of the discourse topic 
reveal how discursive construction of identities and sociolinguistic indexical links involves local, 
ethnographically and interactionally determined cultural orientations associated with larger socio-
cultural models. This important perspective on the relations between indexical meanings created 
in micro- and macro- contextual frames is hard to gain at the level of topic-oriented analysis of 
metadiscourse. 
Another important way of analyzing participants’ linguistic behavior is to focus on those 
linguistic features that participants use intentionally, with more strategic control, such as, for 
example, when they produce linguistic imitations, stylizations, or “performances” of their own or 
others’ speech styles.  Schilling-Estes’s (1998) ethnographic case study of style-shifting in 
conversational data on Ocracoke English illustrates this second type of linguistically-oriented 
analysis. It includes acoustic comparison of the nucleus of the /ay/ vowel used in “performance” 
and “non-performance” speech of a participant. Results of a quantitative examination of the 
recurring patterns in the use of phonetic features were integrated in this study with the 
interpretation of the function and sequencing of the “performed” formulaic utterance in the 
overall structure of the discourse. Specifically, the linguistic patterns in style-shifting were 
analyzed in light of the conversational roles that the respondent was proactively assuming by 
performing linguistic styles for the present and non-present audience.  
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The use of linguistic performance to achieve interactional goals may be seen as reflecting 
speakers’ ideas about the dialectal features that are capable of invoking certain sociocultural 
images in the audience. It has been demonstrated that the study of such performance speech, 
including dialect imitations and caricatures (e.g., Evans, 2002; Preston, 1992) can shed light on 
respondents’ beliefs about the social meaning of language variation. The changes in the imitated 
speech implicitly carry information about the modes of folk-linguistic awareness (Preston, 1996) 
and salient linguistic features stereotypically associated with certain speech styles and identity 
repertoires. Thus, participants’ assumptions underlying their use of linguistic imitations to 
illustrate dialectal features are seen as related to their awareness of the macro-level language-
ideological processes in a community of speakers. Attributing even broader significance to 
studies of performance speech, Schilling-Estes concludes that “self-conscious speech may lend 
valuable insight into the study of the overall patterning of language variation and the 
directionality of language change” (1998, p. 62). Recently, linguistic analyses of style shifting 
and linguistic imitations have become a research area of growing interest and importance in 
sociolinguistics (Bucholtz, 2009; Coupland, 2007), “for it is ultimately in styles and their relation 
to personae and social types that the indexical value of variation is grounded in the social” 
(Eckert, 2010, p. 176).  
A linguistically-oriented analysis of imitations of dialects and other stylizations 
performed by participants may focus on different levels of linguistic structure, including phonetic, 
phonological, lexical and syntactic patterns. As has been claimed in recent sociolinguistic work 
(e.g., Coupland, 2007; Eckert, 2012; Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012; Moore & Podesva, 2009), a 
richer understanding of indexicality of speech styles is derived from considering clusters of 
linguistic variables since, as Bucholtz  (2009, p. 148)  put it, “A single feature … is typically 
insufficient to index a style; rather, styles comprise clusters of co-occurring semiotic elements, 
including both linguistic and nonlinguistic resources.” From this perspective, we can view 
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participants’ use of linguistic elements as part of creating clusters of semiotic resources for style-
making employed strategically for social actions (Coupland, 2007) in everyday talk about 
language variation. To examine clusters of semiotic resources belonging to different levels of 
linguistic and non-linguistic structures and their interrelatedness with immediate interactional 
goals of participants and larger sociocultural contexts, the analysis may be initially performed at 
lower linguistic levels and later become integrated with more global, discourse-level analyses.  
In the types of linguistic analyses illustrated above, interpretations of the social and 
interactional motivations underlying linguistic choices and their intended effects on addressees 
have been related to an account of the context of communication, including local interactional 
contexts and macro-level socio-cultural frames of reference – linking these two major types of 
contextualization is crucial to an understanding of the role of participants’ linguistic choices in 
their constructions of sociolinguistic indexical relations. Thus, a linguistically-oriented analysis of 
metadiscourse, especially if it relies on linguistic theory and shows how linguistic details 
contribute to meanings created at other levels of discourse structure, may reveal important aspects 
of meaning-making and style-shifting that shape the ways in which beliefs about language 
variation become expressed in everyday communication. 
2.7 Cognitively-oriented Analysis 
While topic-oriented and linguistically-oriented analyses deal with the overall topical 
development and the meanings of surface-structural linguistic patterns in everyday conversations 
about language variation, a cognitively-oriented analysis explores participants’ cognitive and 
epistemic moves including representation, management, and evaluation of knowledge and beliefs 
about language variation. Representation of knowledge, meta-knowledge, and other information 
structures may be viewed as one of the discourse domains, according to Schiffrin’s (1987) model 
of discourse coherence which singles out a discourse plane of “information state.” This 
34 
 
component of Schiffrin’s discourse model involves the following aspects of knowledge 
management in discourse: (1) speaker/hearer access to information, (2) speaker/hearer meta-
knowledge which includes their assumptions about the sharedness of certain parts of the 
knowledge base among discourse participants, (3) degrees of participants’ certainty in their ideas, 
and (4) salience of certain knowledge structures or their parts which become activated in 
discourse. These are legitimate concerns for students of language ideologies and attitudes since 
“attitude can be conceived of as a specific category of judgment or a specific knowledge 
structure” (Kruglanski, 1989, p. 111). 
  A cognitively-oriented analysis of discursively constructed attitudes considers the socio-
cognitive dimension of  interaction between participants as well as the following characteristics 
of information states:  their context-dependent, changing nature: “information states are dynamic 
interactive processes” (Schiffrin, 1987, p. 28), and the fact that they can be “essentially internal 
states” since they are “only potentially externalized” (p. 29). These characteristics pose several 
methodological problems for the analyst who focuses on the cognitive aspect of participant 
interaction: the problem of interpretation and analytical reconstruction of the knowledge and 
meta-knowledge structures that have not been fully externalized in discourse, and the problem of 
capturing and explaining the dynamics of changes in the information states throughout discourse.   
These problems have been approached differently in discourse-based language attitude 
research. One of the examples is Winter’s (1992) application of Chafe’s (1986) framework for the 
linguistic encoding of experience and knowledge in English. Based on the frequency of 
occurrence of evidentiality markers (e.g., I think, I believe, should, could and would), Winter 
(1992, p. 10–15) analyzed modes of knowing and sources of knowledge that participants use to 
support their discussions of language attitudes in group conversations. Although doubts may be 
raised concerning the assumption underlying this framework about the monosemous nature of the 
markers of evidentiality (Kärkkäinen, 2006), Winter’s (1992) study is an example of an attempt to 
35 
 
use an existing theoretical and methodological apparatus of a linguistic theory to investigate 
participants’ epistemic orientations to the sources and nature of their beliefs about language 
variation. In this approach, however, knowledge structures are viewed as pre-existing internal 
psychological states rather than “dynamic interactive processes,” in Schiffrin’s (1987, p. 29) 
terms. This problem with the treatment of “stance” in linguistics has been repeatedly pointed out 
(e.g., Kärkkäinen, 2006, p. 700) and raises questions about the role of the audience (Kiesling 
2009, p. 191) and context in unfolding negotiations of social meanings through stance-taking 
activities in metalinguistic discourse.  
The significance of discoursal constructions of epistemic stance may be generally seen in 
terms of their metapragmatic functionality which links participants’ subjective metacognitive 
orientations and their social experiences with language variation to the context of interaction – a 
view which signifies a reorientation from “denotational” to “interactional” planes of analysis of 
epistemic stance (Silverstein, 2004; Johnstone, 2007; Lempert, 2008). According to Kiesling 
(2009), stances are the primary means of creating social meanings of language variation. They are 
part of both “interior” and “exterior” indexicalities: “it is not the stances alone that account for 
their primacy in intraspeaker shifts, but how they fit into the total social landscape” (p. 179). 
Viewing epistemic stances in this light would reorient the analysis of language-attitudinal 
constructions from focusing on the inner intentions of speakers in representing their sources of 
knowledge about language to focusing on contextualizing effects of such representations in local 
interactions and their contextualized embeddedness in larger, macro-ideological structures.  
In addition to speakers’ epistemic orientations, information states are also characterized 
by categorization processes of meaning construction in which different parts of the information 
structures become activated and are made more or less salient in unfolding discourse.  To explore 
such processes, a cognitively-oriented approach to discoursal data on attitudes may use existing 
theories of categorization. An example of this type of analysis is Preston’s (1994) extension of 
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MacLaury’s (2002) Vantage Theory, which was initially developed in anthropology for the study 
of color categorization. Vantage Theory allows the analyst to study the categorial processes of 
conceptual development in conversation and probe deeper into indirect attitudes that a participant 
expresses through the constant creation, maintenance, and change of points of view. Preston’s 
(1994, pp. 306–327) analysis demonstrates a focus on the fluidity of a cognitive construal which 
helps account for dynamism and a changing nature of information states. The knowledge and 
meta-knowledge structures in this account are seen not only as pre-given in the previous 
experience, but as structures that are conceptually changing throughout the interaction.   
Applications of Vantage Theory demonstrate a cognitively-oriented analysis of discourse that 
reveals the interactive, dynamic, and context-dependent nature of sociolinguistic categories 
constructed and negotiated in discourse. This kind of understanding of sociolinguistic 
categorization reflects the role of speaker agency in language ideology construction (Eckert, 
2012) and is needed to refine, enrich and complicate the quantitatively-derived, more static 
accounts provided within the Labovian (Labov, 1972) variationist paradigm of correlational 
sociolinguistics.  
Analyses that focus on discursive representations of social categorization processes and 
other socio-cognitive dimensions of metalinguistic awareness can be performed from a variety of 
theoretical and methodological perspectives that offer differing views of the relationships 
between discourse, cognition, and social contexts. One of the advantages of using discourse data 
to explore cognitive aspects of language attitudes is that it allows for an approach that goes 
beyond a “mentalist” treatment of social categorization “as a universal, automatic, and 
thoughtless device used to simplify the perceived environment” (Condor & Antaki, 1997, p. 331). 
A cognitively-oriented analysis may reveal how interactionally-emergent conceptualizations are 
constructed through cognitive coordination of participants’ points of view on structures of beliefs 
about language in society. This type of analysis may shed light on the complexity of social and 
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linguistic category construction and epistemic stance-taking at the deliberative level of the 
cognitive task of social perception, as opposed to the level of automatic and rapid reactions to 
language that has been a primary focus in the quantitative variationist paradigm of sociolinguistic 
research.  Considering “the relatively low level of engagement with cognitive questions” 
(Campbell-Kibler,  2010, p. 423) in the “third-wave” studies of linguistic variation (Eckert, 2012) 
and the dearth of research on the acquisition of language attitudes, more cognitively-oriented 
investigations of deliberative, “propositional processes” of attitude construction (Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen, 2006) are needed to refine our understanding of the nature of sociolinguistic 
differentiation and its relation to the social agency of speakers (Eckert, 2012).  
2.8 Interactional Analysis 
Interactional approaches to discoursal data on language attitudes offer a way of exploring 
everyday constructions of sociolinguistic indexicality based on the analysis of pragmatic 
structures of discourse. Schiffrin (1987) mainly defines pragmatic structures of conversational 
organization in relation to Goffman’s (1981) notions of “system constraints of talk” (e.g., turn-
taking requirements), “framing,” “functional constraints of talk,” “production and reception 
formats,” and “positioning.” In Schiffrin’s model (1987), there are three interrelated pragmatic 
planes of discourse: an “exchange structure,” an “action structure,” and a “participation 
framework.” 
While some interactional approaches used Conversation Analysis to focus on the 
exchange structure of discourse (e.g., Laihonen, 2008), participation frameworks and self-other 
relations seem to constitute a more prominent focus of analysis in interactionally-oriented 
techniques (e.g., Liebscher & Dailey-O’Cain, 2009; Preston, 1993; Soukup, 2007) which were 
influenced by the frameworks developed within interactional sociolinguistics (Goffman, 1981; 
Gumperz, 1982; Schiffrin, 1994). Soukup (2007, pp. 223–280), for example, used interactional 
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sociolinguistics approach in the study of the social meanings attached to standard-to-dialect 
shifting in Austrian German. Focusing on the strategic use of styles, Soukup (2007) applied 
Gumperz’ (1982) theory of “contextualization” and Goffman’s (1981) concepts of “footing” and 
“production format” to demonstrate that shifts into dialect were deployed by participants of a TV 
show to construct their evaluations (predominantly negative) of the people and ideas discussed in 
the show. The analysis of the changes in footing assignments throughout the conversation reveals 
the complexity of contextualized indirect expressions of language attitudes which cannot be 
captured using topic-oriented techniques. 
Furthermore, interactional analyses may explore the linkages between the micro-level of 
an interactional context and the macro-level linguistic and social ideologies.  For example, an 
approach to the role of a broader cultural context within an interactional study of metalinguistic 
discourse has been implemented by Leihonen (2008) who combined Conversation Analysis with 
a theory of Language Ideologies (Irvine & Gal, p. 2009) while adhering to Schegloff’s (1997) 
analytic principle of rigorously limiting the applicability of larger sociocultural and historical 
contexts only to those contextual references that participants make relevant in the analyzed 
interaction (cf. Johnstone et al., 2006). Imposing such a limitation on the scope of analytical 
references to a larger cultural context may be seen as one of the ways of avoiding the problem of 
making discourse “subservient to contexts not of its participants’ making, but of its analysts’ 
insistence” (Schegloff, 1997, p. 183).  
The analytic attention to such interactional aspects of discourse as contextual influences, 
social positioning and “footings” that speakers attribute to self and others, as well as turn-by-turn 
exchange and action structures may not always yield a holistic understanding of the content of the 
belief structures or the underlying categorization processes; rather, it is focused more on the 
pragmatic moves that may define how beliefs are expressed or why certain stances are taken. 
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Interactional analysis can be enriched through the combined application of analytic techniques at 
other levels of discourse structure as has been demonstrated in Preston’s (1993) work.  
2.9 Rhetorical Analysis 
It has been repeatedly observed that argument may be a productive site for the study of 
language attitudes (e.g. Billig, 1987; Preston, 1993, 1994): “ideologies are intrinsically rhetorical, 
for they provide the resources and topics for argumentation, and, thereby, for thinking about the 
world” (Billig, 1990, p. 18). Rhetorically-oriented analyses of language ideologies mainly focus 
on the study of the structure, processes, functions, and propositional content of arguments in 
metalinguistic discourse. Usually, this type of analysis relies on some form of rhetorical or 
argumentation theory which supplies a particular framework for an understanding of the notion of 
“argument,” its structure and role in discourse relations.  
One of the conceptions of everyday argumentation that has been applied to discourse 
analyses of language attitudes is Schiffrin’s (1985) “oppositional argument.” In this approach, 
argument is defined as “discourse through which speakers support disputable positions” 
(Schiffrin, 1987, p. 18). Preston (1994) adapted Schiffrin’s approach and illustrated its application 
in the analysis of discursively constructed beliefs about AAVE. In this approach, arguments are 
identified on the basis of disputation, and their structure consists of three main components: 
“position,” “dispute,” and “support.” “Disputes” and “supports” may relate to various parts of a 
position such as its propositional content, a speaker’s stance, or “personal and moral implications 
of the verbal performance” (Schiffrin, 1987, pp. 18–19). Preston’s (1994) analysis mainly has 
three analytic foci: a focus on discourse-level argumentation strategies of supporting and 
disputing positions, a focus on argumentative constructions of disagreement, and a focus on the 




Analysis of oppositional argument may help uncover the sources of disagreements on 
language-related issues, but since agreement is a preferred act in communication (Levinson, 
1983), the focus on oppositional argument cannot be fruitfully applied to all discoursal data. 
Thus, Thøgersen (2010) revised Preston’s (1994) requirement that positions are identified as part 
of argument structure if they become implicitly or explicitly disputed in discourse. Instead, 
Thøgersen (2010) used a broader definition of positions which may also include potentially 
“disputable items” (p. 303). Thøgersen considered the term “argument” in a rhetorical sense 
rather than oppositional. In particular, Thøgersen used Toulmin’s (1958) model of argument and 
focused his analysis on “warrants” – the argument components which, according to Thøgersen 
(2010), reveal presuppositions that “take on the status of socially recognized givens” (p. 303) 
shared by members of a speech community. While Preston’s (1994) analysis of presuppositional 
content of arguments was mainly linked with local interactional concerns and participants’ 
identity positions, Thøgersen (2010) views presuppositions as indicative of participants’ 
assumptions about the sharedness of background knowledge structures with the interlocutors. 
Both analytical techniques, however, emphasize rhetorical functions of argument components, 
such as “position,” “support,” and “dispute,” over the conceptual and inferential relations in 
argument structures.  
This study presents a different rhetorical approach to folk-linguistic discourse which uses 
the New Rhetoric theory (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) as a framework that establishes a 
view of propositional socioindexical processes in terms of cognitive coordination of interlocutors’ 
perspectives based on objects of agreement as well as in terms of speakers’ use of associations 





2.10 Concluding Remarks 
 Different approaches to metalinguistic discourse can contribute various perspectives on 
the social-semiotic and meta-semiotic processes involved in constructions of sociolinguistic 
indexical relations in the local interactional and larger societal contextual frames. Distinguishing 
the levels of analysis based on a theory of discourse coherence highlights important differences in 
the amount of analytical attention researchers give to such aspects of language ideology 
construction as (1) speakers’ engagement with ideas about language variation, (2) speakers’ 
linguistic choices reflecting their awareness of and sensitivity to sociolinguistic variation, (3) 
cognitive and metacognitive aspects of sociolinguistic belief construction, (4) dependence of 
language-ideological expressions on the context of interaction, and (5) use of argumentation 
strategies to construct relations between social and linguistic forms. Analyses at these different 
levels may proceed differently: for example, while linguistically-oriented analyses tend to begin 
with an examination of linguistic features in the data with no a-priori assumptions about possible 
influences of the context, a rhetorical analysis tends to begin by considering discourse 
development in terms of existing theories of communication and then moves to the analysis of 
linguistic forms and context-bound discourse meanings.   
Interactional and rhetorical approaches integrated with fine-grained analyses of 
participants’ linguistic choices may allow for studying metalinguistic discourse in terms of such 
highly contextualized reflexive social activities as stance-taking, identity-making, performativity 
and stylization (see Bucholtz & Hall, 2008; Coupland, 2007; Eckert, 2012; and Pennycook, 2003 
for discussions of these concepts). Such approaches create frameworks for the study of language 
regard that underscore the role of meaning creation, intersubjectivity, and individual voice in the 




Contemporary understanding of discourse processes warrants integration of several levels 
of analysis since “discourse cannot be considered the result of any single dimension or aspect of 
talk from either speaker or hearer alone” (Schiffrin, 1987, p. 20).  Approaches that combine 
several levels of analysis may be seen as a way to overcome a number of potential analytic 
shortcomings of applying discourse analysis to the study of social psychological phenomena. 
Specifically, a multi-level principled analysis may help avoid the problems that Antaki, Billig, 
Edwards, and Potter (2003, p. 3) have warned against, such as under-analysis of data, the problem 
of circularity in identification of discourses and mental constructs, and “simply spotting features” 
in the data. Multi-level, theoretically-informed approaches may allow a discourse analyst to more 
fully account for the complexity of language attitude construction in everyday interaction and 
explore the content of the discoursal data in a comprehensive way, beyond a surface level of 
simply summarizing the main themes.  
This review reveals that analyses performed at different levels of discourse-based 
examination of explicit and implicit language attitudes expose various aspects of social-semiotic 
and meta-semiotic processes involved in constructions of sociolinguistic indexical relations in the 
local interactional and larger contextual frames. Thus, this review shows that applications of 
discourse analysis are well-suited for revealing the complexity characterizing sociolinguistic 
indexical relations constructed in everyday metalinguistic discourse.  A discourse-based study 
may uncover both idiosyncratic and more representative aspects of language-ideological 
constructions. This is in contrast with more abstract generalizations of larger-scale quantitative 






THE NEW RHETORIC APPROACH AS A DISCOURSE-BASED METHOD OF STUDYING 
PROPOSITIONAL PROCESSES OF SOCIOLINGUISTIC INDEXICALITY 
 
3.1 Organizational Overview 
 This chapter presents selected aspects of the New Rhetoric theory, explains and discusses 
the affordances of this approach for a study of everyday argumentation and sociolinguistic 
indexical relations constructed in folk-linguistic discourse. It also illustrates such applications 
using samples of folk-linguistic discoursal data. This chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 
gives a general introduction to the New Rhetoric approach to argumentation; section 3.3 explains 
the application of the New Rhetoric in this dissertation; section 3.4 discusses the rhetorical 
construct of audience; section 3.5 discusses the rhetorical construct of audience agreement; 
section 3.6 presents the rhetorical construct of audience agreement; section 3.6 explains, 
discusses, and illustrates the application of the construct “objects of agreement” including “facts,” 
“truths,” “presumptions,” and “values”; and section 3.7 explains, discusses, and illustrates the 
application of the theory of argumentation techniques, including arguments that rely on 




3.2 The New Rhetoric Approach to Argumentation 
In this dissertation, I apply the theory of argumentation developed in the New Rhetoric 
(TNR) (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) to the study of folk-linguistic discourse. TNR 
defines the object of argumentation as “the study of discursive techniques allowing us to induce 
or to increase the mind’s adherence to the theses presented for its assent” (p. 4, emphasis in the 
original). This rhetorical approach does not view argumentation as a special form of discourse or 
as a form of resolving disagreement (e.g., van Eemeren, 2010). The object of study in the New 
Rhetoric has a wider scope than that in classical rhetoric and in a number of other rhetorical 
theories. The object of study in TNR includes, in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s words, both 
written and spoken speech, the epideictic genre, self-directed speech, discussion with a single 
interlocutor, formal discourse, and even “the fragmentary expression of thought” (1969, p. 7). 
Although examples given in TNR are mainly derived from written sources, this theory has the 
potential of wider applications to different types of everyday communication, including informal 
spoken discourse.  
TNR perspective on the role of argumentativity in everyday discourse is theoretically 
similar to the pragmatic framework of intersubjectivity (Verhagen, 2005), according to which, in 
linguistic communication, 
… engaging in cognitive coordination comes down to, for the speaker/writer, an attempt 
to influence someone else’s thoughts, attitudes, or even immediate behavior. For the 
addressee it involves finding out what kind of influence it is that the speaker/writer is 
trying to exert, and deciding to go along with it or not (p. 10). 
In other words, in linguistic communication, “… every utterance is taken as orienting the 
addressee towards certain conclusions by invoking some shared model in which the object of 
conceptualization figures” (p. 12). This view is in line with an approach to human communication 
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developed within Interactional Sociolinguistics, according to which “… communication is always 
intentional in that participants respond to their perceived understanding of the other’s 
communicative intent, and everyday language relies on simultaneously conveyed symbolic and 
indexical signs” (Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz, 2007, p. 484).    
TNR’s broad approach to the role of argumentation in linguistic communication 
represents a multidimensional perspective which integrates the pragmatic, cognitive, and 
rhetorical aspects of argumentativity. In particular, TNR’s view of discursive techniques in terms 
of their functioning in gaining the assent of the audience reflects several fundamental and 
interrelated pragmatic and cognitive aspects of communication, including the discursive 
processes of cognitive coordination of interlocutors’ points of view and contextualized 
embeddedness of argumentation in pragmatic relations in discourse which is realized, for 
example, in the ways speakers rely on assumptions about the knowledge and values shared with 
the audience, or use rhetorical techniques to modify the presentation of knowledge structures in a 
way which is more likely to enhance hearers’ assent or achieve other rhetorical purposes. TNR’s 
analysis of argumentation pays close attention to the contextual (rhetorical) effects of 
communication on the audience achieved by relying on common patterns in informal logic that 
represent generalized models of human reasoning.  TNR provides an extensive descriptive 
catalogue of these patterns which are based on inferential relations between the components of 
argument structure. These relations are broadly viewed in TNR in terms of a cognitive dimension 
actualized in the processes of association and dissociation of concepts that underlie all 
argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 190). The focus on these processes in 
TNR analysis of argumentation reflects its potential to illuminate the conceptual structure and 
complex conceptual relations between argument components as well as the conceptual and 




In TNR view, the effects of argumentation on the audience are achieved not only by 
relying on the common structures of the reasonable. Such effects are also achieved by the 
selection of the linguistic means of presentation of the data and form of discourse. In a separate 
chapter of the treatise (1969, pp. 142-183), TNR provides a detailed and insightful discussion of 
the effects of linguistic choices, including lexical, grammatical, sequential, and stylistic choices, 
as well as the effects of the selection of the form of discourse. TNR sees the effectiveness of 
linguistic means of presentation in their ability to act upon the audience by foregrounding certain 
elements in the conceptual structure. The techniques of linguistic presentation are important, 
according to TNR, 
 “not only in all argumentation aiming at immediate action, but also in that which aspires 
to give the mind a certain orientation, to make certain schemes of interpretation prevail, 
to insert the elements of agreement into a framework that will give them significance and 
confer upon them the rank they deserve” (p. 142).   
By foregrounding certain conceptual elements and schemes of interpretation in discourse, 
speakers achieve the effect of their heightened “presence” in the consciousness of the hearer. 
Effects of linguistic presentation, however, depend on the context of communication. Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca strongly argue against studying linguistic presentation techniques, stylistic 
structures and figures “independently of the purpose they must achieve in the argumentation” (p. 
142). In other words, they “refuse to separate the form of the discourse from its substance” (p. 
142). In addition, they do not include in their study the aesthetic effects created by forms of 
expression.      
The integration of rhetorical and discourse-analytic perspectives in analyses of everyday 
talk has been implemented in different disciplines, including rhetoric (Amossy, 2005, 2009a, 
2009b), social psychology (e.g., Billig, 1987; Antaki & Leudar, 1992), and discourse analysis 
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(e.g., Quasthoff, 1978; Lauerbach, 2007; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2011). Amossy’s (2009a, 
2009b) application of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric (1969) in a discourse-
analytic study of reasoning patterns demonstrates that such an adaptation has important 
consequences for linguistics since discursive strategies and argumentative logic are interrelated 
aspects of meaning creation that complement each other and, taken together, provide a more 
holistic picture of how meanings are constructed argumentatively in discourse within specific 
social constraints.  
3.3 The Application of the New Rhetoric in this Dissertation 
The cognitive, pragmatic, and linguistic dimensions in theorizing argumentativity within 
TNR framework form its potential to serve as a unifying approach to meaning-making processes 
in discourse. To extend the reach of the analysis and support analytic interpretations of discourse-
based meanings with research-based evidence, I supplement TNR approach with the insights 
from several fields of study: (1) the field of conversation analysis that has explored the micro-
interactional effects of subtle differences in speakers’ linguistic choices, (2) the field of  
sociology with its work on interaction structure (e.g., Goffman, 1983) and on a number of 
concepts relevant to the processes of sociological differentiation displayed in folk-linguistic 
discourse, and (3) theories of metapragmatics developed in linguistic anthropology (e.g., 
Silverstein, 2003; Agha, 2007). Metapragmatic theories play a special role in this application 
since they allow the analyst to see association and dissociation processes in argumentation as part 
of metasemiotic processes of meaning creation that underlie sociolinguistic differentiation. The 
purpose of the proposed application is to shed light on the propositional processes of 
sociolinguistic indexicality revealed in folk-linguistic discourse. Thus, the samples of analysis 
illustrate various affordances of this approach in the context of the current developments within 
the field of sociolinguistics. The application of this approach to the study of discursively-
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constructed meanings of a specific folk-linguistic concept is illustrated in the analysis of the 
constructions of “twang” in Chapter IV.  
The rhetorical approach illustrated in this dissertation applies the descriptive dimension 
of argumentation theory to the study of language attitudes and ideologies. In other words, the 
purpose of this application is not to evaluate the logical validity of arguments, but to use theories 
of rhetoric and the descriptive inventories of argumentation techniques (e.g. Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Walton, 2008) in order to examine the propositional content of 
metalinguistic beliefs, the relations between conceptual constituents of belief structures, as well 
as linguistic and rhetorical means of presentation of such structures revealed in conversations 
about language. 
The examples used in this dissertation were selected to illustrate various aspects of the 
proposed approach. They were taken from a set of 14 one-on-one and multi-party interviews, 
follow-up interviews, and focus group discussions I collected in 2013-2016 from the residents of 
central Oklahoma, mainly in Oklahoma City and its suburbs. The participant characteristics and 
the context of the interviews are explained as they become relevant to the samples of detailed 
analyses. Most of the interviews and focus groups were loosely structured: the interviewer’s 
strategy was to remain as “invisible” as possible while directing the conversations to the topic of 
English language variation in the US and in Oklahoma. This interviewing strategy was chosen to 
elicit the type of discourse in which participants have topical control – this type of data resembles 
natural discourse development characteristic of the context of everyday talk. In some 
conversations, a map-drawing technique (Preston, 1989) was used as a conversation starter. Some 
participants in one-on-one interviews were asked to listen to several voice samples and comment 
on their perceptions of linguistic differences. Different interview contexts had an influence on the 
rhetorical and interactional development in the conversations, and these differences will be 
discussed as they become relevant to the analyses. I recorded the interviews using Marantz PMD-
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660 digital recorder with an AT831b miniature cardioid condenser microphone. I transcribed the 
interviews using transcription conventions provided in Appendix A. In some examples that 
integrate acoustic analyses with analyses of rhetorical development, I used Praat software for 
acoustic measurements (Boersma & Weenink, 2016).     
3.4 The Role of the Audience in Argumentation: The Perelmanian Construct of Audience 
The concept of audience plays a central role in the theory of rhetoric. TNR addresses a 
number of important cognitive and pragmatic dimensions of “audience” which can usefully 
contribute to the analysis of the propositional processes of sociolinguistic indexicality as they 
occur in everyday discoursal interaction.  
The Perelmanian framework of the rhetorical audience has been discussed extensively 
from several perspectives in argumentation theories, including the critical appraisal and 
development of the following theoretical problems: (1) “universal” and “particular” types of 
audience (e.g., Aikin, 2008; Crosswhite, 1989; Gross, 1999; Ray, 1978), (2) the role of the 
audience in argumentation and persuasion (e.g., Aikin, 2008; Long, 1983), (3) the locus of the 
concept of audience (e.g., van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1995), (4) ways of implying and 
achieving audience agreement (Long, 1983), and (5) the development of the speaker’s concept of 
audience throughout discourse interaction (e.g., Gross, 1999). For a discourse-analytic application 
of TNR theory of audience, all of the abovementioned theoretical problems are relevant since 
they offer valuable perspectives for the analysis of a number of rhetorical strategies affecting 
discourse development.  
TNR locates the audience in the mind of the arguer as a mental, “systematized 
construction” (p. 19) influenced by the arguer’s social milieu which is “distinguishable in terms 
of its dominant opinions and unquestioned beliefs, of the premises that it takes for granted 
without hesitation” (p. 20). In the arguer’s adaptation to the audience, these premises and 
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assumptions are used as part of inference structures. This understanding of the locus of audience 
in argumentation is in line with cognitive and social psychologists’ conceptions of inference, 
judgment, and reasoning as both cognitive (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and socioculturally-bound 
(e.g., Hilton, 1995) processes. Viewing audience as the arguer’s mental construct also has 
interesting parallels with the theories of mental processes in cognitive linguistics, including the 
notions of “mental spaces” (Fauconnier, 1994), “framing” (Fillmore, 1976), and “conceptual 
blending” (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002): underlying these theories is the idea of mental 
“projection” that connects conceptual structures (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998). The Perelmanian 
view of the locus of audience is essentially that of a mental projection that conceptually integrates 
social information about the audience into inference structures used by the arguer. These mental 
projections may be seen as the realization of the indexical function of language that establishes a 
connection between the pragmatic phenomena in the immediate context to macrosocial 
representations that argumentation relies on.    
One of the important theoretical constructs underlying Perelman’s framework is the idea 
of “universal audience” which is defined as anyone to whom the argument is addressed (Perelman 
& Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 7). This concept explains Perelman’s focus on the structures of 
informal reasoning: the ability to comprehend and evaluate such structures is characteristic of any 
rational human being and can be assumed by arguers in their constructions of the image of the 
audience. The concept of “universal audience” is helpful in understanding the ideational function 
of ideologies. The arguer’s reliance on commonly accepted structures of practical reasoning is 
implicated in construction of inferential links that connect different conceptual elements in 
ideological structures of sociolinguistic indexicality. Appeals to reasonableness involving the use 
of commonly accepted inferential structures may be seen as one of the fundamental 
argumentation strategies (cf. Fetzer, 2007) in arguers’ efforts to justify, rationalize, or negotiate 
the validity of language attitudes and ideologies.  
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 At the same time, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca position the value of their study of 
argumentation in relation to the attention they give to the various characteristics of “particular” 
audiences and their concrete realizations in argumentation (1969, p. 26). They define a “particular 
audience” as “the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation” 
(p. 19). A particular audience can also be described as having certain qualities of the universal 
audience since there are patterns of reasoning that generally enjoy the validity independent of the 
local or historical contexts (p. 32).  Any particular audience, in a generalized construction of the 
arguer, may be seen as unanimous, or “universal,” in its reliance on certain beliefs, expectations, 
knowledge, or qualifications that the audience members share (p. 34). Thus, as Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca conclude, “audiences are not independent on one another,” and they can be said 
to “pass judgment on one another” (p. 35). 
In addition to rhetoric, “audience” as a mental construction in the mind of the speaker is 
one of the fundamental notions in other theories of human interaction developed within various 
fields of knowledge, including sociology, social psychology, pragmatics, and sociolinguistics. 
One of the influential sociological views of “audience” formulates the centrality of “audience” in 
terms of a cognitive relationship that underlies all human interaction: 
 At the very center of interaction life is the cognitive relation we have with those present 
before us, without which relationship our activity, behavioral and verbal, could not be 
meaningfully organized. And although this cognitive relationship can be modified during 
a social contact, and typically is, the relationship itself is extrasituational, consisting of 
the information a pair of persons have about the information each other has of the world, 
and the information they have (or haven't) concerning the possession of this information 
(Goffman, 1983, pp. 4-5). 
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From the perspective of Interactional Sociolinguistics, understanding crucially involves the 
notion of audience since conversational involvement cannot exist without interlocutors’ reliance 
on their (often implicit) agreements on a variety of social and language-related conventions and 
context-bound interpretations (Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz, 2007, p. 484).  
This rhetorical conception of “audience” is of interest to the scholars of language 
ideologies since ideological constructions involve systems of socially constructed beliefs, 
knowledge, expectations, and judgments that particular audiences and members of speech 
communities share or do not share. The rhetorical perspectives on “audience” may help explain 
contextual and cognitive aspects of the metapragmatic functioning of dialectal and other linguistic 
differences as ideological entities. Specifically, arguers’ construals of the characteristics of their 
audience may define the ways people select, present, and develop their ideas about dialectal and 
other linguistic differences in everyday communication in relation to socially-motivated forms of 
group organization. Audience construals may contextualize relationships between social 
groupness and linguistic typifications through participants’ stances towards interactants expressed 
in the form of positioning, interactional alignment, and “footings” (Goffman, 1981) in everyday 
discussions about language variation. Rhetorical construals of audience are also reflected in the 
choice and form of presentation of knowledge structures related to constructions of 
sociolinguistic beliefs.  
Phenomena of language contextualization are “inherently indexical,” according to 
Silverstein (1993, p. 55), and “audience” may be seen as a construal of contextualization in 
broader social-semiotic and sociological terms. This perspective will be revealed in the sample 
data analyses in this manuscript which view sociolinguistic indexical relations constructed (and 
often jointly co-constructed by several participants) in metalinguistic discourse in light of 
participants’ rhetorically-motivated choices.  
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3.5 Audience agreement 
Argument can be seen as part of conversational interaction in which the arguer needs to 
choose and refer to those parts of shared social knowledge which are more likely to be accepted 
by the audience in a given context of argumentation, based on the arguer’s assumptions (Bigi & 
Greco Morasso, 2012). Studying appeals to shared knowledge in discourse on language attitudes 
and ideologies may shed light on how this body of knowledge is organized conceptually at the 
macro-level. This information may also be used as a clue to understanding the ways in which 
participants in metalinguistic discourse construe their stances and identities in the micro-context 
of communication. 
TNR views audience agreement as essential for all argumentation (p. 14). Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) emphasize the pragmatic dimension of argumentation when they discuss 
how audience agreement is constructed with regard to the following complex factors: (1) both 
internal and external motivations of the arguer and the audience to participate in discourse (pp. 
16-17), (2) the arguer’s and interlocutor’s memberships in the social class and other social groups 
characterized by “dominant opinions and unquestioned beliefs” (pp. 17, 20, 22), (3) a composite 
nature of audiences and the diversity of roles, personalities, and stances that may be assumed by 
the audience and the arguer (pp. 21-23), (4) the qualities that give the arguer “authority for 
speaking” (p. 18), and (5) the arguer’s adaptation of the speech to the audience (pp. 23-26).  
In addition to outlining these theoretical issues, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) 
elaborate on the realization of the construct “audience” in the use of various presentational and 
organizational aspects of argument development, including the arguer’s selection of the 
following: (1) the point of departure in an argument, (2) forms of support for conclusions, (3) the 
source of evidence the conclusions rely on, and (4) presentational devices (linguistic and 
rhetorical) used to formulate positions. This section elaborates on the theoretical frameworks 
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pertinent to the understanding of these strategies and their role in the study of metalinguistic 
discourse. The importance of the rhetorical construct “audience agreement” for the study of 
language ideologies may be seen if we consider that language-ideological constructs operate with 
reliance on their macro-social function realized in discourse in the form of presuppositions about 
the social sharedness of ideologies that circulate in certain speech communities and become 
instantiated in micro-social contexts of everyday interaction.  
3.6 Objects of Agreement 
Agreement of the audience, in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) theory, is 
presupposed in the way argumentation begins and in the way it unfolds (p. 65).  The arguer’s 
assumptions about audience agreement may be revealed in the choice of argument premises, 
connecting links used in argument, and in the manner of using connecting links.  TNR states that 
argument premises which may serve as a point of departure in argument can be of different types: 
“the real” which include “facts,” “truths,” and “presumptions,” and “the preferable” which 
include “values, hierarchies, and lines of argument relating to the preferable” (p. 66). In 
argumentation theory, these distinctions are important mainly in terms of achieving 
persuasiveness in argument by way of choosing the most effective starting point of 
argumentation.  In the analysis of folk linguistic discourse, however, the usefulness of these 
distinctions lies in their relation to the identification of the epistemic, pragmatic, and 
metapragmatic status of the knowledge and belief structures used in argument not only as a 
starting point but at different stages of argumentation as well. The use of these structures is part 
of indexical meaning-making processes that contribute to language ideology creation and 





3.6.1 Objects of Agreement: “Facts”  
Argument premises may use “facts” as “objects of precise, limited agreement” (Perelman 
& Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 69): “Facts” include both those that are “observed” based on 
established knowledge and experience and those that are “presumed” by the audience. Folk-
linguistic accounts of language variation often rely on explanations of linguistic differences in 
terms of historical, geographical, and social facts or their interpretations. Participants bring 
together these various factual aspects of reality when they build folk-linguistic theories that 
present ideological rationalizations of the processes of language variation and change.  
The choice of facts as premises in folk linguistic arguments may be seen as part of the 
process of objectivation1: the factual basis of an argument appears to create the objectivity of 
expression that enhances the persuasiveness of the argument. Objectivation may also allow the 
arguer to distance themselves, their own attitudes and subjective opinions from the evaluation and 
conceptualization of a sociolinguistic stereotype. The process of objectivation  in epistemic 
stance-taking in language ideology construction leads to the creation of a seemingly objective, 
rational, fact-based account rather than a subjective, attitude-laden, and possibly politically-
incorrect stereotype.   
Extract 1 given below shows an example of how several facts describing the climate, 
natural environment, ethnic composition, and cultural distinctiveness of the Southeastern area in 
Oklahoma are used to explain a different “intonation” in the region. While Tom does not explain 
how specifically the facts that he mentions are related to the distinctive “intonation” in the 
Southeast of Oklahoma, he seems to believe that the relations are real and that the audience may 
perceive that it is reasonable to postulate such relations. 
                                                             
1 In the sociology of knowledge, “objectivations” are usually defined in Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) 
terms as “enduring indices of the subjective processes of their producers, allowing their availability to 
extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be directly apprehended” (p. 49).  
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Extract 1   
1   Tom:   But if you go down into Southeastern Oklahoma, (0.4) you are going into a different climatic=  
2               =and linguistic area. It’s a different climate, (.) different geology, (.) the flora and fauna are=  
3               =different, (0.5) so pine forests, (.) rural area, (.) very white, (.) not diverse, (.) most people=  
4               =down there have lived there for generations, (0.5) and you will find a different intonation=  
5               =there than you would (0.4) in Ponca City or Woodward. 
 “Facts” that are used as part of the objectivation process may include those that have the 
real support from the extant research on the subject as well as those that are of purely folk-
linguistic nature. While the social facts of ethnic diversity and rootedness mentioned by Tom 
have been shown by sociolinguists to act as factors in language variation (e.g., Tillery, Bailey, & 
Wikle, 2004), the influence of natural conditions has not been supported by language scholars 
(Montgomery, 2008, p. 101). Nevertheless, the argument about the impact of natural environment 
on language differences is often revealed in folk comments. There is a widespread folk belief, for 
example, that the climate is responsible for some southern speech habits (Montgomery, 2008, p. 
101): long and hot summers in the South lead to a slower pace of life, according to the folk 
opinion, and a slower lifestyle reflects on the tempo of speech. This folk explanation, which has 
not been supported by sociolinguists (p. 101), uses the facts about the climate to explain the social 
stereotype about the Southern lifestyle which is then applied to an explanation of linguistic 
typifications of the Southern speech.  
The type of discourse illustrated in Extract 1 is an instantiation of the common 
metasemiotic process of “demonstrating naturalness” (Agha, 2007, p. 77) in which   
an isolable sign or performed sign structure is recontextualized through a metasemiotic 
treatment in relation to other sign phenomena of a more abstract or generic order…; such 
a treatment minimizes the appearance of the sign’s isolable arbitrariness (or contingent 
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form) and maximizes the appearance of its place (function, purpose) within the more 
totalizing order (the ‘nature’ of mind, society, cosmos, etc.).     
The argumentation in Extract 1 uses facticity to construct the linguistic distinction of the 
Southeastern part of Oklahoma as naturally motivated and objectified. The circulation of widely-
held folk beliefs about the influence of nature and climate on language use may contribute to 
reification of linguistic distinctions in terms of inevitable external influences brought about by 
natural causes.  According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), “reification can be described as an 
extreme step in the process of objectivation, whereby the objectivated world loses its 
comprehensibility as a human enterprise and becomes fixated as a non-human, non-humanizable, 
inert facticity” (p. 106).  
However, the process of objectivation may also be intertwined with subjective processes 
in discursive contexts. This reflects the dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity in discourse 
– the view which “does not allow the separation of an assertion from the person who makes it” 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 59). Extract 2, given below, illustrates a construction of 
the subjective meaningfulness of the facticity of a widely-held folk-linguistic belief. It shows how 
the stereotypic belief structure describing the cause of the perceived phenomenon of slower 
speech in Oklahoma integrates several categories of facts referring to the social and natural 
conditions of language use with the facts based on one’s subjective experience with these 
conditions: 
Extract 2 
1  Jocelyn: In Oklahoma City, we had the (0.5) asphalt (.) streets, (0.4) the temperatures were a hundred= 
2                 =plus, (1.0) We did not have air conditioning. (1.5)  ((about 1 min. of omitted talk about air 
3                 conditioners) But (.) the concept of air conditioning in a home or a business, (.) was unknown= 
4                 =at the time. (.) And this would have been in 1960. (1.5) So_ (.) I came back, ((to Oklahoma 
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5                 City after living in San Francisco for some time)), and, (1.0) in order to (.) stay ali:ve, (.) 
6                  you had to walk more slowly. (.) And people spoke more slowly. (0.2) Everything was being=  
7                  =done more slowly, (.) for (.) er (1.3) sustenance. ((about 3 min. of omitted talk about cooler  
8                  weather in San Francisco)) And I found that when I slowed down in my speech, (1.2) equally=  
9                 =was slowing down in my walk, (0.5) I went back to the Oklahoma twang, (0.2) if you will_ (.) 
10               = I NEVER did speak (.) I never did speak quite twangy_  ((about 2 min. of omitted talk about 
11                the places outside Oklahoma Jocelyn lived in)) I’ve been around other cultures enough, that= 
12                my parents’ speech (0.6) was (.) a more educated speech.  (1.2) And so, (0.4) I went back into=  
13               =an Oklahoma twa:ng. (1.0) The minute I did that, (0.6) it was as if I’d opened my arms and= 
14               =all my friends came back. (0.8) And so I practiced. (0.8) I practiced for a long (.) time, (0.6) 
15               = just trying, (.) planning when I was going to use colloquial speech, and when I was going to= 
16               = use more (0.5) proper speech. 
 
 This explanation of why Oklahomans spoke more slowly than people in San Francisco 
seems to have an objective, fact-driven character based on the references to the high temperatures 
in the summer, asphalt streets, and absence of air conditioning in Oklahoma at a certain period in 
time. Oh the other hand, Jocelyn’s account of the social and linguistic stereotype of Oklahoma 
English is embedded here into a subjective construction that engages identity-related processes as 
well as the participant’s personal, subjective experiences with different natural, social, and 
linguistic environments in two different regions of the United States. In Extract 2, Jocelyn 
engages in conscious introspection and reflection on how the socially shared stereotypic 
representations of Oklahoma English were part of her sociolinguistic awareness and how such 
representations were related to her conscious effort in building her social and linguistic identity. 
This construction underscores the empowering role of linguistic and metapragmatic awareness as 
well as the role of human agency in actively appropriating and strategically using the 
authenticating potential of linguistic variability in different social contexts. The juxtaposition of 
objectivation and subjectivity in this discursive construction counters the reification inherent in 
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the widely-held stereotypic beliefs about the deterministic influence of the natural environment 
and climate on language use.  
According to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 66), audience agreements are not 
static and should be viewed in light of the progress of discourse. The epistemic status of a 
knowledge structure which is presented as a “fact” in a metalinguistic argument may change in 
the process of conversational interaction and become an object of disagreement, as illustrated 
below in Extract 3. This episode begins with an answer to the interviewer’s question inquiring 
about the U.S. English accents that sound more or less educated. The speakers in this episode are 
husband and wife. 
Extract 3  
1    Curt:  Southern. (.) Without a doubt, (0.2) less educated [because- 
2    Jane:                                                                                   [Southern is less educated? 
3    Curt:  Oh yeah. (0.2) because,  
4    Jane:  That’s a prejudice. 
5    Curt:  Yeah. (0.2) It is a prejudice. (0.5) But it’s also because if you wanna look, (0.2) if you look at= 
6               = the states with the worst educational systems, (0.5) you look in the Southeast. I mean, (0.6) 
7                 Oklahoma can make fun of them that’s how bad it is. (0.5) So, (.) you know, (.) Louisiana, (.) 
8                 Arkansas, (.) Mississippi is the worst.  
In this episode, the stereotypic belief that Southern English sounds less educated, which 
is widely-held in the U.S. (Preston, 1999), is initially presented as having the status of an 
uncontroverted “fact” in this discourse. This status is clearly signaled in line 1 by the marker of 
epistemic stance “without a doubt.”  However, this seemingly factual statement is immediately 
questioned by another discourse participant, Curt’s wife, who labels it “a prejudice.” While Curt 
agrees that it is a prejudice, he does not accept it as his subjective prejudiced attitude. Rather, he 
supports his proposition by referring to the facts based on his social knowledge about the relative 
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quality of education in the US regions which, in this argument, serves as a rationalization of what 
has been dubbed as “a prejudice” about “uneducated” Southern English. In this construction, 
facticity serves to justify the belief that another participant indexes as a subjective, prejudiced 
evaluation. It also serves to distance the speaker’s self from the belief through objectivation by 
indexing the evaluative assessment to the macro-sociological level of conceptualization. This 
episode shows that negotiations of an epistemic status of a proposition in folk-linguistic discourse 
may be ideologically driven and reveal participants’ disagreements concerning the ideological 
and moral value of metapragmatic relations linking the linguistic to the social.   
Such examples illustrate the role of factual representations in the processes of 
sociolinguistic stereotyping and in the construction of underlying socioindexical relations. The 
circulation of the folk-linguistic theories that seem to be based on the facts linking social 
conditions, behaviors, and qualities of social groups to typifying linguistic behaviors may be seen 
as instantiations of the processes of enregisterment (Agha, 2007) of dialectal distinctions.  
3.6.2 Objects of Agreement: “Truths” 
The objectivation process in language ideology construction may also be realized in the 
use of another type of object of agreement referring to “the real” which Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca (1969) call a “truth.” TNR defines “truths” as “more complex systems relating to 
connections between “facts” such as religious or scientific theories (p. 69). In everyday talk about 
language, people build their own theories that connect linguistic and social facts into systematic 
relationships. Analytical propositions in the rhetorical form of a “truth” represent a common type 
of verbal expressions of stereotypic beliefs, according to Quasthoff’s classification (1973, as cited 
in Wodak, 1999, p. 182). Using “a truth” in a metalinguisitic argument introduces an element of 
objective analyticity and theorization into discursive, intersubjective ideological processes and 
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may be seen as an essential rhetorical strategy in building folk-linguistic theories as ideological 
models of linguistic distinctiveness.     
The following extract gives an example of how one discourse participant proposes a truth 
of a general kind which, in this micro-context of interaction, has the entailing projections of wider 
significance: it connects several stereotypic beliefs about social groups and their linguistic 
typifications into an ideological, macro-level system by proposing an explanatory folk-theoretic 
framework.  
Extract 4  
1   Sam:   You know what I’ve noticed, (0.4) I noticed that (0.2) you look at the (.) at the accent (.) like= 
2               = from the South. (0.4) Or at the accent from New York o::r (0.8) Michigan (.) or whatever. (.) 
3               And then you look at the way they (0.2) you know, (0.2) the culture they’re in, (0.8) and the= 
4                accent matches the way they live their life. (0.2) The New Yorkers are brash people, (.) you=  
5   Lynn:                                                                    uh-huh 
6   Sam:    =know, they are (0.4) very (0.2) upfront kind of (.) in your face, (0.2) they don’t hold back  
7               =what they are thinking, (0.4) they are they’re very (.) very >like that< (0.4) and the way they=  
8               =talk, (0.8) helps that. (.) >to communicate that.< 
9    Lynn:                                        yeah 
10   Sam:     And the Southerners are very kicked ↓back.(0.4) Southerners are very ↓polite. 
11   Jane:    La:id ba::ck 
12   Sam:    They’re very laid back, (.) and their dra::wl, (0.2) and the way they [ta:lk all the ti:me, (0.4)] 
13   Curt:                                                                                                                 [Well,/ it’s how they live.] 
14   Sam:    sort of sort of fosters that.  
15   Jane:                            uh-huh 
16   Curt:   So the Northeasterners, (0.2) they talk very fast, (.) they live fast.  
17   Sam:   Uh-huh 
18   Curt:   The Sourtherners, (0.8) sit on their porch all day. (0.5) So they speak ve::ry slo::w. 
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19   Sam:   It seems, (.) it seems that way. (0.5) I mean, (0.5) to me, (0.4) when I see the regions, (.) I see= 
20   Jane:  yeah 
21   Sam:     =the (.) the way they talk, (0.4) associated with the way they live kinda. (0.5) And [even in]=  
22   Jane:                                                                                                                                         [I agree] 
23   Sam:   =like Michigan, (.) in that area too.  
24   Curt:   Yeah. (.) And if you look at the West coast, (.) you know, they are (0.4) more (0.2) laissez-faire   
25              (0.4) they are more free, (0.5) and their language doesn’t follow any rules.  
26   Sam:   Yeah. “Hey dude, (.) what’s going on?” (.) you know, (0.5) “hang ten” and that sort of stuff. 
In this discourse episode, Sam builds an indexical association between “accents” and “ways of 
life” at a more abstract level of generalization: according to this proposition, there are similarities 
between lifestyles in certain regions and the ways of speaking typically associated with those 
regions.  Sam and two other participants in this episode co-construct an ideological model which 
brings together several stereotypic linguistic and social beliefs and uses abstraction to process 
them at a higher level of metapragmatic awareness. The co-construction of a mutual view of the 
indexical meanings is revealed in the participants’ contributions of supporting examples and 
linguistic imitations of distinctions among people living in the South, North and West of the 
United States. The participants’ support of Sam’s argument shows that his argumentation has 
achieved audience agreement.  
All the supporting examples that the participants readily supply express and imply 
stereotypic beliefs, and they are presented as agreed-upon, socially shared facts. This discursive 
construction indexes these stereotypic linkages as macro-socially available ideological constructs 
derived from familiar repertoires of social and linguistic identities. These stereotypes describe the 
Other, the out-group members: note the use of the third-person pronouns throughout this episode 
that enables the speakers to position their Selves as not belonging to the stereotypical social 
groups discussed in this episode.  
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Sam’s argument “the accent matches the way they live their life” serves as a 
“macroproposition” (van Dijk, 1982, p. 180), in this complex argumentation structure. This 
macroproposition subsumes several other supporting arguments co-constructed by the 
participants. This macroproposition creates local ideological coherence for several sociolinguistic 
typifications that are offered as interpretable within the proposed folk-linguistic theory. The 
stereotypes about the American South, the North, and the West cohere on the basis of the 
observed similarity which is a “match” between the culture and the “accents” of these regions. 
This conceptual association reveals “essentialization” of these perceived phenomena – the kind of 
process that Silverstein (2003, pp. 202-203) described as follows: 
An essentialization or naturalization is a discovery of ‘essenses’, qualities or 
characteristics predicable-as-true of individual things (including persons, events, signs of 
all sorts), and in particular predicable-as-true independent of the micro-contextual 
instance of presentation of the thing at issue. That is, to the ideological perception, 
essences perdure, and, when naturalized, they are grounded in cosmic absolutes, or at 
least relatively more cosmic and absolute frameworks-of-being than the micro-contextual 
indexicality with respect to which they manifest themselves. 
The “cosmic absolute” proposed by Sam identifies an iconic, essentializing motivation underlying 
widely-held stereotypic beliefs about social and linguistic differences in the US. It conceptualizes 
the semiotic process of “iconization” which has been described by Irvine and Gal (2009) as one 
of the three indexical relations fundamentally characterizing the ideological models of linguistic 
distinctiveness. “Iconization” includes representations of linguistic features in ways suggesting 
that the features somehow “depicted or displayed a social group’s inherent nature or essence” (p. 
403). The principle of iconicity identified by Sam in his folk-theoretic proposal is illustrated in 
this discourse by several co-constructed examples of the sociocultural “essenses” of major 
regional groups in the US whose linguistic behavior presumably displays their inherent nature. 
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In his proposal of this folk-theoretic idea, Sam is explicit about its subjective and 
tentative nature (i.e., the micro-contextual significance): he marks these epistemic statuses by 
phrases such as “I noticed,” “to me,” and “it seems” in lines 1 and 19. On the other hand, the 
analyticity of his proposition, its abstract nature of an explanatory generalization objectivizes 
stereotypic beliefs by rationalizing, validating them, and integrating them into a folk-theoretic 
system. The role and functioning of explanatory frameworks in everyday conceptualization has 
been identified by Fodor (1981, p. 62, as cited in Niedzielski & Preston, 2003, p. 322) as follows:  
Much everyday conceptualization depends on the exploitation of theories and explanatory 
models in terms of which experience is integrated and understood. Such pre-scientific 
theories, far from being mere functionless “pictures,” play an essential role in 
determining the sorts of perceptual and inductive expectations we form and the kinds of 
arguments and explanations we accept. 
The complex argumentation in this episode portrays an interpretation of the nexus 
between the linguistic and the social at the level of conceptualization and reflexivity that 
integrates stereotypical socioindexical constructs and affords predictive possibilities for future 
regimentation of ideological interpretations. This complex argumentation results from a higher-
level, n + 2d order of the indexical process which metapragamtically constructs a higher-order 
relation between existing n + 1st order metapragmatic relations. This study of propositional 
processes of sociolinguistic indexicality reveals that folk-linguistic theories may be built at the 
level of abstractness which integrates perceptions of socially-loaded typifying linguistic 
distinctions with higher-order ideological meanings of sociolinguistic differentiation. 
3.6.3 Objects of Agreement: Presumptions of the Normal 
What enables participants to draw together various social and linguistic facts and connect 
them into folk-linguistic theories is what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) call 
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“presumptions”: they are shared assumptions about “the existence, for each category of facts, and 
particularly for each category of behavior, of an aspect regarded as normal and capable of serving 
as a basis for reasoning” (p. 71). TNR does not postulate clear, unambiguous criteria 
differentiating “presumptions” from other objects of agreement. “Facts,” “truths,” and “values” 
can be presumed or may be stated explicitly, and the status of these objects of agreement in 
argumentation may change as discourse unfolds. Some examples of presumptions of general 
nature include an assumption of truthfulness of a speaker’s contribution in communication, “the 
presumption that the quality of an act reveals the quality of the person responsible for it,” and 
“the presumption concerning the sensible character of any human action” (pp. 70-71). There are 
similarities in Perelman’s conception of “presumptions” and in Grice’s (1975) and Searle’s 
(1969) pragmatic theories: they are based on the idea of conventionality in meaning interpretation 
which parallels the Perelmanian focus on the connection between presumptions and the 
conceptualization of what is “normal” and “likely.”   
In terms of indexicality theory, the Perelmanian “presumptions” are presuppositional 
meaning projections in the indexical mode of semiotic sign relations. Analytical attention to 
presuppositional meanings is important since “the most robust and effective metapragmatic 
function is implicit, not denotationally explicit” (Silverstein, 2003, p. 196). Presuppositional 
meanings, according to Silverstein (2003), point to “… what is already established between 
interacting sign-users, at least implicitly, as ‘context’ to which the propriety of their usage … 
appeals” (p. 195). The Perelmanian approach to presumptions with its focus on what is “normal” 
and “likely” expresses the idea of an underlying macro-sociological schematization of social 
“appropriateness” of indexical signs to their contexts of use, which establishes, according to 
Silverstein (2003, p. 193), a dialectic relationship between micro- and macro-contextual 
meanings.   
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Presuppositions are also in a dialectical relationship with entailments, or “effectiveness-
in” context (2003, p. 195) of an indexical relation. What Silverstein calls “pragmatic entailments” 
TNR discusses as effects of argumentation on the audience. Effectiveness of argumentation is one 
of the central aspects that distinguish the Perelmanian approach to argumentation – TNR is 
primarily about the effects argumentation has on the audience and how such effects are achieved 
rather than about the structure of argumentation. Using TNR as an analytic lens in the exploration 
of presuppositional meanings has the advantage of supplying the rhetorical framework that allows 
the analyst to view presumptions in their interrelations, constructed both within and across 
discourse episodes, with the rhetorical effectiveness of the indexical structure underlying an 
ideological construal.   
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) view of presumptions in relation to the arguer’s 
and the audience’s shared assumptions of the normal is a potentially useful perspective in the 
analysis of metalinguistic discourse since linguistic and social differentiation is fundamentally 
premised on agreements with regard to what constitutes linguistic and social norms and 
deviations from such norms. In broader terms, “The potential for [normativity] is latent in every 
communicative act, and the impulse behind it pervades our habits of thought and behavior” 
(Cameron, 1995, p. 9, as cited in Johnstone et al., 2006, p. 100). According to Agha’s (2007) 
social theory of language, normativity, which is in a dialectic relationship with “tropic 
variability,” underlies the social processes of enregisterment.  The norms underlying such 
processes may include baseline defaults in the sound patterns, as well as norms of denotation and 
interaction (p. 124). In sociolinguistic research, the traditional Labovian approach to 
sociolinguistic analysis regards norms, such as “sociolinguistic markers,” as features that define 
speech communities (Labov, 1972, p. 179). 
According to Agha (2007), normativity may be realized in several gradations of overt 
semiotic behaviors including (1) externally observable patterning of behavior, (2) normalized, 
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reflexive models of behavior “recognized as ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ by (at least some) actors,” and 
(3) normative models of behavior “linked to standards whose breach results in sanctions” (p. 
126). These “thresholds of normativity” help distinguish norms derived from statistical 
observations of predominant behavior patterns from norms based on recognition of social 
typifications and those based on prescriptive standards. 
Analyses of what is presumed to be normal in metapragmatic discourse may reveal folk-
linguistic abstractions of the baseline defaults used to conceptualize others’ and one’s own social 
and linguistic behavior as part of normalized and normative reflexive models. Presumptions of 
the normal underlie the processes of essentialization and stereotyping that lead to ideological 
constructions of characteristic features of sociolects, including dialects and speaking styles 
associated with certain social identities, persona types, and characterological figures. Analyses of 
presumptions of normality may shed light on how these processes develop metapragmatically and 
how assumptions about norms and standards are implicated in speakers’ positionings of their 
identities and their alignments with social groups. Such analyses can also help illuminate 
ideological constructions of sociolinguistic differences from many angles including, for example, 
questions concerning the kinds of speech norms that are stereotypically associated with certain 
sociolects, discursive constructions of deviations from norms and their violations, attitudinal 
evaluations of norms and their deviants, as well as acquisition of speech norms and 
accommodation to them.  
Presumptions of normality, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) observed, always 
depend on a reference group which can be conceptualized differently: 
 Sometimes one thinks of the real or fictitious group acting in a certain manner, 
sometimes of the common opinion held with respect to those who act in this way or of 
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the opinion of those regarded as spokesmen for this common opinion or of what is 
commonly considered to be the opinion of these spokesmen (p. 72). 
From this perspective, a reference group in assumptions of the normal is a mental construct in 
the mind of the arguer. This construct functions as a cognitive point of reference in presumptions 
of linguistic and social norms. It is based on typifications and abstractions of what is assumed to 
be the predominant or authoritative views in a certain real or imagined reference group. Such 
typifications constitute what Agha (2007) calls “a reflexive model” of normativity which has its 
“social range” consisting of people who exhibit a certain type of social and linguistic behavior 
and “a social domain” consisting of people who evaluate or reflect on this behavior (p. 125). 
Perelman’s and Agha’s views of normativity highlight the fact that there may be multiple 
normative models co-existing and competing in the same speech community. Such models may 
undergo change which may result from the variability in social and linguistic behavior (Agha, 
2007, p. 5) and lead to the emergence of new norms and new imagined and real reference groups. 
 The theory of reference groups has been extensively developed as one of the fundamental 
sociological and social-psychological frameworks explaining the patterns in social behavior and 
the processes of social identification, social categorization, and value and attitude formation. 
More specifically, the mental construct of a reference group is part of “a subjective frame of 
reference” which is based on the processes of social comparison: Through these processes, 
people realize their need to establish veracity of their beliefs and opinions while relying on the 
agreement of the reference group which helps to gain confidence in the truth of one’s beliefs 
(Abrams & Hogg, 2006). Social comparison and perceptions of ingroup/outgroup relations are 
also crucially involved in the processes of self- and other-categorization and social stereotyping 
(Tajfel, 1982). The rhetorical perspective on these processes in the framework of a discourse-
based analysis offers a way of analyzing their discursive instantiations in the context of 
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individuals’ interactional and argumentative engagement with other speakers and in the co-text 
of co-occuring metasemiotic signs and their relations.  
If we look back at the data in Extract 4 given in the previous section, we can see how the 
arguments supporting the macroproposition in this episode construe essentializing typifications 
of social and linguistic behavior that characterize several sociolects. These constructions are 
based on presumptions of normality of the behavior patterns stereotypically associated with 
certain speech communities. In terms of social behavior, the participants presume that a cultural 
norm for the New Yorkers is to be “brash,” “upfront,” and to live fast, for the Southerners – to be 
“kicked back,” and for the Westerners – to be free from rules. In terms of linguistic behavior, the 
presumed norm for the New Yorkers and Northeasterners is to talk fast, for the Southerners – to 
talk slow, and for the Westerners – to “not follow any rules.” The social range of these 
normalized reflexive models is generalized to anyone who represents the sociolects delineated 
along psychologically salient regional boundaries (with the exception of New York which is 
semiotized here as being on par in comparison with larger regional distinctions). The social 
domain of these normalized models – the people who reflect on and evaluate the conceptualized 
behavior – consists of the arguers themselves, since in the constructions of their footings and 
alignments in this episode the participants do not position themselves as belonging to the typified 
social groups. In this conceptualization, the norms of linguistic behavior of the outgroups are 
presented as deviant from the norms of the speakers’ ingroup. In other words, one’s own 
linguistic variety is taken to be the default baseline in identification of sociolinguistic distinctions 
– a cognitive operation characteristic of self- and other-categorization and stereotyping processes 
(Abrams & Hogg, 2006). Recall that presumptions of socially-typifying norms in this episode 
serve the rhetorical purpose of supporting the folk-theoretic proposition that “accents” match the 
ways people live their lives. By comparing the patterns of linguistic and social norms within the 
normalized models and by bringing models of regional variation into a comparative ideological 
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scheme, the participants co-construct a rhetorical support for the folk theory proposed in this 
discourse episode.  
The presumption of one’s own variety as the default baseline in comparative schemes of 
normality is of course a ubiquitous strategy in everyday folk-linguistic discourse and, more 
generally, in perceptions of linguistic distinctiveness. In discourse, this presumption is commonly 
used in metapragmatic arguments which express the idea that “they speak very different”: 
“different” often presupposes the difference from one’s own group. Presumptions of norms 
underlying discursively-constructed distinctions between one’s own variety and the outgroup 
variety may be analyzed in terms of what Agha (2007) calls “denotational” and “interactional” 
norms in language use. “Denotation of an expression involves a norm of class membership” (p. 
87), and “interactional norms” reflect the conventions of the social functioning of a linguistic 
expression, such as appropriateness of its use in certain social contexts (p. 85). Extract 5, which is 
given below, illustrates this type of analysis. This excerpt is part of a longer discussion about the 
distinctiveness of African American English.  
Extract 5 
1   Sam     And there’s different meanings to some of the words, (.) sometimes they’ll use the=  
2   Lynn                                                                                       [Yeah] 
3   Jane                                                                                            [yes] 
4   Sam     =same word that’ll have the meaning, (.) that we have no idea of what it ↓[means.] 
5   Curt                                                                                                                           [oh yes] “Oh yo man, 
6                  (.) that girl is ↓pha:t” [(0.8) And of] course it’s P-H-A-T (.) for pretty hot [and tempting]_ 
7   Sam                                         [((laughter))]                                                               [((laughter))  ] 
 
In this passage, Sam’s use of personal pronouns creates a division into “us” and “them” which 
positions the discourse participants, all of whom are White, as belonging to the ingroup 
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contrasted with the outgroup of African Americans on the basis of the differences in the 
circulation of denotational stereotypes in the two communities. All the other participants express 
their symmetrical alignment with this stance. Curt expresses his alignment by citing “phat” as an 
example of intergroup differences and by performing an imitation that illustrates how “phat” can 
be used in the context of evaluation of a woman’s sexual attractiveness. This semiotic 
performance is seemingly metasemantic, but the norm itself - the denotational meaning of the 
lexical item “phat” that draws on sexually-loaded connotations - and the implied interactional 
norm of its contextual appropriateness serve metapragmatically to anchor the African American 
variety in an indexical association with the types of social identities evoked by Curt’s imitation. 
These evoked identities may include those that draw on male youth street culture, hip-hop culture, 
or the situations of casual, sexually-loaded talk among men. Although the types of identities 
evoked by this discursive act depend on the social and linguistic experience of the audience, the 
contextual effect of this entailing meaning projection lies in the layering of indexical meanings 
that may contribute to the perpetuation of ideological associations linking the African American 
variety to the stereotypes of marginalized social groups. In this discursively-emergent register 
differentiation, the denotational and interactional norms of language use referred to both 
explicitly and implicitly acquire metapragmatic significance in the context of group-relevant 
social positionings of the participants. The metapragmatic function of the presumptions of norms 
realized by the linguistic imitation in Extract 5 is, arguably, characteristic of any discursive 
contexts in which such imitations, or caricatures, occur, since the pragmatic goal of a linguistic 
imitation is usually to demonstrate or indexically point to some of the most typical features of the 
imitated linguistic variety. Importantly, these presuppositional meaning projections are usually 
part of the contextually-determined semiotic act that metapragmatically uses these 
presuppositions to create entailing projections or contextual effects serving particular rhetorical 
goals in the unfolding propositional (argumentative) and interactional structure of a discursive 
event.       
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In the passage that follows, an imitation is used to support an explicit account of the 
typifying features that constitute the perceived linguistic model of normality in the imitated 
linguistic variety. Another metapragmatic function is realized in this extract as the participant 
reflects on and analyzes the differences in the degrees to which various linguistic features 
contribute to the perception of a “twangy” speaking style in American English. Note that this 
extract is taken from the part of the one-on-one research interview in which the participant 
listened to five voice samples, rated each sample on the semantic differential scales with regard to 
the presence of the features such as “twang,” “drawl,” “nasal,” speech tempo, etc., and was asked 
to explain the differences in the ratings of the samples. The following excerpt is part of the 
participant’s explanation of why he assigned higher ratings on “twang” to two voice samples. 
Extract 6 
1   Sam:   The nasal is probably a byproduct of the twang maybe (.) sometimes, (0.4) that’s not the= 
2               =requirement of the twang. (0.8) The requirement of the twang is those emphases on the (.) 
3               and (.) and I had- (0.5) I hadn’t really thou:ght about it, (0.8) but the rhythm with which= 
4               =they are ^talking (0.6) and the way they put the emphasis on the sounds while they are 
5               doing the rhythm is what makes it part of the twang. 
In this extract, “twang” functions as a meta-sign, as a metapragmatic concept associated with a 
cluster of linguistic features stereotypically identifiable in listeners’ perceptions. This 
conceptualization constitutes a reflexive model of “twanginess” normalized by the references to 
its “typical,” from the participant’s viewpoint, characteristics. In this construction, not all features 
contribute to the folk-linguistic model equally: while the “emphases on the sounds” is a 
“requirement” of “twang,” nasality is considered to be its “byproduct.” The participant 
distinguishes these features by grading them in terms of their ability to index “twanginess.” This 
gradation conceptualizes the relative salience of various features contributing to the perception of 
“twang.” This reveals that language users are sensitive to the hierarchical relations between 
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sociolinguistic indices: they may articulate these relations and comment on the relative indexical 
potential of semiotic signs within a particular model of linguistic variation. 
It is important to point out that linguists usually cite “nasality” as the only linguistic 
feature associated with this folk-linguistic term (e.g., Cukor-Avila, 2012; Mongomery, 2008). 
The denotational meaning of the term codified in the dictionaries also points to a nasal sound as 
its main characteristic. Thus, the folk-linguistic conceptualization constructed in this episode is 
more complex and detailed compared to the linguists’ and dictionary definitions. But, just as any 
other structure of informal reasoning in everyday argumentation, this construction of the 
meanings of “twang” may be incomplete or not quite accurate. Furthermore, the modes of 
metalinguistic awareness that underlie folk beliefs about language vary across speakers on the 
dimensions of accuracy, control, availability, and detail (Preston, 1996). In this regard, a 
discursive construal of the linguistic norms of a variety is always a reflection of the participant’s 
mode of folk-linguistic awareness. Such discursive construals reflect, as we can see from Extract 
6, language users’ sensitivity to the default linguistic norms functioning as baselines against 
which “emphases on sounds” and “nasal” sounds may be differentiated as indices of a sociolect.       
 Folk-linguistic awareness may be heightened by the active engagement in the reflexive 
metapragmatic discourse, as Extract 6 demonstrates. In the process of reflecting on the features 
that constitute the perception of “twanginess,” the participant identifies “rhythm” as the feature 
that previously, before the interview, was not part of his conscious metalinguistic awareness. This 
suggests the emergent nature of this metapragmatic construction influenced by the context of the 
metapragmatic discourse which activates the indexical associations with the concept “rhythm” in 
the indexical field of “twang.” When this indexical link becomes accessible to the participant’s 
conscious awareness, he uses it in the performance of the “twangy” speech. Through this 
performance, the newly activated link becomes associable with the participant’s reflexive model 
of the linguistic norms that typify the “twangy” speech style. When indexical associations and 
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their interrelations are overtly articulated in metapragmatic discursive acts and are shown to be 
performable, these meanings become available for the processes of their further “enregisterment” 
(Agha, 2007, p. 81) as recognizable features of “twang.”   
3.6.4 Objects of Agreement: Presumptions of the Normative  
 While normalized models conceptualize typifications of behavior, normative models 
implicate prescriptive standards and norms that should be followed in society (Agha, 2007, p. 
126). As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) observed, presumptions of the normative 
standards may be revealed in the analysis of participants’ linguistic choices (p. 161). In 
metalinguistic discourse, presumptions of prescriptive normative models often underlie 
ideologically-saturated constructions of what is referred to as “standard,” “correct,” and “proper” 
language. As they emerge in discursive acts, such constructions are influenced by the context of 
interaction which includes participants’ interpersonal footings, role alignments, and epistemic 
stances. This is illustrated in the passage given below which shows a participant’s expression of a 
reflexive epistemic stance on the macro-sociological status of the concept of “proper” language. 
Extract 7 
1   Int:     Can you  (0.2)  say anything else about the social groups that,  (0.6)  uhm you commented about= 
2              = the (.)  the association with education or lack of education, (0.4)  Is there anything else or-,   
3   Sam:   And this is all just subjective you know,  (0.5) this is all just  (0.4)  and there’s no telling if it’s= 
4               =right or wrong, but  (0.5)  you know, (.) it’s a common stereotype that people that talk with=  
5               =less proper English structure, (0.4)  are thought of to be less intelligent or less educated. (0.8) 
6               Not necessarily intelligent but less educated you know, (0.4) that they come from environments= 
7   Int:                                                                                              Uh-huh 
8               =that didn’t have the educational ability or standards available to them you know, (0.4) that’s= 
9               =not  necessarily ↑true, (0.2) but there’s an association with that.  
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In this extract, Sam construes a conceptualization of the linguistic behavior that deviates from a 
presumed system of prescriptive norms implied by the phrase “proper English structure.” The 
notion of a deviation implicitly presupposes an existing baseline of speech norms against which a 
speaker’s linguistic behavior may be judged as divergent. This conceptualization also relies on 
presumptions of norms or standards in educational achievement in a speech community. 
Violations of the normative models of behavior in society are often accompanied by social 
sanctions (Agha, 2007, p. 126). In this episode, Sam presents his perspective on the nature of 
such sanctions functioning as stereotypical evaluations of the social significance of the deviations 
from the normative model of “proper” language use. The development of this discursive 
construction is contingent on the interactional frame of the communicative context. Here, Sam is 
responding to the researcher’s direct question about metapragmatic stereotypes that involve 
judgments of the speaker’s education level. Sam’s response is a cautious, carefully-formulated 
statement: he prefaces his account of the metapragmatic stereotype with remarks that point to his 
attempt to downgrade, diminish the significance of the stereotype: note the use of a modifying 
pragmatic marker “just” which functions in a “diminisher” sense (Preston, 1993, p. 250), with a 
downtoning meaning (Aijmer, 2002, p. 158) of “this is not much.” This mitigating device as well 
as Sam’s remarks that the stereotype is “subjective,” that “there’s no telling if it’s right or 
wrong,” and the repeated claim that it is “not necessarily true” express Sam’s epistemological 
assessment (Mushin, 2001, p. 151) of the socioindexical relation signaled by deviations from 
“proper English structure.” This represents an assessment of the contingent status of the rationale 
underlying the metapragmatic stereotype, according to which, as Sam explains, if a person’s 
speech does not conform to the “proper English structure,” it may mean that they grew up in the 
environment where “standards” were not available to them. The stance Sam takes with regard to 
the ownership of the stereotype is revealed in the phrase “are thought of” which ascribes the 
authorship of this stereotype to the Other, while the speaker’s personal epistemological 
commitment is not expressed in this construction.   
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This construction of interactional and epistemic positionings with regard to the content of 
the overtly discussed stereotypes is in contrast with the way in which the same participant 
engaged with three interlocutors, as illustrated in Extract 4, in the discussion of the sociolinguistic 
stereotypes during a multi-party conversation where the researcher’s contributions were minimal. 
In a more casual context of a conversation with friends at the dinner table, the audience mainly 
consisted of non-linguists and the participants’ exchange of talk was more spontaneous, with 
most topic transitions initiated by the participants as new topics were mainly derived from 
preceding arguments or offered in support or in refutation to the others’ arguments. In that 
context of interaction, Sam’s typifications of the linguistic and social norms were, overall, 
expressed more directly, with more certainty and personal epistemological commitments. As 
exemplified in Extract 4, such typifications were often presented as factual rather than as 
subjective, contingent representations of folk-linguistic beliefs. Extract 7, however, is part of a 
one-on-one research interview: the audience of Sam’s argument consisted only of the researcher, 
and the researcher often had topical control during the semi-structured interview. In Extract 7, 
Sam’s argument is a response to the researcher’s “topical action”2 (Bublitz, 1988): this response 
may be seen as an instantiation of more deliberative propositional processes driven by more 
conscious discursive actions oriented to the particular audience of argumentation. This illustrates 
how the interview context may be one of the significant factors that shape the propositional 
processes of sociolinguistic indexicality.       
Although Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) rhetorical theory views presumptions 
of the normal as implicit objects of agreement in argumentation, the uses of this rhetorical 
construct can be extended to the analysis of speakers’ overt references to typifying and 
prescriptive norms of language use and social behavior. Attention to discursive constructions of 
                                                             
2 A “topical action” is defined by Bublitz (1988) as an action used “to intervene in the development and 
the course of the topic, and thus to contribute to a topical thread being initiated, maintained and 
competed” (p. 40). 
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normality is an essential analytical tool in any discourse-based study of language ideologies since 
language-ideological models are fundamentally defined by participants’ reflexive understandings 
and contextualized reinterpretations of what constitutes linguistic and social norms, deviations 
from norms, and their social meaningfulness. Qualitative, discursive investigations of everyday 
talk about language may uncover the ways in which rhetorically- and interactionally-constructed 
meanings of normality function both explicitly and implicitly as presumptions, or 
presuppositional meaning projections, and as contextual effects, or entailing meaning projections, 
in ideological models of sociolinguistic distinctiveness. The issue of broader significance here is 
how the dialectic relation between pre-existing macro-sociological meanings of norms and their 
contextualized reanalysis is realized in ideological and identity-embedding processes, and what it 
can reveal about the nature of sociolinguistic differentiation.  
3.6.5 Objects of Agreement: Values 
 The New Rhetoric approach to argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) lays 
out a framework for conceptual analysis of arguments in relation to underlying value judgments 
(p. 75). It views everyday argumentation as a form of justifying values that speakers attribute to 
conceptualized phenomena and use to achieve persuasiveness in discourse. According to TNR, 
Agreement with regard to a value means an admission that an object, a being, or an ideal 
must have a specific influence on action and on disposition toward action and that one 
can make use of this influence in an argument, although the point of view represented is 
not regarded as binding on everybody. The existence of values, as objects of agreement 
that make possible a communion with regard to particular ways of acting, is connected 
with the idea of multiplicity of groups. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 74) 
As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 76) pointed out, values are an object of 
agreement of particular rather than universal audiences. As they observed, if values were 
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universal, it would be hard to distinguish them from truths. It is through their non-universal, 
community-based nature that values acquire their status. A “particular” audience may include 
interlocutors in a particular discursive act, or it may be conceived in broader terms, as a particular 
community.  A speech community may be defined based on the members’ agreements of what 
constitutes norms of linguistic and social behavior, or based on common evaluations of norms. 
Norms and their evaluations, however, are not stable: in the dynamics of social life and in the 
dialectic relationship between social and linguistic forms, norms and values may be redefined and 
acquire new meanings both in the macro- and micro-contexts of their use (Gumperz & Hymes, 
1972; Silverstein, 2003; Agha, 2007). 
At the macro-social level of ideological processes, language use is interpreted in terms of 
“widespread schemes of valorization” which “associate particular forms of speech with 
commonplace value distinctions (e.g., good vs. bad speech, upper-class vs. lower-class speech), 
which are known to a large number of speakers” (Agha, 2007, p. 15).  Social meanings of 
language or any other cultural form are derived from the values attributed to such forms with 
reference to widespread valorization schemes. Shared value systems underlie what Hymes calls 
(1974) “norms of interpretation” that “implicate the belief system of a community” (p. 61); thus, 
values play a crucial role in language-ideological processes. At the micro-level of interaction, 
however, social effectiveness of language use is “mediated by emergent features of current 
semiotic activity” (Agha, 2007, p. 16). Speakers’ positionality with regard to the propositional 
content and interactional structure of discourse, as well as metasemiotic effects of contextualized 
meaning reinterpretation can have a significant influence on the nature of indexical relations that 
emerge in discourse. In other words, while macro-sociological value distinctions may be evoked 
or referred to explicitly in discourse, they may become negotiated and reanalyzed during the 
micro-interactional engagement in the context of communication. This dialectic relationship 
between the macro- and micro-social levels of meaning creation is an important factor in the 
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understanding of the nature of “sharedness” or “agreement” with regard to values: it helps 
understand the mental construct of “sharedness” not in terms of metaphysics (cf. Agha, 2007, p. 
183), but in terms of the realization of this construct in specific communicative contexts. The 
conceptualization of the dialectic relation between relatively stable macro-social uniformity and 
dynamic micro-social variability of values underlying sociolinguistic differentiation defines the 
theoretical and methodological differences between qualitative discourse-based and quantitative 
approaches to the study of language attitudes and ideologies.  
An application of the rhetorical construct of “agreement on values” in a discourse-based 
study of language ideologies can shed light on how values and systems of values related to social 
and linguistic phenomena are called upon and negotiated in discursive constructions of 
sociolinguistic indexicality. Cultural values are dynamic rather than static entities: “discursive 
practices … imbue cultural forms with recognizable indexical sign-values and bring these values 
into circulation along identifiable trajectories in social space” (Agha, 2007, p. 190). To identify 
how values contribute to meaning creation in discourse, the analyst may attend to the conceptual 
interrelations between propositions, as well as the nature of connecting links between claims and 
their premises. Whether a statement expresses a value or a fact depends “on its place in the 
speech, on what it enunciates, refutes, or corrects” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 76). 
As discourse unfolds, speakers may modify the epistemological status of knowledge structures by 
ascribing them the status that is more likely to enhance audience agreement: they may, for 
example, present personal feelings and impressions as commonly shared value judgements, or 
present value judgments as judgments of fact (pp. 179-180). This suggests that the status of these 
objects of agreement may be recognized within a specific context of communication (p. 183). If 
we consider how values or sets of values are used as semiotic signs in interaction and 
argumentation, we will need to look beyond the utterance level and consider the uptake, 
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negotiation, development, or rejection of values in relation to co-occurring indexical signs, 
including those that emerge in the exchange structures of discourse and in text-level  indexicality.   
Values can be distinguished in terms of their abstract and concrete nature. As Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) observe, there is a fundamental distinction between these types of 
values: “A concrete value is one attaching to a living being, a specific group, or a particular 
object, considered as a unique entity” (p. 77). In this view, solidarity, for example, is a concrete 
value since it is only conceivable in relation to a specific group of people, a specific individual, or 
particular qualities of a group or an individual. Abstract values may include those of truth, justice, 
equality, etc. (pp. 77-78).  
Values are often used as a starting point of argumentation. To use an example from 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s treatise (1969), “When a person says that men are equal 
because they are children of the same God, he seems to be relying on a concrete value to find an 
abstract value, that of equality; but it could also be said that really only the abstract value is 
expressed, by appealing, through analogy, to a concrete relationship; in spite of the use of 
because, the starting point would lie in the abstract value” (pp. 77-78).  
Values play a fundamental role in sociolinguistic differentiation: the latter is achieved 
through attachment of values to varieties of language, including “standard” and “vernacular” 
registers. Milroy (2001) has defined standardization, “in respect of the internal form of language,” 
as “the imposition of uniformity upon a class of objects” (p. 531) and has claimed that this 
definition is “non-ideological.” However, “imposition of uniformity” and “invariance” imply 
certain values attached to the abstract concept of language and to sets of particular linguistic 
forms. Specifically, there is an underlying assumption here of linguistic variability which is not 
desired and needs to be eliminated through the process of imposing uniformity on language use. 
Uniformity as applied to language use can only be achieved by language users’ conformity to 
uniform rules of using language; in other words, the valuation of language standardization is 
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based on the values of conformity and obedience to rules. These values are part of the system of 
moral rules. According to Kohlberg’s (1969, 1976, as cited in Bandura, 1991, p. 47) cognitive 
structural theory of morality, there is a typology of moral rules: moral behavior is characterized 
by a hierarchy of lower- and higher-level moral reasoning “beginning with punishment-based 
obedience, evolving through opportunistic self-interest, approval-seeking conformity, respect for 
authority, … and culminating in principled morality based on standards of justice.” Applying the 
Perelmanian distinction between concrete and abstract values, we can see how these moral 
principles may develop starting with concrete values and reaching the level of the abstract value 
of justice. With regard to the ideological models of language variability and language 
standardization, justice would mean attributing value to language diversity which is the highest, 
more superior level of moral reasoning compared to obedience to uniform rules and conformity to 
language standards. However, the highest level of moral reasoning is not cognitively superior: “in 
most of their judgments, people do not use the highest mode of thinking they understand” 
(Bandura, 1991, p. 47). This perspective on the functioning of moral behavior in society may be 
useful in understanding how values factor in language-ideological constructions of the normative 
models of behavior.  
Discourse-based instantiations of values underlying the standard language ideology are 
illustrated in the analysis that follows. It shows how explicit and implicit, abstract and concrete 
values are implicated in discourse-based language-ideological constructions of vernacular and 
“correct” forms in American English. This excerpt was taken from a conversation with two 
Oklahomans, mother (Patsy, in her mid-70s) and daughter (Kate, in her early 50s), who were born 
and raised on a farm in the eastern part of the state, close to the Arkansas border, before they 
moved to the suburb of Oklahoma City. Patsy is conscious of how her speech is different from 
what she calls “the correct pronunciation,” and the excerpt below reveals how this consciousness 
relies on a system of social values ascribed to the vernacular forms which are contrasted with 
“correct” forms. The extract that follows is taken from the part of the conversation in which the 
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participants discuss the typical linguistic features that characterize the ways Patsy’s relatives 
spoke in Eastern Oklahoma, where both Patsy and Kate used to live.   
Extract 8 
1     Kate:   We would say “wash_” (.) and they would say “warsh.” (0.3) “[I’m gonna warsh, (.) I’m= 
2     Patsy:                                                                                                       [They would always say (**) 
3     Kate:   gonna wash, warsh [my clothes ] (.)  how can you say [“warsh”?] (0.5)  An iron. (.) I’m= 
4     Int:                                        [((chuckle))]  
5     Patsy:                                                                                           [uh-huh  ] uh-huh 
6     Kate:   =gonna iron them. (.) Not iron them_ (1.2) ◦So that was interesting◦_ 
7    (0.9) 
8     Int:      So is that how you said those words?  
9     Kate:   I never said those [words. (0.7)  
10   Patsy:                               [@No  ] she ((chuckle)) [this is-] 
11   Int:                                                                           [No? (.) Why not.] 
12   Kate:                                                                                       [I REBELLED] FROM THE=  
13               =BEGINNING. >I was like “That is not how it’s spelt, that is not how you say it.<” 
14   Int:      @Why?@ [How did you know?] 
15   Patsy:                    [You go to ↑schoo::l ] you learn (0.2) the correct (0.3) ^pronunciations. (0.3) of the= 
16                =words_ (0.4) but around your fa:mily (.) you grew up saying it (.) the way they said it. (0.4) 
17   Int:                                   ◦uh-huh◦ 
18   Patsy:   Until you learnt the correct (.) pronunciation in school. 
19   Kate:    But but for a lot of people it was just too far go:ne_ They just (.) [always] said it cause that’s=  
20   Patsy:                                                                                                           [Yeah  ]  
21   Kate:     =how they learned it and, (1.2) >(**) just< ain’t there_ 
22   Int & Patsy: ((chuckle))  
23   Int:       But in school is that how they talked in [school? Was it different?  
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24   Kate:                                                        [↓Yeah (.) a lot of the- (.) yeah (.)  a lot of people in= 
25                =that area, (.) that’s how they talked. (.) that’s how- that’s how my dad talked.  
26   Patsy:   The teachers taught you correct. (.) English pronunciation, (0.5) but that didn’t mean you (.)=  
27   Int:                                                      uh-huh 
28   Patsy:    =said your words that way. 
29   Kate:     @When you were home.@ ((chuckle))   
30   Patsy:    Uh-huh (.) uh-huh. (.) You said it how your family and relatives said it (.) you know, (1.1)  
31                 unless you chose to. (0.2) do it correctly [((laughter))] 
32   Int:                                                                          [chuckle] 
33   Kate:      I was like a city girl born on the farm [from the- from the beginning_] (0.2) 
34   Patsy:                                                                 [Right. (.) She never liked [that country-] 
35   Kate:                                                                                                 [Never. (.) I was never a=  
36                   = farm girl even though I lived on (.) a farm so I always_ (0.5) as soon as I was eighteen I= 
37                   =moved to the city and_ (1.1) [◦ (***)◦ 
38    Patsy:                                                      [Lived in Oklahoma City ever since. 
39    Int:          So is that kind of talk associated with country (.) [talk?] 
40    Kate:                                                                                      [Yes. ]  Uh-[huh. 
41    Patsy: [Uh-huh (.) Oh yes. (.) Yes. (.)  
42                  And I am sure (0.3) Arkansas, Missouri, and Missippi, (0.4) Alabama, Georgia, (.)↑all=  
43                  = through the:re, (0.2) they were (.) worse (.) even than ↓that.       
44    Int:       ◦uh-huh◦ 
45    Patsy:    And the slang- slang way that they- (.)↑it would ↓vary in different (.) areas of the same state= 
46    Int:                                   uh-huh 
47    Patsy:    =that you lived in, (0.4) not all of the state would speak the same way. (0.4) It was just your= 
48    Int:    uh-huh 
49    Patsy:    = >particular area that you were raised in.< 
50    (1.0) 
51    Kate:   Which to me, they should seem uneducated. (.) [I mean, I mean, you could go through schoo:l_   
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52    Patsy:                                                               ◦uh-huh◦ (.) [Right.] 
53   Kate:    (0.3) and have a degree, (.) but the way you v ta:lked, (.) made you seem like, (.) you (.) had=  
54   Patsy:                                                                                                                        Uh-huh  
55   Kate:    =no degree_ 
56   Int:      To [to whom.] 
57   Kate:        [AIN’T  I] (0.2) I AIN’T KNOW (.) AIN’T KNO:W (.) OR AIN’T GO:T (.) or whatever_ I= 
58               =was  like (.)↑what (.) what kind of English is that.  You don’t have [any-  
59    Int:                                                                                                      [So ↑who would think  
60               =about those people as being uneducated. 
61    Kate:   ↓Me. [((chuckle)) @Whoever you are talking to.@  I guess it’s just because (.) it makes you (.) 
62    Int:              [((laughter)) 
63    Kate:    come across, as being not as (0.4) intellectual when you are not saying words  [that are (1.2) 
64    Patsy:                                                                                                                         [uh-huh uh-huh 
65    Kate:     correct. It would mean to me it’s just like just a matter of- (0.3)  That’s my type of = 
66    Kate:     = personality though_ (.) Things are_ (0.4) This is how it’s spelt_ This is how you say it. (0.5) 
67                 My ducks have to be in a row. So, (0.9) it didn’t make sense. This is how it’s spelt and they= 
68                 =are saying what? (.) [((chuckle))] >What are you talking about?< 
69    Int:                                           [ ((chuckle))] 
((about 1.5 minutes of omitted talk about the differences between Texas and Oklahoma, about the 
varieties used in Arkansas and Louisiana)) 
70   Patsy:  I like to hear different dialects except for that (1.2) what I call country slang [((laughter)) 
71   Int:                                                                                                                                  [@You=   
72                   =don’t like that?@   
73   Patsy:   @I don’t care for country slang@ ((chuckle)) I know I say a lot of my words wrong and I’ve=  
74                =tried to correct them (.) and say them (.) correct (.) for my sake (.) as well as my daughter’s,= 
75                = other people, but (.) you still have trouble when you’ve heard it all your li:fe, (.) you still=  
76                =have trouble (.) saying it (.) the way you know it’s supposed to be spoken_ (.) If I hear=  
77                = somebody really butcher their English [language,] it really bothers me (.) it really bothers= 
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78    Int:                                                                       [((chuckle))]  
79    Patsy:   =me. 
80    Int:       So when you- (.) [er (.) say] 
81    Patsy:                               [because ] you know you were all taught the same thing at school. We were= 
82                =all taught how to say it correctly. (0.4)  but you go home and everybody speaks that= 
83                 =particular way_  (.) and so you end up speaking the same way too. (.) unless you get away= 
84                 =from that environment. (.) you [know. 
85    Int:                                              [Uh-huh. (.) So are the children corrected, (.) when they say=  
86                 =“aint” (.) instead of “aunt”? ((referring to the example Kate mentioned in the beginning of   
                   the conversation which is not part of this transcript)) 
87    Patsy:   Yes (.) yes (.) they do at school, (.) but I am sure not always at home. (.) I am sure=  
88                      =that they don’t always at home. 
89     Int:       But at school (.) teachers correct [that? 
90     Patsy:                                                        [Uh-huh  uh-huh (.) Yes.   
91     Int:       But that’s the same word. (.) It’s just a different way of saying it_ 
92     Patsy:   Right. (.) Right. (.)We call it slang. (.) @slang words.@ ((laughter)) 
 
There are a number of ways in which values are implicated in the discursive constructions of 
sociolinguistic distinctiveness in this excerpt. For example, they are used (1) as positive and 
negative evaluations of specific linguistic forms and registers of language, (2) as identity-defining 
social values, (3) as systems of social values underlying rationalizations of social practices, (4) as 
systems of social values underlying prescriptive language practices, and (5) as social values 
underlying rationalizations of prescriptive language standards. Most of these values are presumed 
but some of them are stated explicitly, in the form of overt attitudinal evaluations.  
 In this excerpt, evaluations of specific linguistic forms, such as vernacular pronunciations 
of “warsh” and “iron” (lines 1, 3 , and 6) and grammatical forms such as “ain’t know” (line 57) 
are constructed at the utterance level, in the phrases such as “how can you say ‘warsh,’” in line 3 
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and “what kind of English is that” in line 58. The evaluative, critical stance is also revealed at the 
discourse level: in the context of “linguistic complaints” (Milroy & Milroy, 1999) expressed in 
this passage, these specific examples are indexically related to what the speakers label as 
“incorrect” and “uneducated.” These evaluations are attributed not only to the specific linguistic 
forms, but also to the register these forms belong to: “country slang” is contrasted during the 
conversation with positively-evaluated “correct” language prescribed by the school. Speakers also 
overtly express their affective evaluations with regard to the register of “country slang” when 
they use phrases such as “I don’t care for country slang” (line 73).  
 The value of “correctness” is also constructed here in relation to the participants’ social 
and linguistic identities: Kate emphasizes that she “rebelled from the beginning” (lines 12-13) 
and never spoke the local variety. In other words, she reports on the types of linguistic behavior 
that expressed an evaluation of the local vernacular forms: she refused to conform to the local 
variety and made a choice to conform to the “correct” variety. The explanation for this behavior 
is given here in terms of values underlying a “personality type” which is oriented towards 
obeying the rules: “That is not how it’s spelt, that is not how you say it” (lines 13, 65-68). Kate’s 
construction of the social identity of a “city girl” contrasted with a “farm girl” contributes a social 
dimension of an opposition between the social values associated with urban and rural lifestyles to 
the value system evoked throughout the conversation: now it is not only about correctness and 
sounding educated, but also about lack of identification with the local culture of a farm life.  
Patsy’s linguistic identity is represented differently here: she judges her own linguistic 
behavior as not quite “correct” (line 13) and admits that she has been trying to change it (lines 73-
74). She explains that her correction efforts have been for her own sake, as well as for her 
daughter’s and for the others’ sake (line 74). In this discussion centered on the stigmatization of 
the vernacular variety as sounding “uneducated,” this explanation suggests that the social 
dimension defining her value of the normative linguistic model is related to achieving social 
effects – most likely, social approval – by building a certain social image untainted by 
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stigmatized linguistic forms. In this conversation, Patsy does not seem to attach any positive 
value to vernacular forms in her own speech. Before the interview, she mentioned that she 
“speaks like a hick,” using a social label which is widespread in Oklahomans’ (Hall-Lew & 
Stephens, 2012; Bakos, 2013) and Californians’ descriptions of the Southern-sounding local 
speaking styles. Later, during the conversation, the participants used “hick” several times to 
describe the southern-sounding speech styles in Oklahoma.  
The meanings of the common folk-linguistic concept “hick” have not been investigated in 
sociolinguistics, but it has generally been interpreted by researchers as a label for a social persona 
(Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012, p. 272) that carries a social stigma and has associations with the 
concepts of rurality, “country,” “southernness,” and low education (Niedzielski and Preston, 
2003; Evans, 2011; Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012). Hall-Lew and Stephens (2012) explicitly asked 
their discourse participants from the Oklahoma/Texas border area whether “country” and “hick” 
mean the same thing. The answers revealed that the main difference lies in the association of 
“hick” with low education. In their study of “country,” Hall-Lew and Stephens (2012) concluded 
that “The existence of hick in the local discourse fills an area of semiotic space that allows 
country more positive meanings” (p. 273). In the analyzed conversation, however, Patsy and Kate 
do not make such a distinction between the values underlying the two terms and treat “country” 
and “hick” as interchangeable labels.  
The analysis of other conversations collected for this study reveals that if participants are 
not asked to define the labels for social personae, such definitions usually do not emerge naturally 
in the development of discourses. Thus, in everyday talk, speakers mainly rely on implicit 
presumptions of stereotypic values associated with social personae types. Discursive acts of using 
widely-circulating labels, such as “hick,” that refer to prominent social personae, rely on the 
presuppositional meanings that can be accessible by those who have been socialized to the 
stereotypic values associated with these personae as part of larger schemes of sociological 
differentiation. At the same time, such uses entail micro-contextual effects of the indexical 
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associations between the stereotypic values attached to the social persona and the features of the 
co-occurring semiotic signs. Values evoked by stereotypic or characterological personae 
participate in the metapragmatic constructions of the partitioning and gradation of the social 
space mediated by the conceptions of linguistic models of the typifying and prescriptive norms. 
As Silverstein (2003) stated, 
 … cultural values as articulable and rearticulable in micro-contextual interaction are 
notoriously “ideological,” that is, they emerge in the micro-contextual dialectic as 
essentializations … of a kind of “logic” of evaluational stances (good/bad; 
preferred/dispreferred; normal/deviant; etc.) underlying social partitioning as the the [sic] 
presuppositions/entailments of semiotic action that instantiate such partitions of social 
space (p. 202).   
Discursive construals of the standard language ideology are often based on the moral 
value of respect for authority – in particular, the institutional mechanisms of the authority of the 
education system and respect for its regimenting power to establish linguistic standards by 
imposing judgments of correctness on language use. Such values, however, are often represented 
in language-ideological debates in terms of unquestionable and factual knowledge structure, and 
this representation is overall characteristic of the construals in Extract 8. The speakers in this 
conversation take the authority of school-imposed corrections for granted and do not put this 
authority to doubt. Milroy and Milroy (2002, p. 87) have observed that it is usually very difficult 
for speakers to realize to what extent their language use has been determined by prescriptive 
standards: even when they agree with the rationality of the arguments against standardization, 
their evaluations of non-standard speech are often informed by the inculcated prescriptions and 
learnt attitudes. This tendency is revealed in the conversation analyzed here: Even when the 
interviewer at the end of the episode says “But that’s the same word.  It’s just a different way of 
saying it,” this argument is not taken up for discussion of the notion of language “correctness.”   
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The elusiveness of the role played by values in judgments of correctness and of the possibility 
that these values may be taken to a different level of moral reasoning may be one of the factors 
contributing to the persistence of standard language ideologies in society.    
 For Kate and Patsy, the influence of institutionalized standards has been internalized as a 
set of “norm-ideals,” using Kristiansen’s (2004) terms. Norm-ideals are target norms that 
speakers relate to as they engage in self-categorization and identity-building with regard to social 
differentiation in a speech community. Norm-ideals are “representations/evaluations of particular 
ways of speaking, as focused combinations of language use and social values” (p. 171). Although 
Kristiansen observed that norm-ideals are often “cognitively represented as a set of prototypical 
speakers” (p. 171), this does not seem to be the case with identities oriented towards the models 
informed by standard language ideologies. Such linguistic models are more abstract 
representations that rely on a set of interrelated abstract and concrete values that inform 
evaluations of social groups, social personae types, and language registers that are salient in the 
schemes of sociolinguistic differentiation circulating in a speech community.  
The approach to cultural values illustrated here explores the linkage of macro- and micro-
social meanings in their instantiations in a specific discoursal context. It shows how “values” may 
be a useful analytical construct of its own, since values are fundamental in any construction of 
sociolinguistic differentiation. A discourse-based approach may shed light on the sets of values 
that are evoked, implied, and explicitly articulated in interrelated ways in everyday talk about 
language. In metapragmatic discourse, values acquire context-specific actualizations that cannot 
be captured in a quantitative approach, such as, for instance, the one that uses semantic-
differential scales to isolate “solidarity” as a dimension of speech evaluation that arises from a 
factorial statistical analysis. Discoursal data can shed light on the conceptions of concrete and 
abstract values constructed by speakers as they engage in language-ideological discussions. This 
may reveal the complexity of their orientations to the systems of values functioning macro-
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sociologically and their appropriations of such values as part of folk-linguistic theory 
construction.   
3.6.6 Objects of Agreement: Concluding Remarks 
The rhetorical construct “objects of agreement” reflects the social situatedness of 
language use and its dependence on the micro- and macro-contextual alignments among 
individuals and groups of people and their positioning in relation to the interpretations of the real 
and imagined aspects of their worlds. These alignments and positionings may be enduring or 
evanescent; they may be validated or challenged in discourse, but their expression relies on the 
ways of presenting or implying the real and imagined phenomena as facts, truths, theories, or as 
values. Facts and truths reflect the form of epistemic grounding of the knowledge structure, while 
values reflect the embeddedness of knowledge structures into systems of social and personal 
orientations. Folk-linguistic facts and truths derive their status from the rhetorical strategies of 
objectivation and essentialization as well as from agreements of interlocutors on the truthfulness 
and validity of these knowledge structures. Speakers use these data to justify and rationalize 
language-ideological constructions. 
Objects of agreement can be seen as rather static representations reflecting a larger, 
macro-social frame of reference in evoking ideological constructs that commonly circulate within 
certain speech communities, or as dynamically developing representations in relation to how they 
are constructed as discourse unfolds. This dynamic nature of agreements reflects the influence of 
the interactional structure of discourse on the selection and formulation of premises. The 
emergent interactional structure may be quite complex and may be characterized by rapid 
developments and evanescent nature of interpersonal alignments and stances. In this regard, the 
notion of “agreement” may be better seen not in its literal sense of “consensus” but as the 
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potential for establishing cognitive coordination of viewpoints and value-laden orientations 
exploited by the speakers.  
3.7 Techniques of Argumentation 
 Elements of discourse, according to TNR, constantly interact with each other and are 
connected into mental schemes which are generalized and abstract models of relations between 
argumentation components. These habitual patterns of thought used in everyday communication 
rely on the processes of association and dissociation of concepts:  
By processes of association we understand schemes which bring separate elements 
together and allow us to establish a unity among them, which aims either at organizing 
them or at evaluating them, positively or negatively, by means of one another. By 
processes of dissociation we mean techniques of separation which have the purpose of 
dissociating, separating, disuniting elements which are regarded as forming a whole or at 
least a unified group within some system of thought: dissociation modifies such a system 
by modifying certain concepts which make up its essential parts. … all association 
implies dissociation, and, conversely: the same form which unites various elements into a 
well-organized whole dissociates them from the neutral background from which it 
separates them. The two techniques are complementary and are always at work at the 
same time; but the argumentation through which a datum is modified can stress the 
association or dissociation which it is promoting without making explicit the 
complementary aspect which will result from the desired transformation (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.190, emphasis in the original). 
TNR identifies three broad classes of argument schemes that foreground associations 
between concepts. These include (1) quasi-logical argumentation schemes that resemble formal 
logic (e.g., arguments by comparison, transitivity, contradiction, incompatibility, etc.), (2) 
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argument schemes that rely on existing structure of reality (e.g., arguments from causality, 
authority, group and its members, etc.), and (3) argumentation techniques that establish the 
structure of reality (e.g., argumentation by example, analogy, model and anti-model, etc.). TNR 
provides elaborate descriptions of about 36 types of common argumentation techniques without 
claiming it to be a comprehensive survey. Other argumentation scholars have considerably 
expanded this list and developed formalized schemes of argumentation using a structure of a 
major and a minor premise and a conclusion for each argument type (e.g., Walton, Reed, & 
Macagno, 2008). 
3.7.1 Techniques of Association 
Quasi-logical arguments draw on the recognized validity of reasoning schemes in formal 
logic. But due to the contextual situatedness of everyday argumentation, such arguments 
necessarily deviate from formal reasoning structures since everyday argument schemes are 
defeasible and presumptive structures of argumentation (Walton & Macagno, 2010). These 
arguments may be based on logical relations, such as contradiction, total or partial identity, or 
transitivity, or on mathematical relations, such as connections between the part and the whole, 
frequency, etc. Each quasi-logical scheme is based on certain relations between its elements. For 
example, contradiction relies on opposition or incompatibility, arguments of reciprocity – on 
symmetrical relations, comparisons – on contrast, similarity, ordering, or evaluation, definitions – 
on identity relations, part-and-whole arguments – on inclusion or division.         
Quasi-logical type of argumentation often embeds other arguments and may be part of a 
larger scheme. As Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out (1969, p. 194), “almost every quasi-
logical argument makes use of other kinds of argument.” This will be illustrated in the analysis of 
Extract 9 given below, where an argument from contradiction is part of a complex argumentation 
scheme. An argument from contradiction is a very common quasi-logical scheme which, in its 
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explicit or implicit form, is often part of complex processes of social identity work and 
oppositions in stances and positionings that may have a significant influence on discourse-level, 
not only utterance-level development of metalinguistic argumentation. This has been aptly and 
convincingly demonstrated in the use of “oppositional argument” approach applied to folk-
linguistic discourse (Preston, 1993).  
While quasi-logical schemes rely on the recognized logical validity of widely-accepted 
reasoning patterns, arguments based on the structure of reality “make use of this structure to 
establish a solidarity between accepted judgments and others which one wishes to promote” 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyetca, 1969, p. 261). Different techniques, including, for example, 
arguments from causality, of direction, and of unlimited development, can be used to present the 
existing structure of reality from particular perspectives which may be realized in discourse in the 
form of facts, truths, or presumptions. Arguments in this category can be based on relations of 
succession, “which unite a phenomenon to its consequences or causes” (p. 262). One of the most 
common arguments of this kind is the one that establishes the causal link between concepts. This 
argument scheme may foreground different elements: (1) the relation of succession between 
events, (2) the existence of a cause, or (3) the presence of an effect (p. 263). Causal chains 
involve a transfer of value from cause to effect or from effect to cause. A transfer of value from 
effect to cause underlies a “pragmatic” argument “which permits the evaluation of an act or an 
event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable consequences” (p. 266).   Folk-linguistic theories 
commonly use such arguments to establish relations between social and linguistic phenomena. 
The analyses of Extracts 10 and 11 in Chapter IV will illustrate some of these uses in the 
arguments about the effects of the mass media and the influence of the English varieties used by 
Native American Indians on Oklahoma English.   
 Arguments based on the structure of reality can rely on the relation of coexistence. These 
arguments “unite a person to his actions, a group to the individuals who form it, and in general, 
94 
 
an essence to its manifestations” (p. 262). The elements that are brought together in an 
association in this type of arguments belong to different levels with one element being “more 
basic, explanatory, or more highly structured than the other (p. 293). TNR gives as a prototypical 
example of the connection of coexistence the relationship between the person and his acts, or in 
more abstract terms, between the essence and its manifestation. It expresses the way of 
constructing the person as an object of common understanding between interlocutors who attend 
to certain qualities or behavior traits as rather enduring manifestations of the person’s essence. 
This scheme is a prototype of the argument from group membership (pp. 321-327). According to 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, “The same interactions found in the relationship between act and 
person, and individual and group, recur whenever events, objects, beings, or institutions are 
grouped in a comprehensive way, are considered characteristic of a period, style, regime, or 
structure” (p. 327).  
In folk-linguistic theories, these lines of argumentation often underlie the partitioning of 
the social space based on the conceptions of the enduring qualities of personae types and social 
groups. These connections acquire an indexical character when certain linguistic means, both 
explicit and implicit, are repeatedly used in metapragmatic discourses to essentialize the nature of 
the personae type or a social group. Metapragmatic labels such as “cowboy,” “hick,” “hillbilly,” 
“redneck,” “Southern belle,” “Chicana,” for example, represent stock characters associated with 
particular social and linguistic traits that are repeatedly evoked in metapragmatic discourses. By 
evoking the social meanings associated with personae types and social groups, the relations of 
coexistence are established endowing these characterological representations with relevance and 
immediacy in relation to the current metapragmatic focus of awareness and in relation to the 
rhetorical context of communication. By linguistic means, and by means of techniques of 
argumentation, speakers indexically evoke stereotypic qualities enregistered in the popular 
imagination and, through contextual entailments, may renegotiate these meanings and create new 
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ones, thus further contributing to or challenging the enregisterment of the persona type with 
regard to the relations between its social and linguistic characteristics. Arguments which situate 
representations of characterological figures and social groups in certain historical, geographical, 
and temporal frames of reference in discourse may confer certain characteristics and symbolic 
values on them that may further contribute to their essentialized instantiations. These lines of 
argumentation will be illustrated in the analyses of Extract 9 below and Extract 14 in Chapter IV, 
as well as in the analysis of Extract 15, where a person-act argument is embedded into a 
definition of “rednecks” constructed in relation to the presence of “large twang” in the 
Southeastern part of Oklahoma.  
Another type of relation that may be expressed through argumentation techniques is the 
one which establishes the structure of reality. Schemes in this category include argument from 
model and anti-model, argument from analogy, and metaphor.  Arguments from examples 
establish rules, and arguments from illustration are used “to strengthen adherence to a known and 
accepted rule, by providing particular instances which clarify the general statement, show the 
import of this statement by calling attention to its various possible applications, and increase its 
presence to the consciousness” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 357). In metapragmatic 
discourse, linguistic imitations often function rhetorically as an argument from illustration which 
highlights particular features of the imitated variety and brings them into an association with 
other co-occurring dimensions of sociolinguistic indexicality. Extract 9 below discusses the use 
of this argument scheme in relation to its socioindexical functions in a particular context of use.  
3.7.2 Techniques of Dissociation 
TNR also describes the techniques of dissociation, “which are mainly characterized by 
the modifications which they introduce into notions, since they aim less at using the accepted 
language than at moving toward a new formulation” (pp. 191-192). Perelman and Olbrechts-
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Tyteca (pp. 415-419) give a prototypical example of the widespread dissociation which 
distinguishes appearance from reality. When the deceptive nature of appearances is not 
recognized, they are presented as the real. However, when an incompatibility between 
appearances or their uncertain character becomes the object of argumentation, it may bring about 
a new conception of what is real. This dissociation may be presented in terms of a philosophical 
pair “appearance/reality.” Other examples of frequently dissociated concepts in Western 
philosophical thought, which has influenced everyday informal argumentation, include such pairs 
as means/end, act/person, accident/essence, occasion/cause, relative/absolute, 
subjective/objective, multiplicity/unity, normal/standard, individual/universal, particular/general, 
theory/practice, and language/thought (p. 420). Classificatory pairs, such as subdivisions of the 
past into periods, an area into regions, a genus into species, can also be developed, in 
systematized thought, into dissociations (p. 422). 
In folk-linguistic discourse which involves language-ideological discussions, dissociation 
plays an important role and is part, at times foregrounded, and at times downplayed, of many 
instances of metalinguistic arguments, since it represents one of the conceptual operations that 
underlie sociolinguistic differentiation. The theory of argumentation provides analytical and 
theoretical tools with which context-based instantiations of sociolinguistic differentiation can be 
studied. Through dissociation, and its milder version in the form of an argument that severs the 
connecting links between concepts (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 411-415), lines of 
differentiation are drawn in metalinguistic discourse that may reflect a number of phenomena that 
have significance in social relations. Dissociation in metapragmatic discourse underlies divisions 
along many dimensions, including geographical, temporal, identity-related, persona- and 
lifestyle-based, etc. In language-related matters, dissociation leads to differentiation of typifying 
norms and standards, vernacular norms and norm-ideals, of one’s own and others’ speech styles, 
etc. It is important to distinguish dissociations that rely on widely-recognized distinctions 
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enregistered at the macro-ideological level from those dissociations that the speakers create in the 
micro-interactional engagements that involve individual perceptions and experiences and new 
conceptualizations that may or may not have the consensus of the hearers.  
Dissociations in everyday communication do not work in isolation and do not always 
lead to clear-cut categorical distinctions. Complex schemes of argumentation often develop with 
association and dissociation working at the same time. Linguistic means of presentation, as well 
as the choices of rhetorical strategies, such as, for example, establishment of conceptual and value 
hierarchies, may create subtle gradation schemes along pragmatic scales which simultaneously 
associate and dissociate conceptual elements. This aspect of conceptualization of sociolinguistic 
relations expressed argumentatively in discourse is illustrated in Extract 9 below where a 
complex “double hierarchy” argument scheme is discussed.  
3.7.3 Techniques of Argumentation: Sample Analysis 
The analysis of the following discourse episode illustrates some of the possibilities of 
engaging the theory of argumentation techniques in a discourse-based approach to folk-linguistic 
discourse. This extract was taken from an informal, loosely-structured conversation in which 
most topic transitions were initiated by the interviewees. It took place at the interviewer’s home 
after dinner with three interview participants. The two participants in this episode are white 
males; they are pilots by profession and friends with each other.  David is in his mid-twenties; he 
is a native of Oklahoma. Sam is in his late forties; he has lived in Oklahoma for 25 years. Both 
men have lived in urban, metropolitan areas most of their lives. The interviewer’s 7-year-old 
daughter was present in the beginning of the conversation and her linguistic imitation of a 
“country” accent is referred to in this episode.   
Extract 9 
1   Sam:     Is there a (0.8) is there (0.4) an (0.2) an er (.) an opinion or (.) correlation or_ (1.3)   about_ (1.8) 
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2                 intelligence, (0.4) related to (0.9) how somebody speaks? 
3     (2.1) 
4   David:   No_ (0.6) If Jack Benson_ (0.8) was who I fly with_ (0.4) he sounds like the hickest of hicks_  
5                 (0.8) but that dude can do some crazy things with an airplane_=  
6   Sam:      =But not, but not knowing that, (0.9) if you were to meet somebody_ (.)  >and ↑they<  (.)  
7                 ta:lk li:ke_ (0.9) like (0.3)  >a seven-year-old over here_<  ↑talks like she ↑is from the ↑deep, 
8                (0.3) ^woo::ds 
9     (1.7) 
10   David:   Are you talking about perception?= 
11   Sam:     =↑Yea:h (0.2) yeah.= 
12   David:  =vOh perception you automatically assume they’re retarded. 
  In line 4, David describes his colleague Jack as a person who “sounded like the hickest 
of hicks.” This is the first mention of “hicks” in this conversation, and it occurs in response to 
Sam’s carefully formulated question about the relation between intelligence and a speaking style. 
David’s answer presumes that the interlocutors will be able to infer the link between the concepts 
“hicks” and “intelligence” based on the stereotypes that define “hicks” as a social group in the 
American South or in rural areas more generally. The links between “hick,” “intelligence,” and 
Jack’s speaking style are implicit premises of an argument from group membership – the 
technique of argumentation that ascribes certain characteristics to a person based on their 
belonging to a particular social group (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 321-327). This 
type of argumentation relies on the arguer’s knowledge about “the existing structure of reality” 
(p. 261) and on the presumption that such knowledge is shared by the interlocutor. This social 
knowledge includes “hick”-related stereotypes which, as previous studies have shown, carry 
social stigma and have associations with the concepts of rurality, “country,” “southernness,” and 
low education (Niedzielski and Preston, 2003; Evans, 2011; Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012).  
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In the same turn (line 5), David contrasts the inferences from stereotype-based 
associations with the professional characteristics of Jack who can “do some crazy things with an 
airplane.” Here, David appeals to the values and knowledge he shares with Sam as a pilot when 
he describes Jack’s professional abilities and implies that advanced piloting skills require 
intelligence. Thus, David relies on the interlocutor’s ability to draw inferences about Jack’s 
intelligence from different group identifications that evoke stereotype-related and professional 
associations. David presents these inferences as contradictory: on the one hand, he implies that 
Jack is intelligent since he is a good pilot. On the other, Jack speaks like a “hick” which implies 
lower intelligence. This argument from contradiction (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 
195) serves as David’s explanation of his negative answer in line 4 which challenges the 
indexical links between “a way of speaking” and “intelligence.” In other words, David shows that 
the same speaker may project different social identities which may become the source of 
conflicting inferences about speaker characteristics.  
In response to David’s negative answer, Sam reformulates his original question by 
presenting a situation of speaker evaluation in which social information about the speaker is 
limited and can be inferred only from the way they talk (“but not knowing that” and “if you were 
to meet somebody…” in line 6). Then, in lines 6-8, Sam specifies the speech qualities of a person 
evaluated in this hypothetical situation by performing a linguistic imitation. This imitation 
functions rhetorically as an illustration of the “country” accent which was imitated earlier in the 
conversation by a 7-year-old girl. Sam labels this way of speaking as characteristic of someone 
“from the deep woods.” With this metaphorical label, Sam points to the type of social information 
that he presumes to be associated with the imitated speech qualities. This label as well as an 
association with “country talk” may evoke images of the social personae of rural and poorly-
educated people. Given the mention of “hicks” in the immediately preceding discourse, Sam’s 
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imitation may also evoke collective stereotypes of stigmatized groups of rural-based American 
Southerners. 
To function as an effective illustration, Sam’s imitation needs to highlight pragmatically 
salient linguistic features that can be recognized by the audience as indexing the implied social 
characteristics. The linguistic features of Sam’s normal and imitated speech include differences at 
the prosodic and segmental level, as revealed by the acoustic phonetic analyses in Praat (Boersma 
and Weenink, 2016). Compared to the normal speech, the imitation has the following prosodic 
characteristics: (1) a higher pitch level (fundamental frequency differences of about 40 Hz) with 
more frequent pitch accents, (2) abrupt changes in intensity, and (3) a distinct temporal structure 
with shorter rhythmic groups. At the segmental level, there are changes in the position 
(differences of about 100 – 300 Hz) and duration of vowels, including (1) a raised and fronted 
vowel offset in “talks” which gives it a diphthongal quality, (2) a lowered and fronted /ay/ in 
“like,” (3) a lowered and backed onset in the /iy/ of “deep,” and (4) a considerably lengthened  
and diphthongal realization of /uw/ in “woods” with a fronted vowel offset. Impressionistically, 
the imitated speech sounds more nasal than Sam’s normal speech. While it is hard to determine 
the level of Sam’s awareness of each linguistic feature he highlighted through the imitation, his 
choice to cluster these features may reflect his awareness of their collective socioindexical 
potential to evoke a social persona of someone “from the deep woods” who has “a country 
accent.”  
Sam’s deployment of this socioindexical potential is pro-active (LePage & Tabouret-
Keller, 1985, p. 182; Shiling-Estes, 1998). In addition, it serves specific rhetorical purposes. Sam 
uses a linguistic imitation as an argument from illustration (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, 
p. 357) to clarify and strengthen the questioned proposition that an evaluation of a person’s 
intelligence may be made based on their speech. This type of argument also serves to “increase 
the presence to the consciousness” (p. 357) of the audience of those linguistic features and 
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stereotyped ideological values that support the arguer’s point by evoking socioindexical 
associations relevant to evaluation of the speaker’s intelligence. Thus, this imitation, or 
“stylization” in Coupland’s (2007) terms, functions as a speech portrayal which strategically 
embeds macro-level sociolinguistic typifications into the rhetorical context of interaction by 
calling up the social meanings of a cluster of segmental and prosodic phonetic details.  
In response to Sam’s reformulation of his original question in lines 6-8 that introduces a 
hypothetical context of speech evaluation, David confirms in line 10 that Sam is now talking 
about “perception” rather than “opinion.” The phrase “oh perception” in line 12 reveals David’s 
local focus of attention on the new information leading to a shift in a conceptual frame of 
reference (Heritage, 1984, p. 299; Schiffrin, 1987, p. 74). This shift is caused by Sam’s 
clarification that the evaluated speaker is an unknown person which means that social information 
about this person is available only from the speech signal. As a result, David changes his initial 
negative response to Sam’s question and affirms the indexical link between the imitated speech 
style and a lower level of intelligence by saying “you automatically assume they are retarded” in 
line 12.  
The concepts “intelligence,” “perception,” and “hick,” which are central to the discussion 
in this episode, are constructed here along interrelated pragmatic scales. David constructs 
“hickness” on a scale of stereotypicality when he uses an expression “the hickest of hicks” – the 
superlative degree presupposes lesser degrees of the same quality. “Intelligence” is also 
constructed as a hierarchy of pragmatic values implied in the use of related but opposing terms: 
“retarded” on the one hand, and “can do some crazy things with an airplane” on the other. Based 
on the implied social stereotypes, the scale of “hickness” is linked to the scale of “intelligence” in 
an inverse relation: the more “hick” is the sound, the less is the perceived intelligence of the 
speaker. This implicit link is challenged using another set of interrelated pragmatic scales, where 
different degrees of familiarity with an attitude target (an unknown person versus a colleague) are 
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related to the degrees of consciousness in attitudes to a person’s speech style. The latter scale is 
represented in this discourse by the terms “opinions” and “automatic assumptions” which are 
opposed through the conversational repair work on Sam’s question about intelligence.  
These interlinked pragmatic scales are part of “a double hierarchy argument” (Perelman 
& Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) co-constructed by the two participants throughout this episode. This 
argument is often implicit and “normally expresses an idea of direct or inverse proportionality, or 
at least a term-to-term relation” (p. 337).  In such an argument, objects of conceptualization are 
represented as ordered along interrelated pragmatic scales (Coulson, 2001, p. 252).  In this 
episode, a double hierarchy argument links the scale of familiarity with an attitude target to the 
scale of automaticity in attitudinal reactions: the less familiar with a speaker, the more automatic 
the evaluation of their intelligence based on their speaking style. This argument serves to validate 
the contrast between an evaluation of the colleague’s speech that does not follow the enregistered 
socio-indexical route and a stereotypical reaction to a stigmatized language variety used by an 
unknown person.  
The participants’ interactional strategies in this episode reveal their sensitivity to the 
ideological constructs they are discussing. Sam formulates his first question about intelligence 
very carefully in line 1 where he speaks slower, with more frequent and longer pauses, and he 
chooses impersonal forms that help him avoid asking David directly about his opinion on the 
issue.  Personal pronouns are among the means of establishing “footings” in a conversation 
(Goffman, 1981), and avoidance of personal pronouns may indicate an attempt not to assign a 
position to an interlocutor with regard to a sensitive topic. While David is certainly aware of the 
stigmatized linguistic differences associated with lower intelligence, he first challenges such 
typifications showing unwillingness to affirm them. In response to this challenge, Sam provides 
additional, persuasive details in the form of linguistic imitation. Sam’s interactional strategy here, 
which he achieves successfully through his questioning, is to lead his interlocutor to acknowledge 
103 
 
the existence of stereotypical associations without expressing his own positioning directly. In his 
acknowledgment of a social stereotype, David also avoids expressing personal commitment to 
this position: he uses “you” in line 12 in the sense “anyone,” thus avoiding the role of “a 
principal” in the “production format” of the utterance (Goffman, 1981).   
This analysis reveals how ideological representations of “intelligence,” “hickness,” and 
“country talk” become negotiated as part of rhetorical and interactional development in discourse. 
When David challenges the relevance of speech-based judgments about “hickness” and 
intelligence in the beginning of the episode, he challenges the implications of an ideological 
process of “iconization” (Irvine & Gal, 2009) in a specific context of speech evaluation. In other 
words, ideological representations of linguistic differences are not simply employed by the 
participant as stable or uncontestable thought patterns shared by members of a group: instead, 
these representations are shown to be contingent on interrelations with other contextual factors. 
Thus, the connections between social images and linguistic forms are construed as more complex 
than those that are characteristic of iconization. This highlights the importance of focusing on 
“the who-what-where-why-and-how of ideology” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 171) to explore how 
ideological processes may function rhetorically in discourse. 
The analysis of this extract reveals the complex structure of argumentation in which 
several argument schemes are intertwined to create dynamically developing and discursively-
negotiated meanings. The culmination of this development is the co-constructed dissociation 
between “opinion” and “perception” which is an integral part of the semiotization of the folk-
concepts “hick” and “uneducated” speech in the episode analyzed here. In other words, it would 
not be fair to take out of this context separate arguments or their elements and interpret them as 
isolated formalized structures of argument. The complexity of sociolinguistic indexicality created 
in a specific rhetorical context of conceptualization may be hard to uncover, and the meanings of 
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language users’ expressions of beliefs may be distorted if the analysis uses surface-level forms as 
decontextualized evidence of “themes” reflecting language users’ belief systems.  
This analysis also illustrates how linguistic details of participants’ speech can be analyzed 
rhetorically, as part of discourse argumentation. The fact that speakers can deploy fine linguistic 
distinctions in their speech to signal social meanings is an axiom in sociolinguistics (e.g., 
Gumperz, 1982; Shilling-Estes, 1998; Eckert, 2000; Coupland, 2007; Mendoza-Denton, 2011, 
among many others). This study suggests that linguistic detail may be analyzed as part of the 
premises of argumentation and may thus contribute to creating the conceptual framework of 
interpretation for the objects of metapragmatic reflexivity. Considering linguistic features in 
participants’ speech outside of their rhetorical context of use, however, may prevent the analyst 
from exploring a fuller range of their indexical potential that can be an important resource for the 
hearer in understanding the speaker’s intended meanings and social positionings. The 
interactional positionings and alignments are an important aspect of discourse-based meaning 
creation, and the analysis of Extract 9 integrates the interactional level of investigation. However, 
my contention is that the interactional approach on its own is not sufficient to explore the 
meanings created in metapragmatic discourse at different levels of discourse coherence. This 
observation harks back to the proposal made in Chapter II based on the survey of previously-used 
discourse-analytic techniques in language attitude research: the rhetorical approach can serve as a 
unifying framework which blends analytical levels, including linguistic, interactional, and 
ideational structures, in the application of discourse analysis to the study of propositional 
processes of sociolinguistic indexicality.   
3.7.4 Techniques of Argumentation: Concluding Remarks 
The application of TNR approach to argumentation illuminates the role of the patterns of 
reasoning in speakers’ co-construction of conceptual relations between elements of discourse 
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through the processes of association and dissociation of concepts. These processes, as they 
pertain to the content of discourse, cannot be revealed, however, if the rhetorical analysis (e.g., 
Schiffrin, 1987; Preston, 1994) mainly focuses on the functional rather than conceptual relations 
between argument components. The complexity of these processes cannot be revealed in a topic-
oriented or in an interactional approach to folk-linguistic discourse. Admittedly, there are a 
number of difficulties with the applications of TNR, such as those related to the problems of 
analytical reconstruction of implicit meanings and replicability of the process of identification of 
argument schemes. However, it is undeniable that common patterns of reasoning form the 
conceptual and inferential relations in the conceptualization of discourse entities evoked both at 






DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF “TWANG”: AN APPLICATION OF THE 
RHETORICAL APPROACH  
  
4.1 Organizational Overview 
In this chapter, I illustrate the applications of the proposed rhetorically-oriented approach to the 
analysis of the meanings of a specific folk-linguistic concept constructed in metalinguistic 
discourse on the topic of language variation (Rodgers, 2016, in press). I also discuss what these 
applications can reveal about discourse-based language-ideological constructions of linguistic and 
social differences. Several excerpts from a multi-party conversation will be presented to illustrate 
specific applications of the argumentation theory and discuss their implications for the theory of 
sociolinguistic indexicality, as well as for language-attitudinal and language variation studies. 
This analysis will center on the meanings of a popular folk-linguistic term “twang” as they 




4.2 “Twang” in Sociolinguistics 
“Twang” is often mentioned by non-linguists as a descriptor of linguistic differences in American 
English (Preston, 1999). Sociolinguists have defined “twang” as a nasal manner of speech (e.g., 
Montgomery, 2008; Jacewicz, Fox, & Lyle, 2009), but language users’understandings of the term 
have not received much analytical attention. While some meanings of “twang” and its 
collocations have been revealed in several studies, they have not been the main focus of analysis 
since folk-linguistic studies in the USA have been predominantly concerned with exploring 
geographically-delimited distinctions in non-linguists’ perceptions of dialectal differences (e.g., 
Long & Preston, 2002; Hartley, 2005; Bucholtz et al., 2007, among others).  
 Previous research in perceptual dialectology has shown that “twang” is used in 
respondents’ descriptions of the dialectal differences in Kentucky (Cramer, 2013) and Tennessee 
(Cramer, 2010), West Virginia (Evans, 2002), Oklahoma (Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012; Bakos, 
2013), and Texas (Cukor-Avila et al., 2012; Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012; Oxley, 2015). Non-
linguists often find it challenging to define the term, but some of the frequently cited associations 
include the notions of rurality and “Southernness,” lack of education, as well as the social 
stereotypes of “hillbilly,” “country,” “hick,” and “redneck” (Oxley, 2015). The term “twang” was 
also shown to be prevalent in Californians’ comments on Southern dialectal features (Fought, 
2002). These results suggest that “twang” is associated with linguistic features and social 
meanings which are salient in perceptions of the Southern speech in American English including 
perceptions of the social personae of rural white Southerners.  
The socioindexical profile of “twang,” however, does not seem to be confined to the 
associations with “southernness.” An Ohioan participant in Benson’s (2003) perceptual study, for 
example, used a label “Midwestern twang” to describe the speech in the greater part of Ohio and 
all of Indiana, while the label “upper Midwest twang” was used to describe the language variety 
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in the northeastern corner of Ohio and in lower Michigan. On the Pacific coast, some 
Washingtonian respondents described a part of their state as having “Canadian twang” (Evans, 
2011). These data suggest that “twang” may refer more generally to a distinct manner of 
speaking.  
However, folk respondents do not appear to mention “nasality” as a defining feature of 
the term, and this is at odds with the definition of “twang” normally used by sociolinguists. In 
Michigan, for example, where the use of nasal features is quite common in non-nasal 
environments (Plichta, 2004, p. 23), “twang” does not appear to be commonly used as a 
descriptor of Michiganders’ speech (Niedzielski & Preston, 2003). Considering the dearth of 
research on the meanings of the term “twang,” this study is aimed at exploring language-related 
and socio-cultural associations that this “folk-concept” (Agha 2007, p. 191) may have in language 
users’ discursive constructions of linguistic difference.  
4.3 Regional Identity and Language Ideologies of Oklahoma 
This analysis deals with the meanings of “twang” constructed by the residents of Oklahoma. 
Oklahoma has an uncertain regional status in both cultural geography (Zelinsky, 1982) and 
dialectology (Wikle & Bailey, 1997).  It is surrounded by several US regions: the West, the 
Midwest, and the South. According to dialect geographers, Oklahoma is a “borderland region,” 
and the uniqueness of its speech is related to its position at the intersection of several dialect areas 
(Wikle & Bailey, 1997, p. 71). As Figure 1 given below shows, a number of dialectal isoglosses 
crossing the state assign its parts to various American English dialect areas, including the West, 
the Midland, the Texas South, and the South (Labov, Ash, & Boberg, 2006). Dialectal border 
regions are important sites of linguistic studies due to the complexity of production and 
perception of linguistic styles and identities in such areas (e.g., Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012; 
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Cramer, 2013) which may be attributed to the social conflicts and contradictions in the 
borderlands (Alvarez, 1995). 
  
Figure 1. Dialect Areas in Oklahoma (adapted from Labov, Ash, & Boberg, 2006) 
Previous work in Oklahoma has demonstrated that the most significant social factors that 
influence language variation in Oklahoma English are rural/urban divide and nativity (Tillery, 
1992; Wikle & Bailey, 1997). With regard to nativity, length of residence in the neighborhood 
seems to affect language variation more directly than years of residence in Oklahoma (Tillery 
1992, 58). Importantly, at the intersection of nativity (years in the neighborhood) and rurality 
(size of neighborhood), geographic mobility has emerged as a crucial social factor of language 
variation in Oklahoma (Tillery, 1997, p. 442).  Social status and ethnicity were shown to have 
impact on some linguistic variables (Wikle & Bailey, p. 1997), but generally were not big 
explaining factors (Tillery, 1997). 
Studies of Oklahomans’ perceptions of the regional identity of their state have shown 
varied results. For example, over half of Tillery’s (1992) respondents considered Oklahoma a 
Midwestern state, and only one-third assigned it to the American South. About 20 years later, 
however, almost 70% of 60 young native Oklahoman participants in Bakos’ (2013, pp. 54-55) 
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survey agreed with the statements that “Oklahomans are a lot like people from the South” and 
that “Oklahomans speak like people from the South.” Both Midwestern and Southwestern 
regional affiliations received about 40% of agreement. At the same time, about 30% of these 
respondents did not describe themselves as “typical Oklahomans” which may suggest a 
controversy surrounding the issue of self-identification with the state and its collective 
sociolinguistic stereotypes. The most frequent descriptions of “a typical Oklahoman” in Bakos’ 
data included the labels “country,” “friendly,” “cowboy,” “farmer,” “redneck,” “hick,” 
“conservative,” “hard working,” “laid back,” and “nice” (2013, p. 57). These results suggest that 
a stereotypical Oklahoman identity may be associated in popular imagination with a rural lifestyle 
and its accompanying positive and negative attributes. These associations may play a role in the 
tendency of some young Oklahoma natives to distance themselves from an affiliation with 
“typical Oklahomans.”   
Historically, Oklahoma English became known outside of the state as a stigmatized 
“Okie accent” associated with the whites who migrated from Oklahoma and other Great Plains 
states to California between 1920s and 1950s, including the “Dust Bowl migration” wave in the 
Great Depression era. A pejorative label “Okies” was often used to collectively refer to these 
groups of migrants who were seen as uneducated “poor white trash,” “a despised and 
economically impaired group” that faced “prejudice and hostility” in their new home state 
(Gregory, 1989, 79). “Twang,” along with other speech characteristics, was frequently cited 
(Berryhill, 1976; Gregory,1991; Waldie, 1997, p. 172) as a distinguishing feature that the 
migrants tried to hide since it carried the social stigma of the “Okie” accent. The patterns of 
linguistic accommodation of Oklahoman migrants in California included avoiding double 
negatives, “ain’ts,” “might coulds,” and g-dropping, as well as “shortening the diphthongal 
vowels that give Southwestern speech its characteristic twang” (Gregory, 1991, p. 122). Some of 
the speech characteristics of the Dust Bowl migrants are still present in California, especially in 
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the San Joaquin Valley (Geenberg, 2014; Podesva & Hofwegen, 2014; Podesva et al., 2015). 
Although many of these features have acquired local indexicalities (Geenberg, 2014), perceptual 
dialectology work has shown that Californians still use labels such as “okies,” “country,” 
“cowboys,” “farmers,” “hicks,” “rednecks,” “white trash,” and “twangy” to distinguish the areas 
in Northern California and the Inland region of the state (Bucholtz et al., 2007, p. 345). Most of 
these labels coincide with those that Oklahomans use to describe identities of “typical” 
Oklahomans and their links to rural-oriented lifestyles of white Southerners.  
Perceptions of the “Okie” identity in the USA continue to draw on the social memory of 
the Dust Bowl migrant experience (Jennings, 2000; Alexander, 2004). Social representations of 
the “Okies” personae have become part of national awareness and acquired stereotypical 
associations through portrayals of Oklahoma migrants in public discourse including John 
Steinbeck’s (1939) renowned novel “The Grapes of Wrath” and its famous movie adaptation of 
the same name, Waldie’s (1997) memoir “Holy Land,” as well as numerous other literary works 
(see Jennings 2000, for review) and publications in the periodicals. Although the linguistic 
features associated with “Okies” were introduced by migrants from several US states many years 
ago, the collective label “Okies” and the folk linguistic term “Okie accent” are still in current use 
in the USA and invoke associations that link Oklahoma to typifications of white, rural-based 
Southern identities. 
The stereotypes of “rurality” and “Southernness,” however, are in conflict with some of 
the linguistic and social characteristics of present-day Oklahoma (see Figure 2 below for the 
layout of the state). North-central Oklahoma has been characterized as a “Midwestern” dialect 
area (Southard, 1993) and hosts the state government, two metropolitan areas including 
Oklahoma City and Tulsa, and two largest universities in the state – the social facts that may 
define it as a “focal area for a prestige dialect” (p. 243). The urban parts of the state are a site of 
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the expansion of “innovative” linguistic features among newcomers and younger respondents 
(Wikle & Bailey, 1997, p. 81).  
 
Figure 2. Map of Oklahoma 
Note:    The map was adapted from http://dmaps.com/carte.php?num_car=21367&lang=en.  
It shows main roads in Oklahoma, two metropolitan areas, and three small towns in the 
south of the state mentioned by the interview participants. 
In contrast, the southern areas of the state are socially distinct. These areas, including the 
Texas border and the South-East, are less populated and more rural-oriented; they are more 
frequently associated with the labels that are also used to describe “Okies” and “typical” 
Oklahomans. These less urbanized areas form one of the dimensions of linguistic variation in 
Oklahoma (Southard, p. 1993): they have been described as Southern dialect areas (Labov, Ash, 
& Boberg, 2006) and characterized by a wider use of “recessive” Southern features (Wikle & 
Bailey, 1997, p. 81). These geographical, social, and linguistic divisions may be seen as important 
factors defining the language-ideological tensions that set a background for an opposition 
between stereotypical and prestige-bearing sociolinguistic representations of Oklahoma English. 
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These tensions complicate the notion of an ambivalent and uncertain regional identity of the state 
and have implications for understanding the language-ideological and identity-related positions 
that the participants in this study take with regard to language variation in Oklahoma.  
4.4 Context and Participants 
This analysis focuses on the data derived from a conversation with four Oklahomans and 
a follow-up interview with one of the participants. The conversation lasted about 50 minutes and 
took place at one of the participants’ home in a relaxed setting of a casual talk among friends. The 
“draw-a-map” task (Preston, 1999) was used to start the conversation on the topic of language 
variation (see the map used in this task in Appendix B). To approximate the conditions of an 
informal, naturally-developing conversation and to avoid an influence on the topical development 
of discourse, the interviewer’s role was confined to directing the discussion to the topic of 
language variation in the US and Oklahoma. As a result, most topic transitions were initiated by 
the participants themselves. The participants of this conversation are friends with each other, 
belong to the same local community and church groups, and travel together.  
The participants’ backgrounds are as follows:  
Susan (Sus): female, in her early 80s, white, Associate’s degree, 8 years in a small town in 
southern Oklahoma, 72 years in Oklahoma City;  
Sharon (Sha): female, in her mid-80s, white, Associate’s degree, 12 years in a small town in 
western Texas, 72 years in the suburb of Oklahoma City;  
Jocelyn (Joc): host, female, in her late 70s, white, Bachelor’s degree, 43 years in Oklahoma City 
(childhood and later years), 7 – in Kansas, 3 – in Virginia, 24 – in California; 
Jennifer (Jen): female, in her mid-80s, white, Bachelor’s degree, 56 years in Oklahoma City 
(childhood and later years), 6 – in Virginia, 2 – in Nebraska, 7 – in California, 3 – in Louisiana. 
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These participants represent two types of speakers: those whose identity is more place-
bound, and those whose identity is more ambivalent. Sharon and Susan lived in Oklahoma most 
of their lives. In contrast, Jocelyn and Jennifer lived in several different locations in the USA, 
although they spent their childhood, adolescence, and later years of life in Oklahoma. Jocelyn and 
Jennifer are not the typical respondents primarily focused on in the quantitative variationist 
research in sociolinguistics (see Eckert 2003, pp. 392-393 for discussion): they are not the “pure” 
type of a native dialect speaker who has lived in one place most of their life. They represent the 
“migrating” type of respondent who usually accumulates more experience of language contact 
with dialect speakers from other geographical areas and may develop a rather ambivalent 
linguistic identity.  
4.5 Data Analysis 
4.5.1 “Twang” and Spatial Boundaries of Dialectal Distinctions 
“Twang” was first mentioned in the analyzed conversation by one of the participants when they 
were labelling the areas of linguistic distinctiveness on the blank map of Oklahoma. Extract 10 
shows this first reference to “twang” in the context of a comparison of the linguistic distinctions 
between Oklahoma and Texas whereby “twang” in Oklahoma English is contrasted with the 
Texas “drawl.” 
Extract10: 
1     Sus:   They are- yeah. (.) They are close to Texas. And ↑Texans (.) have a [(1.0)  really (.)]      
2     Joc:                                                                                                                 [(***) twang   ] 
3     Sus:   dra[::::::::::::wl]. 
4     Joc:          [They have] a drawl, we have a twang. (0.4) Oklahoma (0.3) Oklahoma had a= 
5     Jen:                                                                                  uh-huh             
6     Joc:   =twang. (1.6) The Texans have a drawl. 
7     (0.5) 
8     Int:   So what is a twang. (.) And what is a drawl_ 
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9     Joc:   That’s where you make two syllables out of one-syllable wo:rds. (0.4) 
10   Joc:   [When I was gro]wing up, (.) everybody in Oklahoma talked with that (0.5) that= 
11   Jen:   [I can tell when-]         
12   Joc:   =twang.  
13   (1.5) 
14   Sus:   I ↓don’t. {laughter} 
15   Int:   [And now_] 
16   Joc:   [Not [now,]  
17   Sus:           [((chuckle))] 
18   Joc:   Well (.) but [what ↑happened was] ↑television came and educated English=   
19   Jen:                       [(***)                        ] 
20   Joc:   =began to be ↑heard by people who lived here, ((PII))  
21             and it changed (0.5) the whole country. (.) you know, (1.0) changed for the better_ (.) 
22             @mostly.@ 
 
In line 1, Susan provides a background for this distinction when she identifies Walters - a 
small town situated close to the Texas border - as an example of a distinctive linguistic area on 
the map of Oklahoma. “They” in line 1 refers to Walters’ residents. Here, Susan builds an 
argument that dissociates Walters from the rest of Oklahoma and associates the speech of its 
residents with Texans who have a “drawl” implying that this is not a defining feature of the 
Oklahoma variety. This assertion is made in careful speech marked by a slow tempo, several 
pauses, a delayed emphatic use of the intensification marker “really,” and a linguistic imitation of 
“drawl” provided through vowel lengthening. “Really” is used as a degree adverb here which 
construes “drawl” in gradient terms and locates it on a high point of “an abstractly conceived 
intensity scale” (Quirk et al., 1985,  p. 589). Susan does not explain whether the linguistic 
distinction between Oklahoma and Texas lies in the absence of “drawl” in Oklahoma, or whether 
it lies in the intensity of “drawl.” Variation in the use of “drawl” is conceptualized here in terms 
of the geographical proximity of Walters to the Texas state line. A similar conceptualization was 
used earlier in the same conversation by the other three participants who named the Southern and 
South-Eastern state border areas, including Durant and Tishomingo as examples of linguistically 
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distinct areas in Oklahoma characterized by “a country drawl” and “talking country.” This 
conceptualization of the dialect region reflects the regional boundary in American English 
dialectology which assigns the southern part of Oklahoma and most of Texas to the Southern 
dialectal area (e.g. Labov, Ash & Boberg, 2006), with “Southern drawl” being one of its often 
cited linguistic characteristics (Feagin, 2015). 
The distinction between Texas and Oklahoma provides a conceptual background for the 
introduction of the notion “twang” into this conversation. In lines 4 and 6, Jocelyn supports the 
dissociations between Oklahoma and Texas established in Susan’s argument and clarifies the 
difference between the two states by pointing out “twang” as a former linguistic feature of 
Oklahoma English: “Oklahoma had a twang. The Texans have a drawl.” Here, Jocelyn is not 
considering finer geographical within-the-state distinctions made earlier in the conversation by 
Susan but constructs a more generalized differentiation along the state boundaries. This 
simplification of sociolinguistic distinctions serves a rhetorical function of building an argument 
which contrasts “twang” and “drawl” as distinctive features differentiating the states of Oklahoma 
and Texas.  
This argumentation technique is what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) call an 
“argument by comparison,” “where several objects are considered in order to evaluate them 
through their relations to each other” (242). In Extract 10, the comparison is argumentatively 
constructed in the form of an opposition of linguistic identities of Oklahoma and Texas. “Drawl” 
and “twang” are presented here as distinct features that conceptually have an equal ability to 
characterize overall linguistic distinctiveness of the two states. An argument by opposition 
establishes the relation between the terms of comparison, and the interaction between these terms 
“may be due to an awareness of real connections between the things which are being compared” 
(p. 244). But, in informal reasoning occurring in the context of everyday communication, non-
linguists cannot support such connections with precise acoustic measurements or statistical facts.  
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In order to achieve persuasiveness in discourse in the absence of such factual justification, “… in 
comparisons, when a distinction between the terms is sought, a constant effort is required to 
maintain the distance between them” (p. 244). The simplified and essentialist nature of a 
linguistic characterization of Oklahoma and Texas may be seen as a contribution to such an effort 
which helps construe “twang” as a term dissociated from “drawl” on the one hand and as a former 
distinguishing feature of Oklahoma English on the other. The argumentative context of the first 
mention of the folk-term “twang” in this discourse is important for its further development in the 
conversational argumentation “where the terms already set forth form a background which 
influences new evaluations” (p. 243). Jocelyn’s claim “Oklahoma had a twang” (lines 4 and 6) 
dominates her discussion of language variation in the state throughout the conversation.  This 
claim serves in this discourse the role of a “macroproposition” (van Dijk, 1982, p. 180) which 
subsumes several subsequent “twang”-related arguments functioning as further supports for 
Jocelyn’s assertion.   
4.5.2 Changes in the Use of “Twang” over Time 
In addition to the spatial aspect of the argumentative context in which “twang” is 
introduced, there is also a temporal factor revealed in the opposition between the present and the 
past tenses used in lines 4 and 6 in Extract 10: “Oklahoma had a twang. The Texans have a 
drawl.” The contrast in the choice of the verb tenses denies the relation of co-existence to the 
phenomena of “twang” and “drawl” in the two neighboring states. But it is doubtful that this 
assertion accurately reflects Jocelyn’s real belief about the current absence of “twang” in 
Oklahoma, considering the fact that Jocelyn contradicts herself in line 4 as well as later in the 
conversation when she admits that “we still have that Oklahoma twang” and labels Durant, a city 
in the south of Oklahoma, as an area with “large twang.”  Considering this contradictory 
evidence, the utterance in lines 4-6 may be interpreted as an exaggeration of the diachronic 
change in the use of “twang” in Oklahoma aiming at a rhetorical effect of enhancing the 
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distinction between the concepts “drawl” and “twang” both in the temporal and in the spatial 
domains.  
Jocelyn supports this argument with another generalization: “When I was growing up 
everybody in Oklahoma talked with that that twang” (lines 10 and 12). Here, she cites her 
personal childhood experience of living in Oklahoma as an epistemic ground that allows her to 
make a strong claim about the past prevalence of the linguistic phenomenon of “twang” in 
Oklahoma which is recognizably exaggerated. “Everybody” is used non-literally here as a 
rhetorical device of an “extreme case formulation” (Pomerantz, 1986) which strengthens the 
argument by emphasizing the speaker’s “investment” (Edwards, 2000) in her assertions about the 
diachronic change in the use of “twang.”  
To support her assertions further, Jocelyn associates the diminished use of “twang” in 
Oklahoma with the influence of the “educated English” introduced by television which “changed 
the whole country … for the better” (line 21). While the folk argument about the influence of the 
mass media on language change is very familiar and has some support of scholarly studies (e.g., 
Lippi-Green, 1997; Stuart-Smith, 2011), its use in this conversational context is noteworthy since 
it creates a number of implicit evaluations of the linguistic and social phenomena and events 
associated with “twang.” The social event of the advent of television and the process of linguistic 
change are associated here via the consequences of the former and, probably, through a causal 
link, although such a link is not foregrounded or made explicit. The type of argumentation that 
Jocelyn uses here is “a pragmatic argument” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969) which 
“permits the evaluation of an act or an event in terms of its favorable or unfavorable 
consequences” (p. 266) since “the consequences … are the basis for the value attributed to the 
event” (p. 267). Thus, in this argument, the linguistic change is implicitly evaluated positively via 
a transfer of positive value from the beneficial social consequences of exposure to television and 
its “educated English” to the linguistic event of a diminished use of “twang.” At the same time, a 
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linguistic phenomenon of “twang” is implicitly evaluated negatively: since it is given in 
opposition to “educated English,” “twang” acquires an indexical association with the speech of 
“uneducated” people.  This indexical association and its negative evaluation are created here as 
part of an argument which relies on the assumption about the existing social order of values in 
which education is valued higher than a lack thereof. Thus, in this argumentative construction, the 
judgments presumed to be socially accepted are used to create an implicit evaluation of the 
constructed reality of a temporally- and spatially-bound linguistic change.  Note that the other 
participants in this conversation do not dispute this line of argumentation and let it unfold without 
challenging it with questions that could put this argument to doubt. Neither they dispute the 
assertion about the positive influence of television over “the whole country” – the rhetorical move 
that strengthens Jocelyn’s original argument about the change in the use of “twang” in Oklahoma 
by a reference to a more global process in which such a change is involved.    
4.5.3 “Twang” and the Influence of American Indians  
Language change is also discussed in this conversation as part of an explanation of the 
origin of “twang” in Oklahoma. Extract 11 is part of a long uninterrupted conversational turn 
which represents a participant-initiated change in discourse topic as this turn follows immediately 
after Susan’s comment about her slow tempo of speech resulting in other people thinking of her 
as being “from the South.” Without any other specific topic triggers, Jocelyn refocuses the 
conversation and puts forward a hypothesis about the influence of American Indian English on 
“twang” in Oklahoma.   
Extract 11: 
1   Joc:   From having been among so many  American Indian (0.4) tribes, (0.6) you can listen to= 
2             =any ((inaudible)) from Dakota, (0.4) Arizona, (0.5) New Mexico, (.) all over Oklahoma, (.)   
3             even the Seminoles in Florida, (0.6) and there’s a (0.4) there is a similarity, ((omitted PII)) 
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4             but there is a (0.4) there is a (1.2) continuity, and everyone’s got a different language, (.) but=  
5            =you start using it in English, (0.6) and when you are among tribal people, (0.8) and you speak=  
6             =English that way, (.) you know you are an Indian. (1.4) and (.) this is why today, er (0.5) we=  
7            =used  to be able to look at some of them, (.) and know whether they are Mexican or American=  
8            =Indian.  
               ((omitted material on the topic of Mexican Americans)) 
9             I am wondering over the years, (.) how that might have influenced (0.6) er (0.4) white people (0.5)      
10             because you know, (.) I grew up, I thought everyone was Indian or part-Indian in Oklahoma.      
11           ((omitted PII)) I just assumed everybody was Indian.  (1.2) and it has to since that (0.5) since the=          
12           =Indians had been here since the early eighteen hundreds. (0.8) I can hear how some of those=    
13           =sounds might have influenced the Oklahoma twang. 
In Extract 11, Jocelyn proposes an association between American Indian varieties of 
English and “twang” in Oklahoma and uses her personal experience of being involved in the 
Indian tribes’ activities as an epistemic support for her argument. In other words, Jocelyn 
rhetorically establishes her epistemic credibility to evaluate the impact of American Indian 
languages on “twang” based on her first-hand social and language experiences. She also supports 
this argument with unmitigated assertion in lines 3-4 that “there is a similarity” and “continuity” 
in the way American Indians use English. This folk-linguistic belief is based on Jocelyn’s 
perceptions; but it reflects, in a way, the results of sociolinguistic studies that show evidence of 
the prosodic features shared by many English varieties used by American Indian and Canadian 
First Nations people (Newmark, Walker, & Stanford, 2015) as well as evidence of common 
features in Southwestern Native American-accented English varieties (Hoffer, 1982, as cited in 
McBride, 2015). In Jocelyn’s opinion expressed in lines 6-8, the linguistic properties shared by 
such varieties can mark a speaker as having Native American background. Conceptually, Jocelyn 
integrates her perception of linguistic similarities with information that comes from her social 




Having established the existence of a linguistic commonality between Native American-
accented English varieties, Jocelyn argues in lines 12-13 that she can “hear how some of those 
sounds might have influenced the Oklahoma twang.” Here, Jocelyn infers a possible relation of 
an association between “twang” and American Indian varieties of English. In line 11, she uses a 
connective “since” to overtly mark this conceptual relation as that of causality.  
 The epistemic premises of this argument also rely on an interpretation of the historical 
facts, referred to in line 12, about the length of dialect and language contact between English 
varieties and American Indian languages in Oklahoma. A reference to the language contact 
situation is presented here as a valid premise supporting the argument which provides an 
explanation of the proposed influence of American Indian English on twang. This influence is 
constructed in lines 11-13 as a naturally occurring and expected result of the contact between 
language varieties.    
Thus, a causal relation between language contact and language change is inferred in 
Extract 11 based on several premises which link internal (perceptual) experiences with 
interpretations of the meaning of external (historical) facts. The rhetorical relations and 
associations established in this discoursal construction of folk-linguistic beliefs about the 
mechanisms of language change engage the processes of metapragmatic awareness which involve 
conceptual coordination of judgments about perceived similarities and differences between 
linguistic varieties on the one hand, and justification of such judgments through the use of 
informal reasoning schemes of causality on the other. 
4.5.4 “Twang,” Linguistic Self-Identification, and Sociolinguistic Authenticity 
There are several ways in which the concept “twang” is implicated in the constructions of 
the participants’ linguistic self-identification and in-group/out-group relations in this 
conversation. The first example concerns a self-presentation of linguistic identity which 
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rhetorically dissociates one’s speaking style from the use of “twang” and seems to be based on an 
implicit negative evaluation of this linguistic phenomenon. When Susan emphatically says “I 
don’t” in line 14 of Extract 10, she uses a rhetorical technique of breaking any possible 
connecting links between “twang” and the way she speaks. This technique is used when 
“elements which should remain separate and independent have been improperly associated” 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 411). The “improper” association which is denied here 
concerns a possibility of classifying Susan as a member of the conceptual category of 
“Oklahomans who had a twang”: since Susan is the same age as Jocelyn and lived all her life in 
Oklahoma, Jocelyn’s generalization “Everybody in Oklahoma talked with that, that twang” may 
be interpreted in this context as applicable to Susan’s speech. It appears that Susan’s objection to 
a mere possibility of this association with “twang” speakers and her self-initiated topical shift into 
the realm of personal reference serves the purpose of severing any links that could presumably be 
constructed to connect Susan’s way of speaking to “twang.” The use of such a rhetorical 
technique is, arguably, part of “a corrective effort” in the process of doing “face-work” (Goffman, 
1955) needed to protect a positive self-image from any negative associations with “twang” which 
Susan may assume to be shared by the interlocutors.  The importance that this type of face-work 
has for Susan is revealed in her repeated use of a similar strategy of breaking “improper” 
associations with “twang” in several other episodes of the same conversation, as illustrated in 
Extract 12 below, where she claims that she does not have a twang and does not hear it in 
Oklahoma. 
Extract 12: 
1       Joc:       But we ↑still have that Oklahoma twang. (1.8) Twa:ng. (0.2)  ^Twa:[::::ng] 
2       Sha:                                                                                                                      [((chu]ckle)) 
3       Int:        Would you say that,- 
4       Sus:                              [And see, (0.2) I don’t hear it,  
5       Joc:       And you aren’t ↑using it. [(0.2) And we don’t have it] as much as we did when we=   
6       Sus:            [((laughter))                      ] 
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7       Joc:        =were growing up. 
8       (1.3) 
9       Sus:       ↑I don’t. 
  Another conceptual dimension that implicates the notion of “twang” in the processes of 
linguistic self-identification in this conversation is the one that concerns the expression of 
sociolinguistic authenticity achieved by using “twang” to linguistically position oneself as an in-
group speaker. Jocelyn repeatedly constructs narrated representations of such sociolinguistic 
accommodation processes which implicitly ascribe a positive value to “twang” based on its role 
in creating a sense of social belonging to a speech community. In Extract 13, for example, she 
reports on her experience of living in California and choosing to “go back to an Oklahoma 
twang” when she was back in Oklahoma to visit her family: 
Extract 13: 
1     Joc:   and I ↑know when I went to San Francisco, and I (.) talked faster and I walked= 
2               =faster, (0.7) when I came back to Oklahoma, (.) which was quite ^often, (0.9) cause 
3                ((omitted PII)) All my friends_ (0.3) put me at arm’s length. People I’d gone to=  
4                =high school with, college with, (0.2) they weren’t ↑friends anymore. They treated=  
5                =me like a ↑pariah, [(0.6)   ] and I thought “what is it,” (0.8) and then, (.)  
6     Sha:                                     [((***))] 
7     Joc:   that summer, (.) I was trying to ↓analyze why this why they ↑changed, (0.7) and of= 
8               =course San Francisco is ↑cooler in the summer. (0.9) Oklahoma was ↑ho:t, 
9     (1.4) 
10   Sha:   ◦(**[*)◦ 
11   Joc:           [So. (0.7) I slowed down. I got off the plane_ (0.2) I slowed [do:wn.] 
12   Sus:       [((***))] 
13   (0.8) 
14   Joc:   I went back to an Oklahoma ↓twang. (1.6) And everybody said. (.) ↑Where’ve you= 
15            =↑been, 
16    (0.6) 
17   Joc:   When I [start]ed ↑speaking like I (.) grew ↑up wi:th, (0.1) and slowed ↓down. 
18   Sha:               [↓No]  ((addressing the dog)) 
19   Int:                                                            uh-huh_ 
10   Joc:   Everybody said oh Jocelyn’s back. 
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“Twang” is presented in Extract 13 as part of the strategy of linguistic and sociocultural 
accommodation that Jocelyn reports to have selected consciously as a result of her analysis (note 
“And I thought “What is it” and “I was trying to analyze why … they changed” in lines 5 and 7 of 
Extract 13) and reflection on the roles that linguistic identities of self and other had played in the 
history of her interpersonal communication. Argumentatively, “twang” is presented here as part 
of the causal relation of “a means to its end” rather than the “act-consequence” relation (Perelman 
& Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 271) between a linguistic form and the social effects of its use 
which allows Jocelyn to highlight the intentional and strategic character of her linguistic 
accommodation. This point of view constructs “twang” as a means of resolving the problem of 
social alienation by indicating in-group membership.  
 “Twang” is constructed in Extract 13 as a defining feature of Oklahoma English at the 
time of narration in contrast to the variety Jocelyn acquired while living in San Francisco. 
California English acquires an implicit negative evaluation via a presumption of a negative 
estranging effect it has on communication with Oklahomans. In contrast, “twang” is implicitly 
evaluated positively in terms of the value it carries to signal belonging to a group of “Oklahoma 
friends.” Thus, “twang” is discursively constructed as indexing what Coupland (2003) calls 
“authentic cultural membership” which ascribes “twang” a cultural value in a strategic 
achievement of vernacular authenticity. This type of speech valorization is created by presenting 
“twang” as a socially authenticating linguistic resource that a speaker can “go back to,” in 
Jocelyn’s words, and use as “an anchor for solidarity and local affiliation” (p. 424). 
  Another narrative account of the use of “twang” for strategic sociolinguistic 
authentication is given in Extract 14 below.  
Extract 14:  
1     Joc:   and when I started working with the oil companies out there, (.) with ((PII)), 
2              (0.7) all of the men who ↑ran the oil companies, (.) in ^California (.) were= 
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3               = from Texas, Oklahoma, and ^Louisiana. (0.9) And I didn’t realize it but= 
4               =when I’d go into a (0.2) a (0.3) a yard, (1.5) an oil yard or (0.2) petroleum or=  
5                =whatever it ^was, (0.4) I just went right back into Oklahoma ^twang, and they=  
6                = were ↑comfortable with me [(0.4)          ] and that’s why I got ↓business. On a= 
7     Sha:                                                       [((chuckle))] 
8     Joc:   =↑handshake (1.2) because the way I ^spoke, (.) was the way_ (0.3) and these=  
9               =men you’d think (.) they were old_ [(0.6)  barbers         ](0.5) they all had at least=  
10   Sha:                                                            >[They ↓trusted you]< 
11   Joc:    =Master’s degrees. (.) in engineering_ or (0.3) something. you know but you just=  
12              =thought they were just good @old boys_@.  
13   Jen:   ((chu[ckle))                                                ] 
14   Sus:        @[They were chemical ↑engineers@] 
15   Joc:   Yah. (.) And I went back into the Oklahoma twang_ (0.5) after ↑fifteen twenty=  
16              =↑years (0.2) without even knowing it. (0.4) until I got away from there and= 
17               =someone said ↑“Where are you from.”  
18   Jen,Sha:   ((laughter)) 
19   Joc:   @“Where are you from.”@  
 
In contrast to the narrative in Extract 13, Extract 14 constructs a representation of an 
unintentional and unconscious process of using “twang” for linguistic accommodation – 
something Jocelyn “didn’t realize” and did “without even knowing it,” albeit with a strategic 
purpose of making a deal.  The narrative in Extract 14 serves as evidence supporting Jocelyn’s 
claim about the causal link between her use of “twang” and her success in making business deals. 
It contextualizes Jocelyn’s shift “back” into “twang” by rhetorically embedding it into a contrast 
between two communicative situations that involved different social evaluations of “twang” 
constructed in relation to ingroup-outgroup dynamics of communication.  
In lines 1-14 of Extract 14, the first narrated situation of interaction depicts Jocelyn’s 
former business partners as having collective identities associated with two different, contrasted 
social groups: educated engineers and “good old boys.” This argument from group membership 
(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, pp. 322-323) constructs the social meanings of “twang” 
and its socioindexical properties in relation to the implied social characteristics and social 
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evaluations of these groups. These constructions of sociolinguistic indexicality associate 
presumptions about the social differences between the groups with the social effects of linguistic 
accommodation. The first type of group description characterizes its members in rather objective, 
factual terms as chemical engineers who ran oil companies in California and had Master’s 
degrees.  The second description, however, is based on a subjective, attitude-loaded perception of 
the cultural group membership of interlocutors. Jocelyn says in lines 11-12: “but you just thought 
they were just good old boys” - an expression which evokes a contrast between the high-status  
level of education and profession (“Master’s degrees” and “chemical engineers”) on the one hand, 
and, on the other, an identity of a “good old boy,” which evokes an image of a stereotypical 
Southern white male with relaxed and informal manners, “and often an anti-intellectual bias and 
intolerant point of view” (AHDEL 2016). “Good ol’ boy” is also a term that, in the popular 
culture, may refer to the stigmatized “redneck” persona (Cobb, 2005, p. 227). This term is 
introduced in lines 11-12 with a phrase “but you just thought”: The plurality and ambiguity in the 
meaning of “you” here constructs Jocelyn’s perception of “good old boys” as something that was 
not unique to her understanding, but as a more generalized and, hence, stereotypical perception 
that other people could have as well.  In line 12 of Extract 14, “good old boys” is modified by a 
pragmatic marker “just” which functions in a “diminisher” sense (Preston, 1993, p. 250), with a 
downtoning meaning (Aijmer, 2002, p. 158) of “this is not much.” In the argumentative context 
of the contrast between two different social identities of the characters in Jocelyn’s narrative, 
“just” is used to rhetorically downplay the social evaluation of the identity of “good old boys.” 
The co-occurrence of this term with a metaphor “old barbers” (line 9) contributes 
metapragmatically to establishing an indexical relation between Jocelyn’s attitudes and 
perceptions of the stereotypical social identity of the characters in her narrative and her 
unconscious linguistic choice of “going back to twang.”  
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The argument from group membership in Extract 14 is a support for Jocelyn’s claim in 
the beginning of the episode that there is a causal relation between a change in her speaking style 
and her success in making business deals. In lines 6-8, Jocelyn makes an explicit and unmitigated 
reference to this causal link when she says “and that’s why I got business, on a handshake 
because the way I spoke, was the way.” Causality is overtly marked here with “that’s why” and 
“because” – the connectives which express a discourse-level relation between propositions 
(Sanders & Stukker, 2012).  This causal relation between a linguistic and a social event creates an 
argumentative context in which Jocelyn and Sharon co-construct socioindexical links between the 
shift into “twang” and achievement of trust and “comfortable feeling” in interpersonal 
communication. These indexical associations underlie an explanation of the effect that Jocelyn’s 
linguistic accommodation had on her success in making business deals. This effect would not be 
possible, however, without the interlocutors’ recognition and acceptance of the implied 
socioindexical values of “twang.” Thus, one of the entailments of this metapragmatic construction 
is a cultural ratification of a socially “authenticating” (Bucholtz, 2003) value attributed to 
“twang” in this argument.        
  This context of successful linguistic accommodation and sociolinguistic authentication 
is contrasted in Extract 14 with another communicative situation in which Jocelyn’s use of 
“twang” leads to an opposite social effect of estrangement from Californians who started asking 
her “Where are you from?” This question signals to Jocelyn a perception of her use of twang as 
indexing outgroup behavior of somebody who is different and not “from here” (Myers, 2006).  
Otherization implicit in this question is what makes Jocelyn conscious of the “twang” in her 
voice. The contrast created in Extract 14 between the social effects of using “twang” in different 
communicative contexts highlights the indexical associations and dissociations that characterize 
the metapragmatic functioning of “twang” in relation to perceptions of the social group 
membership of the interlocutors.  
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In sum, Extracts 13 and 14 rhetorically construct “twang” as a linguistic resource that 
was acquired in the childhood and can be used for different strategic purposes, both consciously 
and unconsciously, bringing about different social effects and evaluations. The cultural, indexical 
values implicitly attributed to “twang” in these conversational episodes can thus be seen in terms 
of the processes of sociolinguistic authentication that Jocelyn, who presents herself as a former 
“twang” speaker, had to go through to create a sense of belonging in different social situations 
while navigating the landscapes of linguistic difference by flexibly moving in and out of 
linguistic identities.  
4.5.5  “Twang” and Social Boundaries of Lower-Class Whiteness 
The concept of “redneck” was first explicitly introduced into this conversation by the 
interviewer as part of a general question about the identity of “hillbillies,” “rednecks,” and 
“hicks” – the question which did not mention “twang.” The episode in Extract 15 is one of the 
participants’ answers to this question. This episode follows a short discussion of “Cowboy Talk” 
and its feature of vowel monophthongization in “oil” and precedes a discussion of the “Honey 
Boo-Boo” TV show whose stars are presented as “rednecks.”  
Extract 15: 
1    Joc:   I think of Little ↓Dixie (.) as the ↓redneck. That’s the most southern part of our=  
2    Sha:                                                              Uh-huh 
3     Joc:   [=state, the most ↓opi]nionated, (0.3) the most ↓opinionated_ (0.6) ↓conservative,  (1.2) 
4     Jen:   [and that’s ↓Durant.] 
5     Sha:                                                      Uh-huh  
6     Joc:   ↓prejudiced, (.) if you wonna say it_  (0.4) area of Oklahoma and that’s  I (.) put here_ 
7             (0.4) large twang. (0.4) [ Little Di]xie_ 
8     Sha:                                       [and a lot,]   
9     Int:   In that area? ((pointing to the map)) 
10   Sha:  A ↑lot of the- (0.3)  
11   Joc:   Durant [is where Durant **]  
12   Sha:              [falderal going on    ] down there.  
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13   (0.6) 
14   Joc:   A lot of what, 
15   Sha:   Falderal.  
16   (0.8) 
17   Joc:   Oh [uhm_  they also] are the most economically deprived.  [(0.6) in] the state.  
18   Sha:        [((chuckle))        ]                                                    [ right  ]    ◦uh-huh◦ 
19   Int:   ◦Yeah.◦ 
20   Joc:   Uhm 
21   (1.3) 
22   Joc:   But it’s ↑just so ↓sad but_  (0.6) the rednecks_ (0.9) they find something wrong=  
23   Sha:                                              uh-huh 
24   Joc:   =with everything. (1.2) other than themselves.  
Extract 15 starts by identifying the Southeastern corner of Oklahoma as “the redneck” while 
referring to this area with a widely-used local term “Little Dixie” which evokes associations with 
the Southern culture. This rural part of the state is often singled out by Oklahomans as a 
linguistically prominent area distinguished by the use of stereotypically Southern speech 
characteristics. One of the Oklahoman participants in Bakos’ (2013, p. 104) study, for example, 
described the Southeastern portion of the state as having “more of a hard drawl and twangy.”  
Dialectological studies confirm non-linguists’ evaluations by including the Southeastern part of 
Oklahoma into “the South” dialectal area based on both lexical (e.g., Southard, 1993, p. 233) and 
phonological (e.g., Labov, Ash, & Boberg, 2006, p. 148) variables in linguistic production.  
Jocelyn starts Extract 15 by saying “I think of Little Dixie as the redneck.” 
Argumentatively, in this episode, Jocelyn and other participants co-construct a classification of 
this geographical area in terms of a social group identity of “rednecks.” An argument from 
classification is usually (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008) “based on two main components: the 
description, or presentation, of the facts or events, and their classification, proceeding from 
properties presented in the definition itself” (p. 67). The argument in this episode supports the 
categorization of “Little Dixie” as “the redneck” with a co-constructed definition including 
several characteristics such as the properties of the personae type (e.g. “opinionated,” 
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“conservative,” “prejudiced” in lines 3 and 6, “find something wrong with everything other than 
themselves” in lines 22 and 24), economic status (e.g. “the most economically deprived in the 
state” in line 17), and characteristics of the speaking style (e.g., “large twang” in line 7 and 
“falderal” in line 15). Inclusion of several properties into one definition establishes a relation of 
association between them whereby “twang” becomes indexically associated with several concepts 
deriving from geographical, social and linguistic domains of reference. Thus, the argument from 
classification in Extract 15 metapragmatically links these associations into a network of meanings 
that, in the view of the participants, define the social category of the redneck identity.  
Categorizing “Little Dixie” in terms of the redneck identity establishes a spatial, cultural, 
economic, and linguistic differentiation of this particular area from other parts of Oklahoma.  The 
linguistic expression of this categorization involves the repeated use of the superlative degree of 
adjectives (“the most opinionated” and “the most economically deprived”) and degree modifiers 
(“a lot of” and “large”). This construction does not imply the exclusion of the “redneck” attributes 
from other areas of Oklahoma or other social identities. Rather, these linguistic choices contribute 
to construing the concept “twang” and several other proposed attributes of the redneck identity as 
gradient: a high degree of their presence within a group of people in a specific locale is presented 
as a characteristic feature of sociolinguistic distinctiveness. 
Definitions, especially the ethical ones, “are rarely, if ever, argumentatively neutral” 
(Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008, p. 67). Several attributes in the definition in Extract 15 are 
ethical and rely on the accepted systems of social values pertaining to a moral evaluation of 
personality traits.  This definition includes a number of concepts with negative connotations. 
Jocelyn’s expression of the affective stance of sadness in line 22 (“it’s just so sad”) explicitly 
marks her position with regard to the attributes of the redneck identity and assumes the 
unfortunate, undesirable character of this social, economic, and regional distinction. Inclusion of 
“twang” into a web of negative indexical associations reflects on the valorization of the term 
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within this conversational context, in spite of the absence of explicit negative evaluation of this 
linguistic phenomenon.  
  According to Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008, p. 67), “argument from verbal 
classification proceeds from semantic, endoxic, or shared properties of a definition.” In other 
words, in order for a classification to be accepted as valid and/or plausible, it has to rely on the 
shared popular opinion about the properties of the definition on which the classification is based. 
Furthermore, classifications and definitions are part of a more abstract level of conceptualization 
based on explicit or implicit generalizations that may be linked to stereotypes (Walton & 
Macagno, 2010, pp. 54-55) of the underlying social structures, norms, and values.  The 
association of “twang” with the “redneck” discourse which is co-constructed by the participants 
in Extract15 rests on the assumption of the sharedness of the cultural knowledge schema of the 
redneck identity among the interlocutors and in the wider community. Thus, inclusion of “twang” 
into this schema metapragmatically indexes the cultural associations of this folk-term not only in 
the interactional space of this conversation, but also at the macro-level of the social context of 
language variation.  
 The association of “large twang” with the “redneck” persona should be viewed in 
relation to the macro-context of the wide circulation in the US society of the negatively-charged, 
contemptuous depictions of “rednecks” as ignorant,  rural, poor, low-class whites who flout social 
conventions (Jarosz & Lawson, 2002; Hartigan, 2003) and resist “American mass society’s 
insistence on conformity” (Cobb, 2005, p. 226). It is important to consider a macro-social 
function of the “redneck” stereotype in delineating “a sharp division among whites, 
distinguishing those who are indelibly marked or unmarked in terms of class and region in 
relation to whiteness” (Hartigan, 2003, p. 101). Concepts such as “redneck” serve as “boundary 
terms” (Wray, 2006) while performing symbolic “boundary-work” (Lamont & Molnar, 2002) in 
social differentiation between  “lesser whites” and “an ideal type of whiteness considered 
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untainted, normative and superior” (Shirley, 2010, p. 57).  According to Lamont and Molnar 
(2002), “Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize 
objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and 
groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality” (p. 168). While symbolic 
boundaries function intersubjectively, social boundaries “manifest themselves as groupings of 
individuals” (p. 169). Seeing our discoursal data in light of the social role of the concept 
“redneck” in the US suggests that different degrees of “twang” may have indexical functions in 
ideological demarcation of the differences among identities of white Oklahomans along the 
dimensions of social class, economic standing, persona and behavior type, regional affiliation, 
and social stigma.  
In this conversation, indexical relations between “twang” and the social personae of low-
class white Oklahomans are created repeatedly, albeit indirectly, and some of these discursive 
constructions integrate participants’ individual experiences with language variety and their 
representations of the sociohistorical contexts of language variation, as shown in Extract 16 
below. Here, the participants co-construct these representations as they draw on the social 
memory of the Dust Bowl experience. This episode immediately follows a discussion of whether 
Oklahoma English is a distinct variety – the topic raised in the interviewer’s question.  
Extract 16: 
1     Sha:   ↑I don’t think we stand out. (0.5) [and (.) particularly] our lang- a- our English.  
2     Jen:                                                          [(***)                      ]                                                                                                                        
3     Int:   ◦Uh-huh_◦ 
4     Sha:   Er (.) [like (***)] 
5     Joc:             [WE ↓DID  ] (0.4) We did. (.) When I first went to San Francisco right out=  
6               =of Oklahoma_ (0.6) and that was the Oklahoma ↓twang.           
7     Sha:   ◦Uh-huh◦ 
8     Joc:   [And people remember_          ] 
9     Sus:   [***I’ve never heard it call***] ↓twang.= 
10   Joc:   =Well_ (.) the people who went to (.) California back in the ↓thirties in the Dust= 
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11             =Bowl_ (0.9) took the Oklahoma twang ↓with them. (0.9) [and so we didn’t think   ]= 
12   Sus:      uh-huh      [Good I’m glad they ***]  
13   Joc:   =[about it, (.) we] didn’t think about it. (0.9) but ^later (.) when I went in_ (.) 
14   Sha:   [((laughter))     ] 
15   Joc:   fifty-^nine there were_ (.) people there who had ^known Okies, (0.5) ◦>then we=  
16             = didn’t like to be called O[kies].<◦ (.) But_ (1.0) they were ones who would=  
17   Sha:                                              [^No::] 
18   Joc:   =identify_ (0.4) the way I was speaking as ^Oklahoma (.) cause they  heard what= 
19             =they had heard in the thirties.  
((57 sec. of omitted talk about “The Grapes of Wrath,” about the author of the book, the actors in the 
movie and when it was last shown on TV )) 
20   Sha:   Well and they were not ↓treated well when they went to ^California (.) Everybody thought= 
21              = they were-_  
22   Joc:   [Well they were talking about the language that was (***)] [and by the way_ (0.5)   ] 
23   Jen:   [They (***)  (0.6) poor white trash.                                    ]                                           
24   Sha:         [(***) white trash (***)] 
25   Joc:   Talking about the rednecks, (0.2) often they are considered_ (0.5) poor white trash. (0.2)  
26   Int:                                     uh-huh 
27   Joc:   Now if they are not ↓poor (.) they can be ↓rednecks. 
 
In the context of the talk about differentiation of Oklahoma English with regard to other 
varieties in the US, Sharon claims in line 1 of Extract 16 that the variety used in Oklahoma is not 
distinctive. Jocelyn then responds emphatically by saying “We did” in line 5 which redefines the 
temporal focus of the discussion and frames it in terms of reference to the past. She identifies 
“twang” as a feature of the variety used in Oklahoma in the late fifties and supports this argument 
by an account of her experience with Californians who recognized Jocelyn’s speech as 
characteristically Oklahoman – the variety that the migrants had brought to California during the 
Dust Bowl period. This argumentative move involves “twang” in discursive constructions with 
complex semiotic relations. A historical representation includes “twang” in the temporal and 
spatial domains of reference to the Dust Bowl period and creates a contrast between the 
Californian and the Oklahoman varieties. This contrast evokes a negative evaluation of “twang” 
in this episode in terms of the stigma associated with the undesirable attributes of the membership 
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in the social groups of “Okies,” “poor white trash,” and “rednecks.” Some of these negative 
evaluations are expressed directly in lines 16 (“we didn’t like to be called “Okies”) and 20 (“and 
they were not treated well”).  
Jocelyn’s identification of “the Oklahoma twang” as a feature of the “Okie” variety lends 
credence to the macroproposition “Oklahoma had a twang,” that she expressed and supported 
repeatedly in several other discourse episodes. While Susan occasionally opposes Jocelyn’s 
claims about “twang,” (as she does in line 9 of Extract 16, for example) the value of Jocelyn’s 
arguments is augmented through their “convergence” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 
471) on the same conclusion that “Oklahoma had a twang.” Jocelyn reinforces this 
macroproposition by advancing different types of supporting arguments during this conversation 
– the arguments that draw on various types of evidence and several domains of meaning which 
include historical, social, spatial, temporal, and language-related representations. These 
arguments and the complexity of the semiotic spaces they engage highlight the role that a 
particular folk linguistic concept may play in shaping language users’ conceptions of language 
ideologies.  
4.5.6  Folk Definitions of “Twang” 
While “twang” is a commonly used term, in everyday conversations speakers often rely 
on the assumptions about the shared understanding of its meaning and do not normally discuss its 
definition unless directly prompted by the interviewer. In the conversation analyzed here, the 
interviewer asked the participants for definitions of the terms they were using (Extract 10, line 7): 
“So what is a twang and what is a drawl?”  Jocelyn’s answer “It’s when you make two syllables 
out of one-syllable words” (Extract 10, line 8) does not clearly indicate whether she refers to 
“twang” or “drawl.” At the same time, during the conversation, she clearly distinguishes these 
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terms as defining features of variation in Oklahoma and Texas. In a follow-up individual 
interview with Jocelyn, she gave the following definition of “twang”: 
Extract 17:  
1     Joc:   Since we ↑talked last_ (0.2) about the differences between tra- twang and drawl= 
2             = I’ve (0.2) given (0.2) further thought to it. (1.0) because Oklahoma_ (0.6) people= 
3             =who_ (0.6) recognize the sound of an Oklahoman (.) speech, (.) talked about the= 
4             =Oklahoma (.) ↓twang. (2.5) In the South, they use a drawl. (2.2) And the twang, 
5             (0.6) is a sound that_  it’s almost nasal.  It’s a sharper sound (0.6) ((clears throat))  
6     Int:                                                                                                    uh-huh_ 
7     Joc:   than you have in the normal South. (0.5) It’s almost a shar- with a semi- twa-=  
8     Int:                                                 uh-huh_ 
9     Joc:   =with a semi-nasal quality. (0.9) And ↑many times in Oklahoma_ (0.2) it=  
10   Int:                                            uh-huh, 
11   Joc:   =included, (0.7) making_ (.) two syllables out of a one-syllable word.   
 
In addition to the process of diphthongization which Jocelyn referred to during the group 
conversation, this definition of “the Oklahoma twang” includes voice qualities of “nasality” and 
“sharpness.” This reveals a complex, multidimensional perception of “twang” that integrates 
information about segmental and prosodic characteristics of speech. Note that “nasality” is 
described in Extract 6 using a phrase “a semi-nasal quality”: this word choice presents “nasality” 
as a scalar variable and entails a partial attribution of this voice quality to “twang.” At the same 
time, the approximating degree modifier “almost” may evoke an “either-or” conception of totality 
(Paradis, 2000, p. 148) which suggests an attempt to describe the voice quality associated with 
“twang” as similar to “nasality” but also in some way different from it. 
“Sharpness” is constructed in this definition as a gradient phenomenon that is evaluated 
in comparison with “the normal South”: “a sharper sound” differentiates “Oklahoma twang” as 
having phonetic characteristics distinct from the “normal” Southern variety. It is not quite clear, 
however, which phonetic parameters may correlate with perceptions of greater “sharpness” in 
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“twangy” speech styles. As for the perceptual meaningfulness of the quality “sharpness,” it has 
been explored in psychoacoustic studies (e.g., Ellermeier, Mader, & Daniel, 2004; Fastl & 
Zwicker, 2007) which suggest that “sharpness” is one of the most salient perceptual dimensions 
of “sensory pleasantness” of sounds, and these two constructs are inversely related: greater 
sharpness tends to be evaluated as less pleasant-sounding. If “sharpness” is indeed a phonetic cue 
of “twanginess,” it may contribute to negative evaluations of “twang.”  
The feature of diphthongization pointed out by Jocelyn as characteristic of “twang” was 
also cited by Jennifer during the multi-party conversation. Jennifer commented on the speech of 
people from Durant - a town in southern Oklahoma where people “use a lot of diphthongs,” 
pronounce the word “well” as “wail,” and have a slightly slow “drawl” in their speech. This 
description portrays diphthongization as a feature co-present with “drawl” in the same 
geographical area which contradicts the argument that Jocelyn makes repeatedly during the 
conversation about a clear-cut distinction between the Oklahoma “twang” and Texas “drawl.”  
“Twang” is often contrasted with “drawl” which is repeatedly defined by the participants 
as “a slower way of speaking” and “drawing out a word.” The definition of “drawl” that Jocelyn 
provided in the follow-up interview (Extract 18) clarifies the distinction she makes between the 
two concepts:  
Extract 18: 
1    Joc:       But a drawl is ↑definitely <a slo:wer way of speaking and dra::wing out a wo::rd>. 
2    (0.4) 
3     Int:  Uh-[huh   ] 
4     Joc:              [That’]s where the dra::::wl_ [comes from. 
5     Int:                                                               [((chuckle)) 
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In lines 1 and 4 of Extract 18, Jocelyn imitates “the drawl” by considerably elongating 
her vowels and slowing her speech rate. Jocelyn’s performance of linguistic imitations illustrates 
the features she is singling out as characteristic of “drawl.” The imitations in lines 1 and 4 in 
Extract 18 make elongated vowels and a slower rate of speech more “present” to the audience. 
The length of “drawl” in line 4 is 0.85 seconds which is almost twice the length of “drawl” in line 
1 (0.44 seconds). These linguistic imitations support the preceding definition and strengthen 
Jocelyn’s argument about the definition of “drawl.”  
Although Jocelyn differentiates “twang” and “drawl,” clear distinctions between the two 
terms are not quite apparent in the folk-linguistic data from the “draw-a-map” experiments in the 
US. Cukor-Avila et al.’s (2012) study in Texas, for example, did not reveal clear geographical 
boundaries in the folk perceptions of the distribution of “twang” and “drawl”: “twang” was 
sometimes used by the respondents in opposition to “drawl” to distinguish parts of the state, but it 
was also common for participants to use these two concepts to describe the speech in the same 
geographical areas.   Future studies using both qualitative and experimental approaches may shed 
more light on the distinctions that non-linguists draw between the folk-terms “twang” and 
“drawl.”   
Although the linguistic realizations of “drawl” have been extensively studied, very little 
work has been done on the folk understandings of the concept, and there is still no uniform 
interpretation of the term among sociolinguists, as has been shown in Allbritten’s (2011) study.   
However, according to sociolinguists’ definitions of “drawl,” it involves “the lengthening 
and raising of accented vowels, normally accompanied by a change in pitch […] but does not 
necessarily involve a slower overall speech tempo” (Montgomery, 1989, p. 761). Feagin (2015, p. 
359) has defined Southern drawl as “diphthongization of lax front vowels.” “Twang,” on the 
other hand, has been described by sociolinguists as a nasal manner of speaking (e.g., Jacewicz, 
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Fox, & Lyle, p. 2009; Cukor-Avila et al., 2012). These specialist definitions do not seem to 
accurately reflect non-linguists’ understandings of these folk-terms: our discourse data suggest 
that diphthongization of vowels and “sharpness” of the sound (which may be a perception of 
sharp changes in pitch) may be perceived as features of “twang” distinct from vowel elongation 
associated with “drawl.” Another important difference is that “twang” is associated with a cluster 
of variables rather than “nasality” only. These differences are summarized in Table 1. Future 
studies using both qualitative and experimental approaches may shed more light on how non-
linguists perceive and conceptualize these salient folk linguistic stereotypes. 
  Table 1. Comparison of the specialist  and folk definitions of “twang” and “drawl”  




 (Montgomery, 1989); 
Raising of accented vowels 
accompanied by a change in pitch 
(Montgomery, 1989); 
Diphthongization of lax front vowels 
(Feagin, 2015) 
Vowel lengthening, 
 “drawing out a word”; 
Slower way of speaking 
 
“Twang” 
Nasal manner of speech  
(Jacewitz et al., 2009) 
Diphthongization of vowels; 
Sharpness; 
(Semi-) nasal quality 
 
4.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
This analysis suggests that the folk-linguistic concept “twang” has a complex 
socioindexical profile characterized by several value dimensions revealed in the local, rhetorical 
and interactional contexts of ideological constructions of social group identities and dialectal 
differences in American English. The language-related meanings of the folk-term “twang” 
revealed in the discourse analyzed here include a constellation of phonetic features, such as vowel 
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diphthongization, “sharpness” of the sound, and “nasality.” These findings are in contrast with the 
sociolinguists’ understandings of the term and highlight the importance of exploring the 
clustering of meanings in sociolinguistic indexical fields. As Tyler (2015) noted, “[i]ndexical 
fields may not be marked by a single core meaning, but instead have multiple cores that result in 
clusters of meaning” (p. 304). This study suggests that one of the possible approaches to the 
exploration of interrelations of sociolinguistic meanings is the analysis of the metapragmatic 
functioning of salient folk linguistic concepts and their networks of associations/dissociations 
built in language users’ own constructions of sociolinguistic indexical relations. 
  Constructions of “twang” discussed in this analysis rely on gradient conceptualizations of 
the social and linguistic features that become associated with “twang” through their inclusion in 
argument structures in everyday discourse. The rhetorical strategies of comparison and gradient 
representations (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 348) allow the speakers to establish more 
nuanced associations between the social and the language-related meanings of “twang” by 
placing them on pragmatic scales of interrelated conceptual hierarchies of values. Some of these 
values rely on assumptions about the “normal” social behavior that become linked to 
representations of linguistic stereotypes which serve to index symbolic boundaries distinguishing 
“untainted whites” from “lesser” forms of whiteness in the American South. As this analysis has 
shown, ideological meanings of linguistic variables invoked by the concept “twang” are 
implicated in the relationality of symbolic boundary work which establishes dissociations 
between social groups signaled rhetorically through the argumentative and other discursive 
strategies of metalinguistic belief construction in everyday interaction. Examining symbolic 
boundaries “allows us to capture the dynamic dimensions of social relations, as groups compete 
in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of 
classifications” (Lamont & Molnar, 2002, p. 168). 
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As revealed in this analysis, the discursive schemes of sociolinguistic valorization of 
“twang” are largely implicit. They are based on relating linguistic and social facts, behaviors and 
personae types to the values ascribed to them in folk rationalizations and typifications. The 
meanings constructed in such typifications are assumed to be shared and easily interpreted by the 
interlocutors. On the other hand, these meanings are contextualized through their embeddedness 
into the specific rhetorical and interactional contexts of communication.  
One of the implicit valorization schemes revealed in this study includes the rhetorical 
construction of the “vernacular authenticity” (Coupland, 2003) of “twang” in relation to several 
value dimensions including a positive value of solidarity and local group membership and 
negative evaluations associated with a social persona “redneck.”  These constructions of 
sociolinguistic authenticity are achieved with reliance on the indexical potential of “twang” to 
(de)authenticate social personae in terms of social group membership. These dimensions of the 
social meaning of “twang” have a macro-ideological function since they rely on a set of 
“enregistered” (Agha, 2007) cultural conceptions about the clusters of social and linguistic 
features indexing group identities. The participants’ concepts of “sociolinguistic authenticity” are 
thus involved in the interactional processes of self- and other-identification whereby speakers 
construct authenticity in discourse based on the strategic and rhetorical deployment of reflexivity 
in discursive representations of social meanings. This analysis suggests that qualitative 
investigations of folk-linguistic discourse may contribute to a better understanding of how 
participants’ concepts of “sociolinguistic authenticity” are involved in discursive representations 
of the social meanings that particular “performance spaces” (Coupland, 2003, p. 428) have for 
those who “occupy” them.  As Coupland (2003, p. 427) observed,  
Personal and social identities may be best seen as projects in the articulation of life-
options, rather than determined by social demographics: identities are never entirely 
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given, fully-formed or achieved, but aspired to, critically monitored and constructed as 
developing personal narratives. 
This analysis also suggests that a qualitative analytical focus on the data collected from 
respondents with an ambivalent linguistic and regional identity can shed light on the complexity 
of the processes of sociolinguistic authentication (Bucholtz, 2003). Encounters with out-group 
members which occur after leaving one’s “natural habitat” may heighten language awareness and 
stimulate reflexive reorientations in one’s linguistic behavior and attitudes. As a result, such 
encounters and the social influences they involve may lead speakers to learn to flexibly 
manipulate linguistic resources available to them in new social and linguistic environments. 
These socially variable situations of dynamic identity construction may put language users at the 
forefront of the creation and renegotiation of the social meanings of language variation (cf. 
Eckert, 2003, p. 393) which is an important factor in rehabilitation of such speakers from their 
marginalized status in sociolinguistics.  
The findings from the analysis discussed above illustrate the affordances of the rhetorical 
approach which uses argumentation theory as an overarching framework and complements it with 
insights and competencies derived from conversation analysis, interactional analysis, and 
sociological theory. The application of this method to the study of the meanings of a specific 
folk-linguistic concept has shown that it can be productive, since it can shed light on the 
complexity of sociolinguistic indexical relations constructed in discourse that is often overlooked 






DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Summary of the Theoretical and Methodological Proposals 
In this dissertation, I have proposed that  
1) sociolinguistic indexical relations may be studied in their actualization in 
metapragmatic discourse in terms of propositional processes of sociolinguistic 
indexicality; 
2) a sociolinguistic study may use as a starting point of analysis a specific salient folk-
concept that has local significance in its social context of use in order to explore its meta-
pragmatic functioning as part of context-specific activations of the fluid fields of 
sociolinguistic indexical relations;   
 3) the study of propositional processes of sociolinguistic indexicality may be approached 
using the rhetorical, discourse-based analysis as an overarching framework for the 
integration of analytical perspectives derived from argumentation theory, conversation 
analysis, interactional analysis, and sociological theory.
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5.2 Discussion and Conclusions 
The rhetorical approach to folk-linguistic discourse has the potential of illuminating a 
number of aspects of discourse-based argumentation, such as:  
1) rhetorical functions of overtly stated and presupposed propositions and their role in 
expressions of agreement and disagreement with interlocutors’ claims; 
2) metapragmatic and metasemantic features of support and refutation offered in response to 
propositions; 
3) speakers’ reliance on the background knowledge and belief structures that are assumed to 
be shared with interlocutors;  
4) types of inferential links involved in the construction of arguments about language;  
5) discourse-level argumentation strategies displayed in the choice of certain discourse 
genres and rhetorical structures for particular communicative goals.  
These affordances offered by the rhetorical approach render it suitable for a unifying framework 
that integrates analyses of meaning relations at several levels of discourse, including ideational, 
cognitive and interactional structures, as well as participants’ linguistic choices in the rhetorical 
development of conversational interaction. 
The rhetorically-oriented approach illustrated in this dissertation has been productive in 
its application in a study that takes a specific locally-salient folk-linguistic concept as a starting 
point of analysis. This methodological application in combination with its analytic focus has 
illuminated the richness and complexity of folk-metapragmatic conceptualizations of the relations 
between linguistic and social forms constructed during the propositional processes of 
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sociolinguistic indexicality. To sum up, the following metapragmatic aspects of these processes 
have been revealed in the application of the proposed approach:   
1) discursive processes of objectivation, essentialization, and reification of sociolinguistic 
distinctiveness; 
2) the dialectic relationship between subjectivity and objectivation in discursive 
constructions of sociolinguistic distinctiveness; 
3) discursive, ideological construction of the normalized and normative models of social 
and linguistic behavior revealing rhetorically- and interactionally-situated 
conceptualizations of standards, typifying norms, norm-ideals, and deviations from 
norms, as well as relations of these conceptualizations to the folk constructions of 
language standardization processes;  
4) discursive construction of the clustering of linguistic and social typifications of 
speaking styles and social groups; 
5) discursive construction of the clustering of linguistic features in terms of subtle 
gradations and conceptual hierarchies that reflect complex indexical profiles of speech 
styles;   
6) micro-contextual and macro-sociological processes of valorization that mediate 
discursive constructions of sociolinguistic distinctiveness; 
7) contextualization and rhetorical embeddedness of the enregisterment processes; 
8) conceptual relations underlying contextualized expressions of folk-linguistic theories 
that rely on the structures of common thought patterns and argumentation schemes 
realized through processes of association and dissociation of concepts; 
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9) context-specific, discursive constructions of folk-conceptions of sociolinguistic 
authenticity; 
10) discursive construction of symbolic boundaries between social groups, of cultural 
membership, and of group- and personae-based classifications.   
The analytic focus on a salient folk-concept “twang” has indicated that this concept is not 
uniform or unidimensional: it is not defined by one precise meaning in folk-linguistic 
conceptualizations. Rather, it serves as a locally-interpretable, subjectively and intersubjectively 
constructed conceptualization which links a number of macro-sociological and micro-
interactional representations from different domains of reference: geographical, temporal, 
sociohistorical conceptualizations, as well as identity-related and experiential processes. The 
multidimensionality of this metapragmatic function suggests that this type of analytic focus can 
be productive in exploring the complexity of sociolinguistic indexicality. 
Participants’ evaluations of sociolinguistic phenomena explored in this rhetorically-
oriented analysis are, primarily, not of the attitudinal nature traditionally sought in language 
attitude studies. Rather, this analysis shows that evaluations that underlie discursive constructions 
of sociolinguistic distinctions may be viewed as argumentative and conceptual in essence – they 
are evaluations of linguistic and social facts, of behaviors and persons in terms of their conceptual 
associations with or dissociations from other facts, behaviors, persons, and traits. These 
evaluations are viewed here as folk rationalizations of linguistic distinctiveness which rely on the 
use of certain folk-linguistic terms and social typifications whose meanings are, on the one hand, 
shared and easily interpreted by interlocutors, and, on the other, complicated by their 
embeddedness into the rhetorical and interactional context of communication. 
Overall, the applications of the rhetorical approach illustrated in this study have shown 
that exploring aspects of sociolinguistic differentiation in its actualizations in metapragmatic 
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discourse may allow us to view sociolinguistic differentiation not in terms of static “differences,” 
but in terms of the complexity and interrelatedness of meanings that arise in relation to both 
micro- and macro-social frames of reference. This approach may help address the simplification 
of the nature of sociolinguistic differentiation that is an inevitable consequence of using 
quantitative approaches. The rhetorical approach, and the unifying framework it offers for an 
integration of interdisciplinary discourse-based perspectives, is one of the methods that can 
complement quantitative techniques in sociolinguistics by illuminating the richness and 
complexity of language users’ own constructions of sociolinguistic differences in their complex 
interrelations with a host of other factors of interactional and more global, sociological nature.   
Using TNR theory of argumentation offers the benefit of attending to the role of 
conceptual relations between discourse elements, including inferential relations in the 
propositional development of discourse. Such relations are “basically indexical”: they participate 
in the evaluation and retrieval of “the contextual grounds of what is communicatively intended” 
(Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz, 2007, p. 484). This suggests that a theory of argumentation may be 
applied in the study of context-specific instantiations of a multilevel process (Silverstein, 2003) of 
sociolinguistic indexicality.  
One of the important advancements in viewing language ideologies in terms of 
indexicality has been made in the applications of Irvine and Gal’s (2009) theory of the semiotic 
processes of “iconization,” “fractal recursivity,” and “erasure.” In their classification, iconization 
involves representation of linguistic features in ways suggesting that the features somehow 
“depicted or displayed a social group’s inherent nature or essence” (p. 403). Fractal recursivity 
involves construction of oppositions “salient at some level of relationship, onto some other level,” 
such as intragroup oppositions projected to intergroup relations and vice versa (p. 403). Another 
semiotic process is erasure which simplifies sociolinguistic relations and “renders some persons 
or activities (or sociolinguistic phenomena) invisible” (p. 404). Studies of folk-linguistic 
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discourse (e.g., Hall-Lew & Stephens, 2012, Cramer, 2013) often rely on Irvine and Gal’s (2009) 
taxonomy in the interpretation of the meanings of discursive language-ideological constructions. 
This study, however, suggests that reliance on this taxonomy only in the analysis of complex 
metasemiotic processes may be limiting. Irvine and Gal initially described their theory of 
semiotic processes in relation to larger-scale ideological modes characterizing colonial discourses 
and other cultural practices that affected language structure. However, there is an important 
distinction between the processes that define sociolinguistic relations at the level of stereotypical 
representations shared in a community of speakers and propositional processes of sociolinguistic 
indexicality that employ discursive resources aimed at achieving contextually-situated rhetorical 
or interactional goals. If we analyze discoursal data in terms of rhetorical and interactive 
strategies rather than wider semiotic processes, we may be better positioned to uncover the 
semiotic complexity underlying the discursive construction of sociolinguistic indexical relations. 
This may help avoid rushing to conclusions about the wider significance of the data 
interpretations at the macro-level of language-ideological processes pertaining to the regional or 
national levels of shared metalinguistic awareness. While Irvine and Gal’s theory illuminates 
fundamental processes of language ideology construction at the macro-social level, it does not 
seem to reveal the conceptual complexity, ideological load, and richness of micro-contextual 
instantiations of these processes in everyday talk about language.   
However, the application of the rhetorical analysis has its own difficulties that are mainly 
related to the fact that, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p. 187) observed, components of 
arguments cannot be analyzed outside of their context of use due to “the equivocal character of 
language” and the reliance of argumentation on implicit meanings. Moreover, it is important to 
keep in mind that different interpretations of the same argument scheme are possible and each 
interpretation is “nothing more than a plausible hypothesis” of the mental processes in the mind 
of the speaker and the hearer. When interlocutors listen to others’ arguments, they construct their 
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own arguments, “which are usually unexpressed but which nevertheless intervene to modify the 
final results of the argumentation” (p. 189). Another difficulty, the authors acknowledge, is that 
the same statement may express several argument schemes (p. 188).  
These complexities may explain the fact that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) do 
not, compared to other argumentation scholars, formalize types of argument schemes as structures 
consisting of major and minor premises and a conclusion (e.g., Walton, 2008). Such formalization 
may ensure, to some extent, consistency in the analysts’ applications of the schemes, but such 
formalization imposes the form of interpretation and formulation of logical relations that may go 
against or do not adequately reflect the inherent equivocal nature and complexity of signification 
in the language of everyday argumentation as well as the  non-linearity of argumentation 
structures. By way of formalizing a scheme and providing a rigid structure to a generalized, 
abstract model of argument, argumentation theories aim at discovering the ways in which the 
logic of these arguments may be questioned in order to enhance the effectiveness of a critical 
discussion (e.g., van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; Walton, 2008). The description of argument 
schemes in TNR, however, does not pursue the goal of evaluating the logical validity of 
arguments. Rather, Perelman’s purpose is to explore the common and complex ways arguers 
make use of thought patterns to create pragmatic and rhetorical effects by particular linguistic 
means. This goal and the way it is achieved by TNR contribute to an understanding of larger 
philosophical questions pertaining to the nature of situated language use in everyday 
communication.  
The breadth and depth of TNR is what makes this theory an appropriate choice in the 
attempt to bring together the perspectives from the fields of discourse analysis and rhetoric. 
Argumentativity, common patterns of reasoning and inferential relations, as well as the processes 
of association and dissociation of concepts are integral, constitutive parts of discourse relations 
and discourse-based meaning construction. TNR approach, with its deep insights into the nature 
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of language viewed in the context of everyday argumentation, offers a framework that can be 
expanded and complemented by interdisciplinary perspectives to lay down the foundation for a 
theory of discourse argumentation. As Amossy (2009b) suggests, “rhetorical argumentation, 
examined in its discursive dimensions, can open a vast ﬁeld of linguistic investigation … 
discourse analysis should take logos into account by integrating in its descriptive approach the 
underlying argumentative structures of the discourse” (p. 323). The approaches which integrate 
rhetorical and discourse-analytic perspectives are needed in order to develop a discourse-based 
theory of argumentation, and at a more specific level of research interest, to develop the 
applications of such a theory in the form of an analytical, qualitative, content-based approach to 
discoursal data. 
This study has illustrated an analysis of the propositional nature of discursive 
representations of folk linguistic concepts as revealed in the associational structures of informal 
reasoning and defeasible argumentation contextualized in interaction among participants.  It has 
shown that these propositional processes of sociolinguistic indexicality engage experiential, 
affective, performative, perceptual, and identity-related processes: participants demonstrate these 
interrelated engagements in everyday metalinguistic discourse when they rationalize, justify, 
valorize, and illustrate their individual experiences with linguistic variability. Through these 
processes, speakers appropriate the meaning potential of linguistic variables and conceptualize it 
in discursive constructions of linguistic distinctiveness. The nature of these different facets of 
socioindexical discursive constructions needs to be studied further for a better understanding of 
their role in language-ideological processes. Such studies may also contribute to a better 
understanding of the processes of social knowledge construction as they relate to aspects of 
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PII                   personally-identifiable information omitted to preserve confidentiality 
-          (hyphen) an abrupt halt, a cut-off, or interruption in utterance  
=                        (equals sign) latching indicates the absence of noticeable silence between two 
turns or between parts of one turn 
[talk]                  (brackets) indicate the start and end points of overlapping speech 
(***)                speech which is unclear or in doubt in the transcript    
((italic text))     transcriptionist’s description of events 
bold type           a stylization, linguistic imitation,  caricature 
. (period) a falling intonation contour 
, (comma) rising, continuing intonation 
? rising intonation, as in a question 
Text_                   (underscore) level intonation 
↑                         sharp rise in pitch 
↓ sharp fall in pitch 
^ up-down variation in pitch 
v  down-up variation in pitch 




 (0.2)  timed pause in seconds 
text emphasis 
TEXT especially loud talk 
◦text◦                   talk that is markedly quiet or soft 
◦◦text◦◦ a particularly quiet voice, or whispering 
@text@ a smiley voice 
:, :: syllable lengthening 
<text>                 slower or drawn-out talk  
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